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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART XII.

CLOSED
UNTIL

1974

JANUARY TO JUNE 1928.

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PART XII.

JANUARY TO JUNE 1923.

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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XII.

[E 371/53/65]

No. 1.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 8.)(No. 11.)
My Lord,

Rome, January 5, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that Dr. Weizman, who spent two days in Rome on his return from Palestine, came to see me on the 2nd January, and had an interview of over an hour's duration with the President of the Council on the 3rd.

Dr. Weizman subsequently called at the Embassy to inform me of the results of this conversation. Signor Mussolini, in reference to the unsympathetic attitude of Italy towards Zionism, stated that the Zionists wished him to "faire le jeu de l'Angleterre," and this he was determined not to do. He repeated this phrase more than once, and appeared to Dr. Weizman to speak with some bitterness. He made use of the well-worn argument of Great Britain's design to split the ring of Moslem States by a Jewish Palestine, and referred to the refusal of your Lordship and M. Poincaré to allow the mandate question to be reopened to enable him to insert one or two points of importance to Italy.

Dr. Weizman pointed out the unreasonableness of this last request in view of the fact that the approval of the previous Italian Government had been given to the present mandates. With regard to Signor Mussolini's contention that Zionism was a tool in the hands of His Majesty's Government to weaken the Moslem States for the benefit of the British Empire in the East, Dr. Weizman, whilst denying that this was in any way the case, said that, even if it were so, Italy stood to gain as much as Great Britain by a weakening of Moslem power. Signor Mussolini admitted that the Arabs had been giving him trouble in Cyrenaica and Tripoli, and implied that he had no confidence in them.

Signor Mussolini raised the question of Italy obtaining concessions in Palestine, and also securing an outlet there for emigration. Dr. Weizman was able to show that by the terms of the mandate itself there could be no policy of favouritism which would debar Italy or any other country from participating in the development of the country. To enable emigrants to live and to be absorbed, a considerable outlay of capital was necessary; the Zionist organisation provided funds for its own immigrants, but the Palestine Administration was short of funds, and any scheme for importing Italian labour would have to be backed with Italian funds.

Dr. Weizman was struck by the mediocre character of the arguments adduced by the President of the Council, and by his superficial acquaintance with the subject, although, in the circumstances, little else could be expected. In the end, Signor Mussolini consented to allow Dr. Weizman to announce to a meeting of Jews that evening that he would have no objection to the name of an Italian Jew being put forward for appointment as a member of the Jewish agency in Palestine—the body provided by the terms of the mandate as the official channel for bringing Jewish opinion before the British Administration. Dr. Weizman was very pleased with this concession, as being likely to have considerable influence over Italian Jews, who, like other

elements in Italy since the advent of the new régime, have been adopting a non-committal attitude.

Later in the evening, one of Signor Mussolini's secretaries informed Dr. Weizman that his Excellency had been much impressed with the conversation, and that he had ordered a memorandum on the subject to be prepared for him.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 151/46/91]

No. 2.

Foreign Office to Emir Abdullah.

Your Highness,

Foreign Office, January 11, 1923.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th November reviewing the history of the movement for Arab independence, and suggesting that certain steps should be taken by His Majesty's Government in order to give effect to the principles which inspired that movement and to recognise the special position of King Hussein in Arab countries other than the Hedjaz.

2. It is observed that in paragraph 4 of your Highness's letter the claim is made that Great Britain promised to work for "the establishment of a great Arab Kingdom." I am to remind you that no such pledge was ever given to King Hussein by His Majesty's Government. The actual promise of His Majesty's Government made in Sir H. McMahon's letter to King Hussein of the 24th October, 1915, reads as follows:—

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances, and make the following reply to your letter:—

"Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherref of Mecca."

Thus the promise to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within certain territorial limits was qualified by specific reservations which have always been held by His Majesty's Government to exclude Palestine and West Syria from the scope of the undertaking.

3. From the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1916 it has always been the aim of His Majesty's Government to co-operate, in the spirit of the above undertaking, with the Arab leaders in securing the freedom of their people from Turkish rule. His Majesty's Government have consistently pursued this policy to which they hope that full effect will be given in the treaty of peace to be concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey.

4. Animated with these intentions and desiring to place their relations with the Hashimite Government on a satisfactory footing His Majesty's Government initiated negotiations last year for the conclusion of a treaty which was signed at Amman on the 8th December, 1921, by you, on behalf of King Hussein, and by Colonel Lawrence on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

5. This instrument, which up to the present remains unratified by the King of the Hedjaz, does not, in the view of His Majesty's Government, who are bound by similar agreements with other Arab rulers, in any way conflict with the realisation of Arab unity. But His Majesty's Government are convinced that the only sure basis on which such unity can be established is the mutual trust and friendship of the various Arab rulers who alone can fuse into one people the diverse element over which they exercise control.

6. His Majesty's Government viewed with benevolence the establishment in Iraq and Transjordan of rulers who, as members of the Sherrefian family, enjoy an exceptional opportunity of promoting close intercourse between their respective

territories and the Hedjaz. Nor have His Majesty's Government failed to afford those rulers material and moral assistance in order to help them to consolidate their position. The ratification of the treaty referred to in the fourth paragraph of this letter would have enabled His Majesty's Government to furnish King Hussein also with a measure of financial support.

7. Pending the coming into force of that instrument, however, His Majesty's Government have necessarily confined themselves to using their influence to promote the cause of peace and neighbourly relations amongst the chieftains of Arabia, and the success of the recent pilgrimage season bears witness alike to the efficacy of their action and to the tact and prudence displayed on that occasion by the King of the Hedjaz.

I am, &c.
D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 531/531/89]

No. 3.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received
January 12, 1923.)

(No. 355.)

My Lord,

Damascus, December 30, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to give below an extract from the "Réveil" concerning the recent activities at Aleppo of the Council of the Syrian Confederation, which also gives the names of the various members of the sub-committees:—

"Le drapeau syrien fut arboré, blanc et vert, avec, au coin, les couleurs françaises.

"Après les discours prononcés par Soubhi Bey Barakat et M. du Caix, les membres du conseil pénétrèrent dans la salle des débats.

"Cette première séance fut consacrée à la formation de quatre commissions, constituées comme suit:

"Commission des Finances: Farès Khoury (Damas), Alexandre Salem (Alep), Nassiri Isahar (Alaouites), Ibrahim-al-Ghondy (Alaouites).

"Commission de la Justice et des Wakoufs: Taher Atassi (Damas), Cheikh Ourfali (Alep), Innail-al-Aouch (Alaouites).

"Commission des Travaux publics et de l'Agriculture: Amin Agha Iéghan (Alep), Djaber Abbas (Alaouites), Néjeb Barazzi (Damas), Mansour-al-Halki (Damas).

"Commission des Affaires civiles, du Commerce, de l'Instruction publique et de la Santé: Sami Pacha Mourdoum Bey (Damas), Rachid Moudarrès (Alep) Abdul-Wahad Haroun (Alaouites)."

2. The federation voted that there should be no "Governors" of independent States, but only valia or mutessarifs responsible to the federation. Hakki Bey-el-Azm, Governor of Damascus, resigned two days ago, and it is believed the vali will be Ata Bey Ayoubi, the recent Mudir of the Interior.

It is further thought that Bedia Bey Moayad (cousin of the ex-Governor), Mudir of Justice here, who recently spent several months in Paris, and whose declarations there to the French Parliamentary Committee appear to have given satisfaction, will be appointed Mudir of Justice for the Syrian Federation. He resigned at the same time as his cousin the Governor, but in his case his resignation was not accepted by the French délégué. The Governor himself has never been popular.

3. If true, I regard the appointment of Ayoubi with some mingiving, as I rather expect he will prove to be an obstructionist. I fancy his nomination would be a proof that the French are really relaxing to a slight extent their grip on local departments, as I am not sure that he would be their own nominee.

4. The Medjlis Shura will probably be abolished.

5. It will be seen from the above that many economies will undoubtedly be effected.

6. The federation will move to Damascus, theoretically for one year only, and return to Aleppo the next year. My own belief is that, once here, they will try and stay here, with only occasional short sittings at Aleppo.

7. The remarks quoted below—also from the "Réveil"—show that the federation

[10594]

is now becoming a serious proposition and not a mere paper fiction, as it was long considered :—

" Les pensions de retraite.

" Par ordre de la Direction générale des Finances, les paiements des pensions de retraite et des allocations de mise en disponibilité seront suspendus à dater du 1^{er} janvier 1923. Ces sommes devront être portées, à partir de cette date, sur le budget de la fédération.

" Départ.

" M. Schoeffler, délégué du Haut-Commissaire par intérim, accompagné de M. Georges Aziz, Secrétaire général de la Direction des Finances, s'est rendu à Beyrouth pour assister à la conférence qui sera tenue prochainement au Haut-Commissariat sur les questions fédérales et à laquelle prendront part tous les délégués auprès des États syriens.

" Des mesures d'économies.

" Les postes de percepteurs en chef des impôts ont été supprimés dans les cazas de Hauran, Kuneitra, Nebek, Wadi Ajam. On prévoit également la suppression des postes des adjoints au Moudirial dans les cazas de Meamié, d'Ezra et de Joub-el-Yarrah."

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 653/653/91]

No. 4.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 15, 1923.)

(No. 92. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, December 31, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period 1st to 31st December, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL.

Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Jeddah Report, December 1 to 31, 1922.

Pilgrimage: Quarantine Dues.

THE Hedjaz Government have raised their quarantine dues for next season's pilgrimage from P.T. 37½ to P.T. 50. Of this sum, 40 piastres is for quarantine dues and the remaining 10 piastres for landing permit dues. These dues are charged at the fixed rate of exchange of P.T. 112 to 11. gold and the Hashimite Government have asked that the shipping agents should, as in previous years, collect the dues in the price of the ticket and pay them to the Hashimite Government.

When we consider the dues at other quarantine stations one cannot object to this increase, but there is no doubt that the pilgrimage is becoming yearly more expensive and compares very unfavourably with the pilgrimage expenses in the time of the Turks. We have calculated that the minimum expenses in the Hedjaz for an Indian pilgrim are, approximately, 264 rupees; this does not include steamer ticket, customs dues, food and water and other necessities of life. It is calculated that the Hashimite Government receive in taxes about 78 rupees, or, approximately, 5l., per pilgrim, so the Government revenue from the pilgrimage must be considerable.

2. The Soudan Government have issued, in "Soudan Government Gazette," No. 404, of the 15th November, 1922, "regulations for the protection of Soudan pilgrims and native passengers travelling by steam vessels and native craft to and from the Hedjaz." I do not think these regulations will facilitate the passage of the Soudan pilgrims. Some of the regulations are vague and some, in my opinion, are too severe for such a short journey.

Regulation No. 4 says that sufficient boat accommodation shall be provided for all passengers and crew; this is a physical impossibility in the small steamers plying

between Suakin and Jeddah with the number of pilgrims they are at present authorised to carry, and it is also impossible in the case of native dhows. Even on the Indian pilgrim steamers only a small number of boats, depending on the tonnage of the ship, are insisted on; sufficient life-belts only are compulsory.

No distinction is made in the regulations between steam vessels and native craft. This is unfortunate, because these two means of transport offer entirely different problems. Steam vessels take approximately eighteen hours on the journey; native craft, with an unfavourable wind, may take many days on the journey.

Slave Traffic.

Another batch of slaves, eighty in number, arrived in Jeddah on the 1st December. This batch came by the same route as the preceding caravan, viz., by sea from Midi to Kufuda and then overland from Kufuda to Jeddah. In consequence of the arrival of these caravans the price of slaves in Jeddah has fallen about 33 per cent.

H.M.S. "Corulower" arrived on the 7th December after patrolling the coast south of Jeddah. The commander informed me that the Political Officer at Hodeida reports that the Idrisi is taking strong action in the slave question and that the receiving and distributing centre for the slave traffic has been changed from Midi to Taif, which is just beyond the Idrisian frontier.

King Hussein, to show his attitude towards the question of slavery in the Hedjaz, sent me the copy of a petition from a Tekruri slave woman whose master, to whom she had borne a child, wished to sell her and her child, contrary to religious law. The King, I presume, intends to take action against the master.

Emir Abdullah.

His Highness the Emir Abdullah arrived on the 5th December and left again on the 21st December. Emir Ali and Sheikh Fund-el-Khatib, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, came to Jeddah to meet him, and he was given an enthusiastic reception.

The Emir was in excellent spirits and gave graphic descriptions of his visit to London, but during his brief stay in Jeddah he did not discuss politics to any extent, though he told me that he hoped to persuade his father to sign the Abdullah-Lawrence Treaty. In this, apparently, he failed, because in a letter written on the 9th December, King Hussein stated that his hesitation to sign this treaty and the Treaty of Versailles was not due to arrogance or pride, but because he was afraid that, by signing, he might irrevocably lose the trust of his country and the confidence of his people.

Turkish Notables.

Mustapha Gabri, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, Riza Tewfik Bey and other Turkish notables arrived on the 5th December along with Emir Abdullah, and all left for Mecca on the day after their arrival. Riza Tewfik Bey returned with Emir Abdullah and left for Egypt on the 21st December. His future movements were uncertain, but he said he thought he might go to America.

General.

1. Arif Bey Darwish has been released by the authorities in Syria and he arrived in Jeddah on the 26th December. He will proceed to Mecca.

2. Nabib Lotfallah has been appointed Hedjaz Ambassador at Rome and has been accepted by the Italian Government. The "Qibla" says that other Ambassadors will shortly be appointed in Europe and America and advertises for clerks for these Hashimite agencies. Candidates will require training in the office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

3. It is reported from Medina that two more caravans have arrived there from Nejd. The last caravan was robbed by the Beni Ali a few miles from Medina, but word was sent to Ibn Saud who said that members of the Beni Ali tribe in Nejd would make good the loss, so all the stolen goods have been returned.

It is said that Ibn Saud has opened the caravan road purposely for three reasons. The first is that he wants to create good feelings between himself and the inhabitants of, and the tribes around, Medina. The second reason is that there is a large number of medjadies in Nejd and the caravans are changing the medjadies into gold at a very favourable rate of exchange. The third reason is that it is possible for these caravans

to purchase large quantities of rifles and ammunition and in the Awali village, two miles east of Medina, occupied by the Beni Ali, there is a large supply of stolen rifles and ammunition. Shereef Shahat is supposed to be deeply involved in this traffic.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Press Summary: The "Qibla."

No. 640, November 30.

The Sultan of Turkey: His telegram accepting gratefully King Hussein's invitation to Mecca, whither he will proceed when circumstances permit.

No. 641, December 4.

Publishes the appeal to the people of Palestine, issued by the Palestinian Committee in Cairo, to be true to the delegation and its aims.

Expresses sympathy with the objects of the Angora "Society for the Protection of Children."

Reproduces the views of the Constantinople correspondent of the "Ahran" on the question of the Caliphate, with the characteristic comment: "Here they are discussing the subject in the name of Islam, and yet they contradict themselves by calling for democracy and Western methods."

No. 642, December 7.

Arrival of the Emir Abdullah: Enthusiastic reception at Yembo and Jeddah of His Highness, accompanied by King Hussein's Turkish guests.

Our Doctors: Thabit Bey has come back from Bagdad.

Martyrs of the Fatherland: Commemoration of a Syrian publication celebrating the patriotism of Arab notables killed by the Turks during the war.

No. 643, December 11.

Emir Abdullah: Description of his reception in Mecca, the prolonged manifestations of joy, &c.

Inconsistency in first principles: Condemnation of the Syrian publication referred to above for reproducing an open letter from Shekib Arslan to the Emir Ali, of objectionable tone. Sayed Ahmed El Senussi, also represented in this compilation, is asked what good he thinks he is doing at Diarbekir. Both the articles to which exception is taken date, I believe, from five years ago.

The Caliphate: Articles from the "Ahran" by Hadib-ud-Din Khatib (late editor of the "Qibla"), the gist of which is that nothing remains of the Caliphate except the name. The "Qibla" finds no one fitted for the Caliphate who is not prepared to give a promise to act in strict accordance with the Koran, unqualified even by the "Iasha'lish" of Ali-ibn-Abu Talib.

No. 644, December 14.

Decorations: The 2nd Class of the Nahda for Thabit Bey and for the Bair-ul-Baladiga of Amman.

"A reader in the capital" has another smack at Shekib Arslan and his open letter to the Emir Ali; the "Qibla," in its characteristically dignified way, makes an insulting pun on the author's name.

No. 645, December 18.

Decorations: The list includes the names of Sheikh Foad-el-Khatib, the Emir I Lah and members of his suite, and the editor of the "Qibla."

Official announcement: Recapitulating declarations by King Hussein indicative of his disinterestedness and submission to the will of the Arab people, for the benefit of an anonymous letter-writer in Haifa.

Syrian-Palestinian Conference in Cairo: A notice issued by the Executive Committee defers the discussion on policy until after the conclusion of negotiations at Lausanne.

The ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey: His refutation of the charge that he was a tool of England, reproduced from the "Ahran."

No. 646, December 21.

The Emir Abdullah: Left for Transjordan via Egypt on the 21st December. Farewell!

No. 647, December 25.

Official notice. Quarantine and passport dues: P.T. 90 (i.e., approximately E.P. 75) will be collected in respect of every individual arriving in the Hedjaz; P.T. 40 by way of quarantine dues and P.T. 50 for the local passport office.

Hashimite Ambassadors in Europe: Habib Lotfallah has been nominated Arab Hashimite Ambassador in Rome, and the Italian Government have telegraphed their agreement. Other appointments will be announced in due course.

Young men wishing to be employed as clerks in the Arab Hashimite agencies (to be established) in Islamic and other countries are invited to apply. A course of training in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mecca will follow appointment.

No. 648, December 26.

Order of El Nahda: With jewels for His Majesty King Fuad of Egypt, and without for the Egyptian Prime Minister of Egypt and other notables. The Emir Abdullah invested King Fuad on his way to Transjordan.

Aref Bey Darwish gets a 3rd Class of the Order.

Officially communicated: A recapitulation of King Hussein's declaration of his constant ideal of Arab unity, as to which a mischievous section of the press professes to doubt.

The "Bark" of Syria explains King Hussein's invitation to the ex-Sultan of Turkey on grounds of mutual benefit from the protection of His Majesty's Government; the "Ba," on grounds of true sympathy and Moslem sentiment. The latter journal is commended, and the former reproved.

Arrival of a noble patriot: Syed Aref Darwish has returned from leave.

Shipping Intelligence to December 31, 1922.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo Discharged.
Mansourah	British	Port Sudan	Suez	Dec. 1, 1922	Dec. 3, 1922	Packets 515
Dakshieh	"	Suez	Port Sudan	" 5, "	" 5, "	771
Assara	Italian	Masana	Suez	" 7, "	" 7, "	1314
Dakshieh	British	Port Sudan	"	" 11, "	" 12, "	245
Mansourah	"	Suez	Port Sudan	" 15, "	" 15, "	447
Assara	Italian	"	Masana	" 16, "	" 16, "	57
"	"	Masana	Suez	" 21, "	" 21, "	85
Mansourah	British	Port Sudan	"	" 21, "	" 22, "	2172
Hedjaz	"	Bombay	"	" 28, "	"	12451
Dakshieh	"	Port Sudan	"	" 31, "	"	2600

H.M.S. "Corusflower" arrived on the 7th December and left on the 9th December.

[E 867/867/39]

No. 5.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

Beirut, January 10, 1923.

THE year 1922 has ended with Syria and the Lebanon apparently quiet and with public security reasonably good.

I gather from the reports of His Majesty's consul at Aleppo that the district round Antioch is now less disturbed, while the brigandage which in the autumn made the roads to Baalbek and Damascus somewhat unsafe seems to have diminished.

The latter part of the year was marked by the disappearance of numerous French officials, who will not be replaced, and the Haut Commissariat is no longer the miniature Ministry that it was. The number of Frenchmen employed in Grand Liban has also diminished. The exact French representation there does not yet

appear to have been settled, but it seems likely that most, if not all, of the advisers in the districts will disappear, being replaced by a few inspectors. This does not, I fear, mean that the Lebanese are any more capable than they were of administering their country, but the calls of economy are imperative. The French naval officer who acts as Governor continues to hold that post. There was at one time a strong rumour that he was going, and there has undoubtedly been a good deal of intrigue on foot, to which some of his compatriots were not alien. However, intrigue and self-interest seem to be the guiding motives in the Lebanon. An attempt has been made to improve the judiciary, and something in that line may have been achieved, but even now the administration of justice leaves much to be desired. The police and gendarmerie is also a weak spot, the police being apparently both inefficient and underpaid, and therefore unreliable. Nothing has yet been made public as to the new judicial organisation which is to deal with foreign cases when the Capitulations are suspended, but the French appear to have decided, as, indeed, they had to, to disregard local protests and to impose French judges in at least the principal courts.

The main event of the year is, I suppose, the birth of the Syrian Federation. How this experiment will work remains to be seen, but it will not all be plain sailing. The venture is one in which M. de Caix is much interested, and he has since his return devoted much time to it, so much so that the Lebanese are now complaining that they are being neglected. According to him, considerable economies have already resulted, and it has been possible to get rid of 2,000 officials, petty employees, gendarmes, &c. It seems pretty certain that Damascus will be the Federal capital, but this is distasteful to Aleppo, and suggestions have been heard that it would be better to choose neutral ground, such as Homs. The Alawite State is none too enthusiastic at its inclusion in the Federation. Its inhabitants are politically less developed, and, being Shi'ahs, do not desire any close communion with States where Sunnis predominate. The Alawites are, from all accounts, fairly satisfied, and appreciate the advantages of their new roads and schools. Though, from opposite reasons, neither Jebel Bruze nor the Grand Liban desire, or are likely to desire, inclusion in the Federation. The former prefers its special form of non-government, while the latter wishes to retain all its old privileges, with, if possible, a lion's share in the customs receipts. At the same time, there are signs of an agitation in the coast towns for annexation to the Federation. Mazbatas to this end have been circulated in Tripoli and, it is said, in Beirut also. Naturally, the Moslems would like to join up with an entity which is predominantly Mahomedan.

I do not think it can be said that the French are any more popular than they were, but, as almost every complaint, when examined, boils down to a matter affecting the pocket of the complainant, this is not surprising. Trade has undoubtedly been bad all through the year. No great relief is expected from the customs agreement with the Kemalists, the terms of which have not yet been made public; the uncertainty of the political situation keeps off such buyers as there are in the interior of the country itself, and the fall of the franc, which took with it the Syrian piastre, has not improved matters. We undoubtedly did an ill service to the country in introducing a stable coinage in the shape of the Egyptian pound during our short occupation of Syria. If a depreciated franc had succeeded a much more depreciated Turkish piastre, most people would have felt that they had gained something. As it is, with a constantly fluctuating franc succeeding the practically stable Egyptian pound, everyone is displeased. Just now there is talk of an improving situation, but this may be only due to the optimism engendered by a new year.

The future is uncertain, and rumours are plentiful. When Muhieddin Pasha was here negotiating the commercial agreement, it was believed that he was really arranging for the cession of some parts of Syria to the Ankara Government. The knowing ones could even indicate where the new frontier was to pass. The French may have had some idea of a rectification of frontier, even possibly a liberal one, but the Kemalists are in disgrace, and the present popular belief seems to be that the Emir Abdullah is to be Emir of Syria. The possibility of an Anglo-French mandate is even discussed. The Lebanon will, of course, remain outside, whatever happens. It is, in any case, surprising how widely the belief is held by many, including Europeans, that the French are not going to remain. Even the special message to the contrary recently sent by M. Poincaré and published in the local press has not availed to dispel this belief.

However this may be, there is no doubt that the local French military authorities are seriously perturbed as to what the spring will bring forth. They believe that the Kemalists have collected forces which are a threat to both Irak and Syria. They have, therefore, the mass of their troops assembled in the north of Syria, from

Alexandretta to Euphrates. The flattering belief that, whatever might happen to Mosul, Syria would escape no longer prevails. Only the other day M. de Caix stated to me that, if any attack was made on us in Irak, they would inevitably be embroiled too, here in Syria. If a civilian might venture an opinion as to the French troops in Syria, it would be that they are at present insufficient in number and, with certain exceptions, not of first-class quality.

How the Moslems would view a Turkish incursion into Syria is difficult to estimate. Undoubtedly they were both flattered and pleased at Mustapha Kemal's rout of the Greeks and subsequent defiance of the Western Powers, so that they were, while secretly somewhat perturbed, disposed to pass over his treatment of the Caliphate. But they can hardly quite have forgotten the past, and, above all, their obligatory military service with the thousands of Syrian soldiers sent to the Yemen never to return. Turkish agents constantly visit Syria, and some pass on to Palestine. This is easy with practically open frontiers.

I doubt whether much importance is attached locally to the goings on of the self-appointed Syrian delegation at Lausanne. These people, who claim to represent the country, never seem to visit Syria itself.

Both Syria and the Lebanon are sheltering large numbers of refugees, both Greeks and Armenians. Some of the Greeks have been shipped away, but they are still coming in. As regards Armenians, many are in the greatest want, and even without shelter. The French do what they can, and the American Near East Relief looks after orphans, but much remains to be done.

Nothing yet is known as to the future of General Gouraud, and the question of whether he will or will not return affords matter for discussion when other subjects fail.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[N 431/312/97]

No. 6.

Memorandum respecting Co-operation of Moslem Countries and Russia.

(Secret.)

ACCORDING to information from secret sources the Kemalist Government looks askance on attempts which have been recently made by Russia to organize a Moslem federation. The pan-Islamic policy in favour at Angora leads rather to a Turco-Afghan-Persian alliance without the participation of Russia, and efforts are being made towards this goal.

2. It appears that the Soviet Government originally proposed the formation of a bloc consisting of Russia, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and possibly other Moslem States, the object being to enable Russia to exercise an influence over Moslem Nationalist movements and to direct them into channels not detrimental to Russian interests. A conference of the four Powers was, as we know for certain from secret sources, to be held in Moscow for this purpose in the latter part of 1922. The proposal, however, fell to the ground owing to obstruction on the part of Mustafa Kemal, ostensibly on the grounds of the impossibility of carrying out such a project while the Lausanne Conference was in progress, and on account of difficulties connected with the entry of Afghanistan into the bloc. It would seem, however, that the real motive behind Mustafa Kemal's objections was a disinclination to allow Russian participation in pan-Islamic schemes, and a preference for developing the union of Islam on purely Moslem lines rather than in co-operation with Russia, the latter course being considered as certain to result in arousing the distrust and hostility of Europe, and, therefore, to be fraught with no little danger to Turkey.

3. The Angora Government appears, therefore, to have taken the initiative in approaching Afghanistan and Persia, with a view to a tripartite treaty. The reported intention to despatch Captain Ismet Bey, formerly aide-de-camp to the late Jemal Pasha, on a special Kemalist Mission to Afghanistan is perhaps to be connected with these negotiations. From secret sources we know certainly that proposals of this nature were made in November at a special conference at Angora attended by Mumtaz-ud-Dowleh (the Persian envoy), the Afghan envoy and Mustapha Kemal himself. The Persian attitude was at that time unfavourable, and the question was postponed.

It has been reported that the following provisions, which show a general resemblance

[10594]

to the terms of the Turco-Afghan Treaty, are suggested as the basis of the new tripartite treaty:—

1. The purpose of the treaty is defined as the strengthening and development of the natural friendship already existing between the nations by virtue of their community of religion and their geographical position.
2. Each party will abstain from any action calculated to disturb security within the others' frontiers, or subversive of the others' independence. Each party will likewise make every effort to suppress all activities hostile to the interests and welfare of the other parties.
3. In the event of foreign aggression against any party the others will immediately afford every possible assistance.
4. If any party considers it necessary to wage war in the name of God, to safeguard the glory and welfare of a people of the Prophet, the other parties will co-operate by every possible means.
5. No party shall enter into any engagements with a third Power without first obtaining the consent of the other parties.
6. Agreements may, however, be concluded with other Moslem Powers without preliminary consultation to obtain the other parties' consent, provided the other parties are duly informed.
7. The duration of the treaty is limited to twenty-five years.

4. These negotiations have apparently become known to the Soviet Government, which regards them with strong disfavour; and on the 26th November, 1922, Aralof, acting upon instructions from Moscow, is reported to have made a strong protest on the subject to the Ankara Government and to the Afghan and Persian envoys at Ankara. In each case, however, he was informed that the countries in question considered the matter to be entirely the concern of their respective Governments, who intended to settle the question among themselves. It was explained that the proposed treaty referred solely to Islamic matters, and that, consequently, there was no necessity for any Russian protest.

5. Several reports have been received to the effect that the treaty has actually been concluded. That this is not the case, however, appears from a report that Muhieddin Pasha, the newly-appointed Kemalist envoy to Tehran, arrived in Constantinople early in January, bearing with him the draft of the proposed treaty for submission to the Persian Government. It is understood that arrangements have likewise been made to submit the draft at Kabul for approval. The departure of Muhieddin Pasha from Constantinople is reported to be delayed pending the receipt of further instructions from Ankara.

6. The avowed aim of the pan-Islamic policy thus actively revived by Mustafa Kemal is said to be to secure the liberation of all Moslem countries from European domination, and to make the Caliphate the basis of a temporal and spiritual union among them. Each nation will, it is suggested, be completely independent, but will be bound to other Moslem countries by offensive and defensive alliances. The ultimate object of the policy is, however, stated to be to make the Caliphate the recognised guarantor of the independence of every Moslem country, with the final result of Turkish hegemony over the whole Islamic world. It seems probable that Ankara, in abolishing the Sultanate, hoped to strengthen the religious appeal made to other Moslem countries in the name of the Caliphate, since it was thought that the appeal, if associated with the Sultanate, might arouse in those countries fears for their hard-won independence. At the same time, if European Governments complained against interference by Turkey in the affairs of other Moslem nations, the reply could be made that, while the Turkish Government would never so interfere, and had no desire for territorial acquisition of any kind, it was only natural for Moslem countries to aspire towards unity under their Caliph.

7. Another instrument of this policy is reported to be the Jemiet-ul-Islam, recently revived, it is understood, under the presidency of Akif Bey. This society is reported to have decided to convoke at an early date, in accordance with the wishes of Mustafa Kemal, a pan-Islamic congress, to which representatives of all Moslem countries will be invited. In addition to general Islamic affairs and to the Caliphate question, the congress is apparently to discuss the formation of a League of Moslem Nations, in opposition to the European League of Nations.

8. In view of these tendencies to purely Moslem co-operation, without the participation of Russia, the Third International is reported to have decided to intensify propaganda throughout Afghanistan, not only with the object of spreading Communist

doctrines in that country and in India, but also with a view to combating the impetus which would be given to pan-Islamic propaganda by the conclusion of a Turco-Persian-Afghan Treaty. In view of the heavy expenditure in foreign currency which would be involved, it is understood that a special meeting of the Third International is to be convoked early this month to discuss ways and means. It is also stated that, in view of the new tripartite treaty, the Soviet Government intended to concentrate considerable military forces in Turkestan, as a means of exercising pressure on the Afghan Government.

Foreign Office, January 26, 1923.

[E 1083/45/91]

No. 7.

Sir H. Rumbold to Dr. Naji-el-Assil.—(Communicated by British Delegation (No. 94); Received in Foreign Office January 29.)

Lausanne, January 26, 1923.

Sir, I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to refer to the letter from this delegation of the 6th January and to the telegram from His Majesty King Hussein to you of the 16th January, of which you were good enough to give a copy to this delegation, regarding the proposed Anglo-French declaration for a Moslem council to advise upon the upkeep and maintenance of the Hedjaz Railway.

2. Very careful consideration has been given to his Majesty's telegram both by the British and French Governments, but in view of the present delicate situation in the Moslem world, the British and French Governments think it preferable to leave the selection of the president of the council to the free choice of the Moslem members of that body. Clearly the selection of the Mashikhat of Medina will not be excluded by that procedure.

3. A copy of the text of the declaration is enclosed herein.

I am, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Proposed Anglo-French Declaration.

LES Gouvernements de France et de Grande-Bretagne, agissant au nom de la Syrie, de la Palestine et de la Transjordanie et désireux de reconnaître le caractère religieux du chemin de fer du Hedjaz, se déclarent prêts à accepter la constitution d'un conseil consultatif ayant qualité pour fournir à l'administration des différentes sections de ce chemin de fer situées en Syrie, en Palestine, en Transjordanie et dans le Royaume du Hedjaz, toutes recommandations tendant à assurer l'entretien de la ligne et à améliorer les conditions de transport de pèlerins. Ce conseil comprendra quatre membres musulmans, désignés respectivement par la Syrie, la Palestine, la Transjordanie et le Hedjaz, et désignera lui-même son président et deux autres membres parmi les ressortissants musulmans d'autres pays intéressés au pèlerinage. Il siégera à Médine.

Les recommandations de ce conseil ne devront pas être en opposition avec les stipulations des conventions sanitaires internationales. Les Gouvernements de France et de Grande-Bretagne déclarent qu'en ce qui concerne les sections de chemin de fer situées en Syrie, en Palestine et en Transjordanie, tous les bénéfices laissés par l'exploitation seront affectés à l'entretien et à l'amélioration de l'ensemble du chemin de fer. Toutes sommes que cet entretien et ces améliorations laisseraient disponibles seront affectées à l'assistance des pèlerins.

1. *Managers' Satisfaction to the Marquess's Work of Administration* (received 12 April 1911)

My Lord,

Beirut, January 19, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that there is at present some tension between the Maronites and Druses in the Shouf district.

The trouble began on the 15th instant, on the evening of which a motor-car with four Maronites from Deir-el-Kamar on its way to Beirut found the road blocked by a cart near the village of Kafarhoun. The passengers on alighting to remove the obstacle were greeted with a volley. Three of them and the chauffeur were killed outright, the fourth passenger was slightly wounded, but came on to Beirut and advised the authorities.

The latter sent up a force of police and gendarmes with a French officer, Captain Clair, and yesterday the Governor of the Grand Liban told me that he had applied to General de Lamothe for French troops to be sent up both to restore confidence and prevent further trouble. Also that the Secretary-General and the Director of Public Instruction, a Druse, had been sent to exhort all parties to calm. The French troops have now been sent.

One of the local papers announces that a Druse was killed on the Deir el-Kamar road near Maraba on the 17th, but it is believed in Beirut that several Druses have been killed in different villages. There is naturally a good deal of nervousness on the part of the Christians.

"La Syrie" attributes the trouble to outside influence, having its origin in French intrigues and not in the internal dissensions of the country. The Governor said something in the same sense, although he mentioned no names, so this is probably the official explanation. Ali Bey Joumlutt, the kaimakam of the Shouf kaza, has resigned.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

E 1292, 1, 44

No. 11

Dr. Najid-el-Assil to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (Communicated by British Delegation, Lausanne (No. 107); Received in Foreign Office, February 2.)

My Lord,

January 29, 1913.

I HAVE been authorized by His Majesty King Hussein to send to the Peace Conference of Lausanne a letter, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith to your Lordship.

Jan 30

NAJLEL-ASNIL

Enclosure in No. 2.

Dr. Naji-el-Asul to the Secretary-General, Lausanne Conference.

Monsieur,

Le 29 janvier 1923.

AU moment où la conférence est en train d'aborder la discussion définitive de la frontière septentrionale de la Syrie et de l'Irak, Sa Majesté hachimite le Roi Houssein m'a autorisé d'exposer à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Considérant que la Conférence de la Paix de Lausanne a été principalement convoquée dans le but de conclure la paix entre les Alliés et la Turquie, le Gouvernement hachimite arabe s'est abstenu de demander sa participation active aux débats de la conférence; mais il se taisait dans la conviction qu'aucune question affectant de près les intérêts du peuple arabe ne serait discutée à son insu ou sans son intervention. Une fois cependant que le Gouvernement turc a accepté la délimitation des frontières et d'assimiler sa position à celle sur l'Alsace et la Moselle, lequel est sans doute une partie intégrale de l'Etat arabe de l'Irak, le Gouvernement hachimite se trouve forcé à soulever la protestation la plus énergique contre les prétentions sans fondement de la délégation turque à cet égard.

Les engagements solennels de la Grande-Bretagne et de ses Alliés donnés à Su-
M. S. P. 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2

L'attitude loyale du Ministre des Affaires étrangères britannique, appuyé par ses Alliés dans cette conférence, en ce qui concerne les promesses données par son Gouvernement et ses Alliés à Sa Majesté hachimite et aux Arabes, nous permet de croire à ce que nul arrangement d'une nature à nuire aux intérêts politiques et économiques des Arabes n'ait lieu dans le règlement définitif de la paix entre les Turcs et les Arabes.

Après 1111 1884
M. s. c. potentiaire de
Sa Majesté haïmonite.

E 1658 46 91

43 14

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

17

Foreign Office, February 13, 1923.

Dr. NAJI EL-ASSIL, the representative of King Hussein, called at the Foreign Office on the 6th instant on his return from Lausanne. He said that on the afternoon of the 4th day last Pastafors had sent him a telegram from Lausanne, had sent for him spontaneously. Ismet had begun the conversation by asking what was the result of the visit. Dr. Nassif said he would prefer to talk about the relations between the Turks and the Arabs. Ismet then said that the Arabs had joined the enemies of the Turks and fought against them, but that all this was past and the only thing that was important was the future of the Arabs. He was speaking for the Arab National Congress, the Grand National Assembly, and he said that the Arabs were not going to be divided. He said that the Arabs were not going to be divided and spoke of the Caliph as being the head of the whole Moslem world.

Turkey towards the Arabs and King Hussein, observing that this was the first occasion on which it had been so defined.

3. Dr. Najj stated that nothing further passed in this conversation, but that he had previously conversed with Colonel Tewfik Bey, a military member of the Turkish delegation, to whom he had spoken of the unfortunate impression created by the statement of Riza Nour Bey concerning the Arabs' military strength. Dr. Najj saw a strong contrast between the explicit statement made to him by Ismet and those earlier pronouncements of Riza Nour.

4. Dr. Naji was sounded as to whether Jamet had hinted in any way at a federation of Turkey and the Arab countries. He was quite positive that Jamet had said nothing beyond affirming Turkey's readiness to respect Arab independence and explaining the Turkish view regarding the position of the Caliphate.

[illegible]

6. Dr. Naji was asked how he regarded Ismet's declaration as differing from the first article of the National Pact. He said that it was a declaration of the principle of self-determination specially designed to leave a loophole for the Arabs themselves to decide to come again into the Turkish sphere. That was the significance of the self-determination formula given in article 1 of the National Pact. On the other hand, Ismet's present declaration meant that Turkey disinterested herself in the Arab countries from a political point of view. Dr. Naji added that he regarded this declaration as the logical sequel of Turkey's practical composition of her difficulties with England. Turkey had realized at

Lausanne that the Arab countries, with England's help had become definitely separated from Turkey.

7. Dr. Najî also stated that he had telegraphed Ismet's declaration to King Hussein, who had replied as follows:

"Inform Ismet in the best possible manner that in future Turkey may regard us as neutrals. Inform our friends at the same time that this declaration and our answer will make no difference to our established relations."

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 1890/1890/89]

No. 11.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord,

Beirut, February 6, 1923

WITH reference to the fourth paragraph of my despatch No. 7 of the 10th January, I have the honour to report that on the 24th January the Acting French High Commissioner and the Governor of the Grand Liban visited Tripoli to investigate local grievances.

Among the demands presented were the following:—

1. Permission for Tripoli to enter the Syrian Federation, or, failing that, to revert to its pre-war status as capital of a sanjak, or to enjoy full financial and budgetary autonomy in keeping with its present status as an autonomous township ("municipe autonome").
2. Reduction of rates on the D H P. Railway.
3. Reduction of lighterage charges. Improvements to quay and custom offices.
4. Re-establishment of a passport office at Tripoli.
5. Revision of the valuations made under the new law regarding the taxation of buildings.
6. Establishment of a daily postal service by motor car between Tripoli and Beirut.

Even the first demand, which at first sight appears to be primarily of a political nature, is probably based on the belief that, as Tripoli serves as a port of entry for towns in Syrian Federation, it would be financially more advantageous for the town to belong to that federation. Also, of course, it could only be pleasant for the Moslems of Tripoli, who are in a large majority, to be attached to a State which is predominantly Moslem. The other demands are, with the exception of No. 5, merely intended to favour the growth of Tripoli as a commercial centre, and they are quite natural. The question of railway rates, which are admittedly high, has for some time been under examination by a commission.

The grievance mentioned under No. 5 is not peculiar to Tripoli. It is general throughout the Grand Liban. The new system is that landlords now have to pay a low tax on the real rental value of their property instead of a high tax on an absurdly low assessment made in the time of the Turks.

I understand that, although on his arrival M. de Caux was, as the creator of the Syrian Federation, warmly received, the warmth soon wore off when he refused to accept the position of a mediator between the Government and the Governor of the Grand Liban or the Representative Council, already existed for the putting forward of the questions with which the petitions dealt.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

[E 1891/1223 89]

No. 12

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 25)

My Lord,

Beirut, February 7, 1923

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 19th January regarding threatened trouble between Druses and Maronites in the Shouf district, I have the honour to report that, as the result of the enquiry held by the procureur général of the Court of Appeal, it is believed that the murder at Kafarhin was the result of a mistake. On the day it took place two members of the band of Hassan Tabet, a brigand who has for a year been terrorising the Bekaa Sanjak, were due to be transferred from Baaklin to Sidon. An attempt was to be made to release these two men, but instead the band held up and killed a party of harmless travellers.

Things seem to have settled down, and any danger there may have been of real troubles between Druses and Maronites has, it may be hoped, passed.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

[E 2256 206 65]

No. 13

Question asked in the House of Commons, February 26.

Mr. Mosley asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the mandate for Palestine has not been fully ratified, he will state from what source the present Government in that country draws its authority; and whether that authority empowers it to hold elections?

Answer.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: The position is that the mandate for Palestine was conferred upon His Britannic Majesty by the principal Allied Powers at San Remo in April 1920. On the 3rd October, 1921, the president of the Council of the League of Nations, Mr. Wilson, in his capacity of President of the Council, issued a statement that the Government should continue to carry on the administration of Palestine in the spirit of the draft mandate, which had previously been submitted to the council, until such time as the position had been definitely regularised. On the 24th July, 1922, the Council of the League approved the terms of the mandates for Palestine and Syria, and passed a resolution that they would enter into force automatically and at the same time as soon as the Governments of France and Italy had notified the Council of the League that they had reached an agreement on certain particular points in regard to the Syrian mandate. It is true that agreement has not yet been reached, but this in no way affects the administration of Palestine. On the 10th August, 1922, a Palestine Order in Council, of which the draft had been officially communicated to the Council of the League on the 1st July, 1922, and which provided for the holding of the elections referred to by the honourable Member, was passed by the King in Council. This order took effect on the 11th September, 1922, when it was published and proclaimed in Palestine.

[E 2345, 2204 89]

No. 14

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, February 12, 1923

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13, Secret, of the 1st instant, the British vice-consul at Alexandretta reports that the French military authorities, apprehending an attack by the Turks or "chetés" (bands) against Alexandretta, are digging trenches round the town and surrounding it with wire entanglements. They have also placed about thirty machine guns at commanding points, while the town entrances are closed to traffic from 8 P.M. to 6 A.M. Moreover a gunboat of the "Lévin" class is now stationed at Alexandretta.

There is a general expectation of "chete" trouble in the spring. There are symptoms of incipient insecurity on the A. road, where several drivers and travellers have recently been shot. A "chete" raid on the village of Zibeh, south of Aleppo, at the end of the winter.

The Turkish Mutesarrif of Nisibin recently passed through Aleppo on his way to take up his post. He expressed very friendly sentiments towards the French and said that the Turks had definitely renounced Syria. He was a superior type of official, well educated and active.

Mustafa Kemal appeared on the scene in the winter. He was accompanied by several officers and others, who exposed them as French agents. The French authorities are doing their utmost to prevent the undesirable advertisement of the Turkish national hero.

The new Turkish Mutesarrif of Nisibin recently passed through Aleppo on his way to take up his post. He expressed very friendly sentiments towards the French and said that the Turks had definitely renounced Syria. He was a superior type of official, well educated and active.

Mustafa Kemal is shortly expected at Adana, where, according to some American naval officers who recently came thence on a flying visit to Aleppo, great preparations are being made to receive him. The Senousi is said to be still at Tarsus, where he is expected to accompany Mustafa Kemal to the Iraq front.

Aleppo is on the whole favourable to the Turks and anti French. The Moslems favour the Turks, because they think that the native Moslems are more practical and better mentally equipped, are bound to prosper to their detriment under a European Power, which would maintain security and a certain degree of equal opportunity.

These Arab Moslems imagine no doubt that the Turks would be prepared to grant them a measure of autonomy more satisfying to their aspirations than the French mandatory régime. The Christians, however, are far from friendly to the French. Doubtless they are disappointed that the French do not show them undue favour, but endeavour to work with the Moslem majority. But the main reason of Christian discontent is economic. The artificial separation of Aleppo from its Anatolian markets as a result of the war and the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement has brought Aleppo trade to a standstill. For a race of middlemen the present situation is almost intolerable. I am inclined to think that it is only apprehensions for their personal safety which restrain many Christians from desiring the return of the Turks and the restoration of that economic unity on which Aleppo prospered. Fortunately, the spectacle of the continual flow of Christian refugees from Anatolia into Aleppo is of a nature to strengthen those apprehensions.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

E 2441 600 89]

No. 15.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Beirut, February 20, 1923.

With reference to your despatch No. 17, Confidential, of the 19th January, the following particulars regarding Ihsan Bey-el-Jabri, with whom Mr. Picot Gordon conversed on the 10th January, may be of interest. They are derived from what I believe to be a reliable source.

Ihsan Bey is a member of a well-known and influential Moslem family of Aleppo, and is himself of good reputation. Before the war, and up to the armistice, he was attached to the Palace at Constantinople. He was then invited to Damascus by the Emir Faisal and appointed to be one of his Chamberlains. He left Damascus with the Emir, and went with him to Europe, where he has since remained. He was at Lausanne with Michel Lutfallah, Emir Shekib Arslan and other members of the Syrian Union Party. He is for complete independence and the abolition of mandates.

I venture to disagree with much of Ihsan Bey's statements as recorded by Mr. Gordon. I cannot bear that any party bearing the name of the "Party of Action" exists in Syria, and I presume that it is merely intended to describe the more active of the opponents of the French mandate. I venture to doubt whether any party at

present exists which is capable of bringing off an "armed insurrection." The renewal of band ("chete") activity in Northern Syria, and especially round Antioch, is, as Mr Smart has already reported, most likely, but the motive power will in that case once more, as in the past, be furnished from over the border. The country is already well supplied with arms.

Turkish propaganda is undoubtedly active in both Syria and Palestine, and finds its most suitable soil in Aleppo. It is practically impossible to close the frontier to Turkish agents.

The Emir Abdullah has for some time past been mentioned locally as a possible rival for the throne of Syria, but there are no signs that the French desire to accept him, or that he has become a *persona gratia* to them. His visit of courtesy was of course paid to M. Ghandi, French Consul at Aleppo.

I do not see how the French can make a treaty with a united Syria on the lines of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The Syrian Federation is but newly born and it is far from united. Aleppo is jealous of Damascus, and the Alaouites are suspicious of both. As for the Lebanon, it only desires to remain in isolation.

It is true that the French will be the first to fall an easy victim to the first comer. They would, I think, in case of attack, at once claim as a right French military assistance not only in arms, munitions and advice, but also in men and money, putting no faith in Anazeh sheikhs or in any other Bedouin. I believe that the French will be forced to advance guards for anything in return for a suitable subsidy regularly paid.

It is true that they will not face reality, and that they are anxious to see Syria as a united whole. The fact is that they must therefore rely on the French, stand alone in any shape or form and that they must therefore rely on the French. They may not always have received as much help from the French as they had the right to expect, but there can be now no question of a French "colonisation" of Syria. The French will be forced to advance guards for anything in return for a suitable subsidy regularly paid.

In one point Ihsan Bey is undoubtedly correct, and that is in regard to the badness of the present northern frontier of Syria; but that is the result of the Angora Agreement, which was, as is now largely recognised, bad business.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW

[E 2477 653/91]

No. 16.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 10. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, January 31, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah Report for the period the 1st-31st January, 1923.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Damascus.

I have, &c.
W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Jeddah Report, January 1-31, 1923.

I have the

HIS Majesty King Hussein arrived in Jeddah on the 13th January. He was accompanied by Emir Ali, many of his Ministers, and a large contingent of the mounted infantry from Iraq. He was accompanied by regular horsemen and a contingent of the mounted infantry from Iraq.

His Majesty, who was suffering from a cold, had a bad cold and had aged considerably since his last visit to Jeddah in June 1922. I noticed also that, in discussing political questions, he had not the same power of concentration, and had a tendency to change the subject without having come to any decision on the former question under discussion.

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Apart from the usual ceremonial visits and a visit by the King to H.M.S. "Carnflower," King Hussein called here on the 15th. He was accompanied by his son, Prince Abdul Hakim, and his brother, Prince Ali. The King discussed the question of the receipt for subsidy payments. King Hussein said he felt that His Majesty's Government had changed their policy towards him, and are now treating him as an enemy and not as a friend. He did not know what offence he had committed to cause this treatment. If it was because he had not ratified the treaty, he was ready to make a treaty with Great Britain which would last for ever, but that we do not want him to do so, and we will not take his advice on Arab and other Eastern matters.

The ex-Sultan of Turkey arrived on the steamship "Manasourah" on the 15th. King Hussein met him on board, while the Ashraf and other notables were present. The streets were lined with infantry, camel corps and cavalry. The ex-Sultan was given a house, one of the best in Jeddah. I called on him officially on the afternoon of the 16th. He called on the same day. He left for Mecca with King Hussein on the morning of the 20th, and arrived safely in Mecca on the 21st. Mecca was decorated in his honour.

Mr. Crane, the American, arrived on the same steamer as the ex-Sultan. He returned to Egypt by the steamer which left Jeddah on the 22nd. During his stay he was a royal guest, and every opportunity was afforded him to see Jeddah and to study native conditions. A Bedouin feast and dance was arranged on his behalf in the neighbouring village of Beni Malik, about 3 miles from Jeddah.

Pilgrimage

The first pilgrim boat for 1923 arrived from the Dutch East Indies on the 27th. The second pilgrim boat has reached Kamaran and will arrive here on the 1st February.

It is said that Nemazi has chartered five steamers for conveying Javanese pilgrims to Jeddah. As a result of this competition the fares have been reduced from 360 to 180 gilders.

The authorities in Java have, for the first time, allowed the issue of single tickets, and the Dutch consul in Jeddah has protested strongly to his Government. But it is still uncertain if, as it was at one time anticipated, the Javanese pilgrimage will be phenomenally large. The attitude of the native press in Java is anti-Arab and does not encourage the pilgrimage.

The pilgrims who arrived on the 27th were quarantined for twenty-four hours in Jeddah, even though the boat had been to Kamaran, and not a single case of sickness occurred during the voyage.

The price of the health certificate for all passengers and pilgrims leaving the Hedjaz has been raised from 20 Turkish piastres (1 mejidie) to 40 Turkish piastres (2 mejidies). This has not yet been officially notified in the "Kibla".

Aviation

Five new Russians, one pilot and four mechanics, have arrived in Jeddah during the month. Constantine Yanni went to Egypt, nominally to meet a relative but really to obtain more mechanics and pilots. The total strength of the Russian personnel in the flying corps is now two pilots and five mechanics.

Turkish Refugees

The first batch of Turkish refugees, thirty-one in number, arrived from Egypt on the 26th. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Mecca telephoned to me before their arrival to say that one of these refugees, called Mowser Bey, is suspected to be an Agent of the Egyptian Government. He will be kept under strict surveillance. King Hussein has refused to accept more of these refugees, provided that they will accept the same conditions as accepted by these thirty-one, and that no people of doubtful character should be included. He asked me to inform the High Commissioner in Egypt that two Turks, called Mahmoud Pasha Nahir and Ragab Bey, should not be allowed to proceed to the Hedjaz. I understand from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they consult the ex-Sultan of Turkey in these matters and accede to his wishes.

General

1. Mr. MacAndrew arrived on his motor yacht "Harpado" on the 19th and left for the Soudan coast on the 26th. He informed me that he has been very well treated during his sojourn on the Arabian coast. He was able to call on the King and thank him personally for the courtesy extended to him during his stay in Hedjaz waters.

2. It appears that the Shereefian steamer "Tawil" has been detained in Suez because of a claim for arrears of pay raised in the Egyptian Courts against the Arab agent by two Italian engineers previously on that boat. The King protested to me against the action of the Egyptian Government in not informing him officially on the matter, but I understand that he has forwarded money to Egypt to meet the claim of the two engineers.

3. Dr. Granville, the president of the International Quarantine Board in Alexandria, is expected here on the 1st or 2nd February to discuss quarantine matters with us and with the Hashemite Government. King Hussein, during his recent visit to Jeddah, said he would endeavour to return to Jeddah to meet Dr. Granville, but since then he has nominated Dr. Thabit to represent him in any discussions which may ensue. He has also instructed the kaimakam to give Dr. Granville every facility to inspect the quarantine arrangements at Jeddah.

4. Recent reports received from Medina show little improvement in the conditions there. A British subject, a member of the Indian community, arrived safely in December without any trouble, but an Indian who followed him about ten days later was robbed of everything, and has been unable to obtain redress.

Mulla Abbas, a prominent member of the Jeddah Indian community, has recently returned from Medina. He had to wait three weeks there for permission to visit the tomb of Syedna Hamza, about 2½ miles from Medina. When permission was obtained, fifty soldiers were sent to occupy the road, but these were promptly fired on by Bedouin and had to retreat. Mulla Abbas finally visited the tomb by going to the Bedouin and obtaining permission from them.

Another Indian, who was proceeding with his wife and family to settle in Medina, was robbed of everything at Bir Ali. He said that only the Indians in the caravan were robbed.

It is rumoured that some of the Magrabis, recently imprisoned in Medina for participation in the explosions at the Medina Arsenal, have escaped, and that the Government have offered a reward of 10L. per head for any information which might lead to their recapture.

Jamil Pasha, the commandant of the Medina garrison, has arrived in Jeddah, and has proceeded to Mecca. It is said that he has been dismissed because of some irregularities in the pay sheets of the soldiers under his command.

As no further caravans have arrived in Medina, the prices of foodstuffs have again risen.

5. All Arabic newspapers coming to the Hedjaz by mail to private individuals are now confiscated by the Government and are not delivered. People visiting the mail boats are carefully searched on their return to the shore. This has given rise to all kinds of rumours in Jeddah, as it is thought that the Government are trying to hide unfavourable news about the conditions in Mesopotamia and in Turkey.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Press: "Al Kibla."

No. 649, January 1, 1923.

Rain. Heavy rain fell in Mecca and the neighbourhood on the 31st December, and the prospects for agriculture are good.

Cost of Living. We learn that King Hussein has ordered the Hedjaz Railway to be repaired at his personal expense. It is expected that it will be available for pilgrim traffic during the coming season.

The Newspaper "Al Kibla." The "Al Kibla" is a commendable effort of this journal's independent Arab correspondent in its polemics with Al Ra'ul An-nabi of Beirut, extract from its pages of an article from an American review flattery to King Hussein.

The Hashemite Government's Position. On the one hand we have the violent criticisms of our present policy, on the other, our respect for our pledged word and

our conviction that present kaleidoscopic conditions are not propitious to a change. *Al Kibla* publishes a copy of Mr. ... *Day News* of the 21st November, 1922, and an appeal by the (1) "Political League of Peoples," signed by Messrs. Harrison and Broadhurst, both strongly advocating the redemption of British pledges to King Hussein.

No. 650, January 4, 1923.

Official Notice.—The public is reminded that stringent penalties are enforced against those exporting gold from the Hedjaz.

Kemalists and the Ashraf.—A Turkish paper has published details of the ex-Sultan's expenses in supporting the Ashraf and other "leeches," and congratulates Turkey on having ensured an economy by cutting out these expenses. "*Al Kibla*" raises the question of the ... *Wakil* ... King Hussein ... to the Prophet's daughter and on to Abraham, to show that the leeches in question are of holy lineage.

An Important Message.—The "*Sunday Times*" of the 26th November, 1922, ... by the formation of an Arab State from Suez to Basra under a single ruler, with the "Caliph of all the Moslems" in Mecca. His Majesty's Government would thus keep their promise of 1915. "*Al Kibla*" applauds this sentiment, but adds: "The Caliphate is, however, and has been for centuries, no more than a name and a word, devoid of real meaning. But we do not hold that there is no place in which it could be revived."

The "Executive Committee of the First Conference of the (Arabian) Peninsula in Mecca" registers its gratitude to those British sympathisers with the cause of Arab independence whose letters and articles "*Al Kibla*" now publishes.

No. 651, January 8, 1923.

Our Exalted Guest.—Sultan Mohammed Wahid-ud-Din has left Malta for Jeddah. **The Caliphate.**—Four columns of a letter from an anonymous contributor to "*Al Hakika*" of Beirut (No. 1759), criticising the action of Ankara in depriving the new Caliph of temporal power. His artistic prowess, emphasised in an Egyptian paper, does not strike the "*Kibla*" as a Caliphian quality of tradition.

The Indian Press.—The declaration of the Afghan Minister in London that the Kemalists' action was contrary to the principles of Islam, are quoted from the "*Wakil Roznash*," of Amritsar, of the 2nd December, 1922.

"*Al Kibla*" endorses the opinion expressed by King Hussein: "The Caliphate is dead. May God comfort Moslems for its loss. But should the world of Islam agree to consider anyone, wherever it be, as Caliph, we will recognise him on condition that he acts in accordance with the Book of God and the teaching of His Prophet."

The "*Sah'feh Hozaneh*," of Hyderabad (Deccan), speaks of the *entente* between Syrians and the Arabs and the Kemalists, and doubts whether King Hussein and Ibn Saud will accept Turkish control again.

"*Al Kibla*" shares this doubt, quotes King Hussein's telegram to the Lausanne Conference, and reaffirms the Arab aim of complete independence within neutral boundaries.

The "*Mashrik*," of Gorakhpore, of the 2nd November, 1922, foresees a visit by Mustafa Kemal to Mecca, to discuss matters with King Hussein. The King's statement ... *Al Kibla* ... such discussion.

"*Al Kibla*" says that if Mustafa Kemal should come to the Hedjaz, he would be made welcome to the Holy Places.

No. 652, January 11, 1923.

His Highness the Emir Ali.—His arrival in Mecca from Taif. **Sultan Wahid-ud-Din.**—Has reached Port Said. He will be met by King Hussein at Jeddah.

Egyptian Pilgrims.—Their complaints to the Ministry of the Interior as to the high cost of pilgrim passages to Jeddah, and the delay in refund of their quarantine deposits, are referred to "*Al Ahram*" as fitter subjects for investigation than the Hashimite quarantine system.

No. 653, January 15, 1923.

Arrival of Sultan Wahid-ud-Din.—A ... by King Hussein. The Jeddah correspondent confesses himself unable to do justice to the magnificence of the arrangements.

Arrival of Mr. Crane.—Welcome to the helper of humanity, and, in his person, to the public are reminded who Mr. Crane is and what he has done.

The Caliphate.—Article from "*Al Mokattam*" of the 2nd December praising the new Caliph's artistic and social qualities.

No. 654, January 18, 1923.

Nothing of interest.

No. 655, January 22, 1923.

A description of the arrival in Mecca of Sultan Wahid-ud-Din in "Ihram." Brilliant spectacle; troops martial and impressive; townspeople orderly and respectful. Sultan performs the ceremonies of "Tawaf" and "Sa'i," under police escort, before proceeding to King Hussein's palace. ... of the article ... unbounded adulation of King Hussein. Even the Holy City of Mecca is referred to as "the legacy of Providence to His Majesty our Lord, the Great Saviour," the beauty of whose gesture in offering hospitality to the ex-Sultan is loudly extolled.

APPENDIX

Shipping Intelligence.

Ship	From	To	Arrived	Left	Pilgrims Disembarked	Cargo Discharged
Heera	British	Calcutta	1923	Jan. 1	..	110 packages.
Chakra	144
Keneb	British	Port Sudan	Jan. 5	2,052
..	11
..	12 tons
..	1,002 packages.
..	24 tons
..	227 packages.
..	175
..	1,702
..	1,000 packages and 1,500 cases of medicines.
..	Dutch	Batavia	5,445 packages.

The French sloop "Algol" arrived on the 6th January and left on the 7th.
H.M.S. "Corall" arrived on the 16th January and left on the 17th.

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No. 17

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, (Received March 8.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith my pilgrimage report for 1922.

Copies of this despatch and report are being addressed to Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Aden, Delhi, Singapore and Khartoum.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Jeddah, January 31, 1923.

Pilgrimage Report, 1922

Pilgrimage

DURING the pilgrimage of 1922 58,319 pilgrims came by sea and disembarked at Jeddah. The first pilgrim boat arrived on the 21st February and the last on the 25th July. As usual, the majority of the Javanese and Singapore pilgrims arrived early and proceeded to Medina before the pilgrimage, while the Lebanese, Egyptians, Persians and Mesopotamians arrived during the months of June and July and proceeded to Medina after the pilgrimage.

The following table shows the number of pilgrims who embarked at different ports.—

Strait Settlements	6,000
Dutch East Indies	9,000
India	12,500
China	4,000
Japan	7,000
Malaya	1,000
Arabia	1,500
Aden	2,000
	100

The number of pilgrims who arrived by sea was only 936 less than the number in 1921 and during the pilgrimages of 1920, 1921 and 1922 the numbers have been nearly the same. A feature of this year's pilgrimage has been the marked increase in the number of northern pilgrims, while the Javanese and Malay pilgrims were about 5,000 less than during the 1921 pilgrimage.

For the first time since the war an official pilgrimage, under the charge of Masoud bin Suweid, came from Nejd. The pilgrims numbered about 2,000, and they were for the most part villagers from Boreidah and Anazah districts. These pilgrims behaved well and there was no trouble of any kind between them and the Hedjaz Arabs. They did not go to Medina, but returned to Nejd after the Arafat pilgrimage.

Pilgrimage day was on the 3rd August, and the Id on the 4th, 5th and 6th.

The weather was favourable, the health conditions good, and reports received say it was a most successful pilgrimage. The number of pilgrims present at Arafat including local people, was estimated at about 65,000.

The first returning pilgrims left Jeddah on the 12th August, and by the end of August approximately 35,000 pilgrims had left the country. Owing to a lack of Indian pilgrim boats, the last pilgrim boat for Bombay did not leave Jeddah until the 22nd November.

The "Mahmal" arrived on the steamship "Dakabieh" from Suez on the 24th July, and left for Mecca on the 27th July.

The disembarkation and embarkation of pilgrims was, as a rule, carried out expeditiously and reflects a good deal of credit on the local authorities. There was also plenty of camel transport, and the pilgrims were able to proceed to Mecca soon after landing in Jeddah.

Public Health

The health conditions throughout the pilgrimage were good. With the exception of smallpox, which has been endemic in the country since the pilgrimage of 1921, and which has remained of a mild clinical type, no infectious disease occurred. Throughout the summer the weather was much cooler than during the two preceding pilgrimages. The health returns have not yet been received but I think to be a fair estimate for this year's pilgrimage will be low. It is said that only twelve deaths occurred at Arafat and thirty four at Mona. So far the deaths of fifty Indian and Egyptian pilgrims who have left properly have been reported to us by the Hashimite authorities. The number of Javanese pilgrims who died during this year's pilgrimage is given as 1,454, but some of the caravans of Javanese pilgrims who went to Medina before the Hadj were caught in a "simoom" (dust storm) and a good many deaths (from heat exhaustion and fatigue) occurred in consequence. More than 1,000 Javanese pilgrims have remained in Mecca until the end of next year's pilgrimage.

Though the health conditions of the pilgrimage have been good, the sanitary conditions in the Hedjaz have not improved. Three Turkish doctors arrived for service under the Hashimite Government, but the hospital accommodation has remained as it was before, and all reports show that there is still a great lack of ordinary medical aid.

Dr Munir-ed-Din, the Indian vice-consul, reports as follows on the sanitary conditions of Mecca, Arafat and Mona.—

"In Mecca the streets are generally dirty, as there are few scavengers and no public latrines. There are no dustbins, hence the night soil, sweepings and all other rubbish are thrown into the streets and from there they are only partially removed by scavengers. The meat, fish, sweet-meats, fruits and other prepared foods are exposed to dust and flies. The system for the disposal of excreta is a cesspool under each house, and this cesspool is emptied after the lapse of years. The smells which enter the houses from these cesspools are occasionally very offensive.

At Arafat the water channel of the Zubeida Canal runs underground through the camping area, but it is open at some places where the water is received in tanks for the use of the public. As all the people and the animals have access to these tanks, the water soon becomes muddy and contaminated. There were few flies and few mosquitoes, but owing to the absence of latrines, human and animal excreta was so abundant that it was almost impossible to avoid soiling the feet or shoes.

At Mona the water is protected. There were few flies and few mosquitoes. The slaughtering ground was kept in a fairly sanitary state, as the blood was washed down the drain. The lack of latrines again led to extensive soiling of the ground. The death rate was low and the causes of death were exhaustion, debility and terminal diarrhoea in old people, dysentery and chronic lung diseases. There was no epidemic.

Public Security.

The public security in Jeddah and Mecca and on the Jeddah-Mecca and Mecca-Arafat roads was excellent, and we have received no reports of anyone molested or maltreated during the journey from Jeddah to Arafat. There were a certain number of robberies at Arafat, but the robbers were summarily dealt with according to Sharia Law.

On the Medina road, on the other hand, the public security was very bad, and the reports of the pilgrims who proceeded to Medina have confirmed the fact that the Hashimite Government has little or no control over the tribes who occupy the pilgrim route to Medina, and that a tax levied by these tribes on the pilgrim caravans is a source of constant trouble. Unfortunately robbery, with and without violence, by the Bedouin attached to the caravans, was very common, and the attacks on the caravans by the Bedouin in the hills was the cause of many innocent pilgrims being ruthlessly shot.

Two caravans returned to Mecca without having reached Medina. In one case it was officially announced that the caravan returned because the pilgrims were afraid they would be late for the pilgrimage. The other caravan was stopped by Bedouin and forbidden to proceed.

One cannot get a better idea of the conditions than by quoting extracts from the reports of the pilgrims. An Indian pilgrim from Calcutta reports:—

"Above all, it is the state of insecurity which harasses the mind of the Hajjis and makes them most uneasy in the Hedjaz. From Mecca to Medina and back from Medina to Jeddah we have nowhere felt the existence of any Government outside the town areas. Bedouin killed the Hajjis and beat them with impunity and fought amongst themselves, causing loss of life and property to the Hajjis. Hostile tribes fired at the caravans, wounding and killing Hajjis, looted their property and killed their camels. No Government official was with the caravans and no one reported to the Hajjis about their safety. No action was taken by the Government when Hajjis were molested, robbed or oppressed. It is a pity that the Hedjaz Government should appropriate so much of the money which the Hajjis have to pay and should not depute a single responsible officer with the caravans, and do other

necessary things to secure and ensure the safety of life and property on these journeys of the Hajjis. It is intolerable that there should be no one to receive or enquire into the complaints for murder and other wrongs.

The report of Mohammed Beg, an Indian pilgrim from Lahore, gives such a graphic account of his journey to Medina and of his experiences on the Shereefian steamer "Tawil" that I attach it in full at the end of this report.

Making an allowance for some exaggeration in the various reports received, there is no doubt that the public security of the Medina road is very bad and there is no improvement from the conditions which prevailed last year. The Hashimite Government do nothing to redress these wrongs. An Indian pilgrim arrived in Jeddah with a gunshot wound of the thigh and pelvis received on the return journey from Medina. He died two days after his arrival in Jeddah. I at once reported the matter to Mecca, and asked that steps should be taken to punish those guilty of the murder. The Hashimite Government made all kinds of excuses, said they had no power, and reported that all the pilgrims had returned safely, and that, therefore, the hostages had been released and that I must give them the name of the Mutawwif, even though I had already told them the house in which he died. I sent them a medical report by Dr. Munir-ud Din, gave them the name of the Mutawwif, and insisted on an investigation. This they reluctantly agreed to, but since then I have heard nothing, and I do not expect to hear anything further on the matter.

Pilgrims are encouraged through Mutawwifin and others to make no complaint, as it is contrary to their religion and that these hardships and dangers are a necessary part of the journey. If a pilgrim complains, he is liable to be treated as a traitor and a chance of redress, any complaint through a consul is almost universally useless.

Only two things appear to appeal to the conscience of King Hussein. One is the fear of what pilgrims may say on their return home, and the other is the fear of the press. As an example of the former, when Mirza Mohammed Beg, the Indian pilgrim, whose report is attached, returned from Medina every effort was made to prevent him from speaking. His fare on the "Tawil" (vide *infra*) was refunded, the chief Muallim called on him, assured him that things would be made easier, and obtained his signature to a document saying that on these assurances he had satisfaction and thanked the King. He was also sent for by the Kaimakam, who treated him with great deference and repeated the assurances of the Muallim.

A good example of the latter is the case of a Dutch consul who applied to the Dutch consul for medical assistance as his wife was ill. The Javanese doctor was sick, so, at the request of the Dutch consul, I sent Dr. Munir-ud Din. The Mutawwif would not allow him to enter the house. The Dutch consul took immediate steps to notify the local Government that he had found three Javanese journals and that they were full of abuse against the King and the Government. The result was that in a very short time the Mutawwif was sent to make a most abject apology to the Dutch consul, and the local authorities expressed regret at the occurrence.

Jeddah Customs

Customs dues on pilgrims' effects were instituted for the first time, and at the beginning of the Hajj season the pilgrims were asked to pay. The articles which the pilgrims were wearing, if they were adjudged new by the customs authorities, were taxed, and on occasions the tax levied was 50 per cent. of the value of the article. One Javanese pilgrim paid customs dues amounting to 20% on his personal belongings.

As the pilgrims were complaining bitterly about these customs charges, I made representations to the Hashimite Government that customs dues on pilgrims' personal effects should be waived or moderated. In their reply the Hashimite Government said that the following articles were exempt from customs dues:

1. Rice, if not a full sack
2. Oil, petroleum and sugar, if not a full tin
3. Bread, called "Kajih," syrups and cocoanuts in any quantity
4. Thram clothes, all used towels and five new ones for each person
5. All perfumes for private use
6. Flour, lentils and wheat, not more than one sack per person
7. All ladies' ornaments, silks, &c

Though the Hashimite Government did not in all particulars, especially with regard to foodstuffs, carry out these regulations strictly, conditions were greatly improved.

A further hardship imposed on pilgrims was the customs dues of 50 per cent. levied on the import of large quantities of goods. No special exemption was given and pilgrims from Bahrein and Mesopotamia, who had brought Medicines, suffered considerable loss. A further order for the confiscation of all Maria Theresa dollars was given to the customs authorities, and some pilgrims from the Yemen, who arrived with no other currency, were penniless. The matter was referred to King Hussein, who said that the pilgrims were to be left to their fate on their return journey. In the meantime these pilgrims were left in the country without any means of support.

Some Afghan pilgrims arrived with a sack of rosaries in order to trade during the pilgrimage, as is allowed in the Koran. The cost of these was 800 rupees. The customs charge was 38% gold.

Quarantine

1 Jeddah Quarantine. As in previous years, the Hashimite quarantine authorities followed no definite rules. All boats from the south arrived from Kamaran with a clean bill of health, but almost without exception the pilgrims were sent to the quarantine islands at Jeddah for twenty-four hours. Pilgrims from the north were also, as a rule, quarantined for twenty-four hours. This, in my opinion, owing to the prevalence of plague in Egypt, was justified, especially as the boats from Egypt were not allowed to land passengers (see article 124 International Sanitary Convention).

Not only were the pilgrims sent to the quarantine islands, but the steamers from the south were kept in quarantine, and the agents, pilot and coolies treated accordingly. I Dutch consul and I consulted Dr. Thabit, in his reply to the Dutch consul, said that he would not accept the word of any ship's doctor as to the presence of any disease on board.

Unfortunately these rules were not universally applied, and distinctions were made between different shipping companies. A new line of pilgrim steamers belonging to the company of Hajj King, with Hajj Zaid Al Bani, the Kaimakam's firm, as agents, were treated much more leniently than the Dutch and Blue Funnel boats. The ships' officers were allowed to disembark without disinfection, and the ships allowed *libre pratique* after the pilgrims had disembarked and left for the quarantine islands. On the arrival of the steamship "Jeddah" (Arab Steamers (Limited))—agents, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co.—the ship was put in quarantine for twenty-four hours and the captain was forbidden to come ashore. Nevertheless, one first-class pilgrim, Dr. Mohammed Hussein, at one time Indian vice-consul in Jeddah, was allowed with his family, to disembark direct without going to the quarantine island. On the same day the Italian consul, Dr. Torrè, who is also a medical man, went on board an Italian boat which was in quarantine. On the following morning the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mecca sent a telegram to all foreign representatives stating that the Government intended to take action in the matter, and that they would not recognise the qualifications of any representative of any Government who interfered in such important questions. In my reply I referred to the case of Dr. Mohammed Hussein, and presumed that he was allowed to disembark because he was a medical man, and that I could not understand why the same courtesies re quarantine should not be extended to Dr. Torrè. In their reply the Government said that Dr. Mohammed Hussein was allowed to disembark because he was a first-class passenger, and therefore exempt. When I sent them a list of the first-class passengers of the ship which had gone to the quarantine island they had no reply to give. King Hussein, on discussing the matter later said that we must remember they were a young country, and had still much to learn.

Two more examples may be quoted to show the arbitrariness of the Jeddah quarantine. An Italian boat arrived from Suaz and was put in quarantine. A few minutes later Dr. Thabit found that three Turkish doctors, travelling third class, had arrived for work with the Hashimite Government, and the quarantine was at once abolished and the steamer given *libre pratique*. The second was the steamer "Borulos," on which I returned from leave early in April. At Yembo there was no quarantine, and people from the shore flocked on board. On arrival at Jeddah twenty-four hours later the steamer was kept in quarantine during her stay in Jeddah harbour.

Shipping.

As in previous years, the shipping arrangements for the Javanese and Malay pilgrims were excellent. The pilgrims were conveyed to Medina before the Hadj. Immediately after the pilgrimage there was a steady stream of Blue Funnel and Dutch boats to take returning pilgrims, and early in September the majority had gone. After the Medina pilgrimage boats called for the small number of Javanese and Singapore pilgrims, who went to Medina after the Hadj and the stragglers. The last boat left on the 6th October. Even for a small party of stragglers these companies will always send a steamer.

Four different shipping companies carried the pilgrims from Indian ports. The Bombay Persia Steam Navigation Company (Mogul and Arab Lines), the Gulf Steam Navigation Company, Mr. Nemazee and Mr. Dada Mia Khandwani. One hundred and sixty-five return tickets were issued, and these were all issued by the Bombay Persia Steam Navigation Company, the remaining companies issued single tickets only.

Owing to the competition, the pilgrim fares were low, but this is a doubtful blessing. The pilgrims are destitute in Jeddah at the end of the pilgrimage. The Indian shipping arrangements worked smoothly this year, and the only drawback was the fact that the number of pilgrims who had embarked, and apparently sent out pilgrims until the steamer refused to take any more, with the result that the steamers were, on two occasions, overcrowded, and the "Mahmoudieh," on her last trip, carried less than ten pilgrims. The second is the fact that a good many Egyptian pilgrims, who came with the official Egyptian pilgrimage, went to Medina after the Hadj, and no shipping arrangements were made by the Egyptian Government for their return. The Egyptian official in charge of the embarkation had done his work properly, he would have cancelled the last trip of the "Mahmoudieh," when she took less than ten pilgrims, and arranged for her to come after the Medina pilgrimage. It is true that the Egyptian Government offered to send a boat after they were sure that all the pilgrims had returned from Medina, but the boat was sent to a town where there are few conveniences for pilgrims, petitioned King Hussein, who sent them on the Shereefian steamer, "Tawil." All those who could not pay were taken free of charge.

The Egyptian pilgrims came in three steamers, the "Dakahlieh," "Mahmoudieh," and the "Keneh." After the pilgrimage the first named took the Mahmal party to Tor, and then carried the pilgrims from Tor to Suez, while the other two steamers carried pilgrims from Jeddah. This was a most excellent arrangement. There were, however, two drawbacks. One was that the Egyptian official sent, as in former years, to superintend the embarkation of Egyptian pilgrims had no idea of the number of pilgrims who had embarked, and apparently sent out pilgrims until the steamer refused to take any more, with the result that the steamers were, on two occasions, overcrowded, and the "Mahmoudieh," on her last trip, carried less than ten pilgrims. The second is the fact that a good many Egyptian pilgrims, who came with the official Egyptian pilgrimage, went to Medina after the Hadj, and no shipping arrangements were made by the Egyptian Government for their return. The Egyptian official in charge of the embarkation had done his work properly, he would have cancelled the last trip of the "Mahmoudieh," when she took less than ten pilgrims, and arranged for her to come after the Medina pilgrimage. It is true that the Egyptian Government offered to send a boat after they were sure that all the pilgrims had returned from Medina, but the boat was sent to a town where there are few conveniences for pilgrims, petitioned King Hussein, who sent them on the Shereefian steamer, "Tawil." All those who could not pay were taken free of charge.

The purchase of two steamers, the "Tawil" and the "Rushdi," by the Hashimite Government, and the entry of these steamers into the pilgrim traffic, showed the Hashimite Government quite incapable of running these steamers, and in consequence great hardships were inflicted on the pilgrims who travelled in these small steamers. The "Tawil" is a boat of about 250 tons and the "Rushdi" about 30 tons. The "Tawil," in August, took 640 pilgrims to Hodeida and arrived in Kamaran on the 20th August (despatch No. 136 from Political Resident, Aden). The pilgrims, owing to overcrowding, were in a most deplorable condition, and there was not a single drop of fresh water on board when the steamer reached Kamaran. Five died at Kamaran as the result of starvation during the voyage. There was no medical officer on board.

The same steamer then proceeded to Suakin with Soudanese and Takruri pilgrims and arrived there on the 31st August with 701 pilgrims and without a doctor on board. The Quarantine Board decided that the captain should pay the penalty for the contravention of the rules of the International Sanitary Convention. It seems a pity that before this step should be taken, warning was not sent to the Shereefian Government, because it was pointed out that the same boat, under the Italian flag

and called the "Paolo," carried, during the 1921 pilgrimage, 570 pilgrims to Suakin without a doctor, and even smaller Italian steamers, the "Serpentara" and the

"G 38," carried 419 and 520 pilgrims to Suakin, also without a doctor, and no action had been taken. Also the "Keneh" and "Mahmoudieh," owing to the reasons given above, carried an excess number of pilgrims to Tor, and again no action had been taken. I am glad that the Quarantine Board decided to take no action this year, but decided to apply these regulations strictly next year. The whole question of the transport of pilgrims to Suakin wants looking into. Unfortunately, the regulations published by the Soudan Government in "Gazette No. 404" of the 19th November 1921, which are for the "protection of Soudan pilgrims and native passengers travelling by steam vessels and native craft to and from the Hedjaz," the regulations appear to apply to steam vessels only, and can have little or no reference to native craft. These regulations for steam vessels are in some cases vague and in some cases—such as that each steamer must carry sufficient lifeboat accommodation for passengers and crew—too severe for a journey of eighteen hours. Some native dhows carry a large number of pilgrims to Suakin, and I cannot see how the conditions can be anything but very unsatisfactory from the overcrowding, lack of proper latrine accommodation, &c.

One dhow, the "Elelaoui," arrived at Suakin on the 14th December with 270 pilgrims, the "Moubachir" on the 2nd November with 212 pilgrims, "Elmatuchal" on the 17th October with 27 pilgrims, "Elmagraba" on the 23rd October with 224 pilgrims, "Elabbas" on the 13th October with 244 pilgrims, and altogether after this pilgrimage 1,677 pilgrims, including 151 infants, were carried in eight dhows to Suakin.

The "Tawil" made two more journeys to Suakin, arriving there on the 8th September with 500 pilgrims and on the 20th September with 627 pilgrims. On each occasion the boat carried a doctor.

The next trip of the "Tawil," and the worst, was the transport of not less than 800 pilgrims from Yembo to Jeddah in September. The conditions, due to overcrowding, lack of water and lack of sufficient latrine accommodation, were very trying for the pilgrims. They were so crowded that they could not move from their original position, could not reach the latrines nor the water tanks, and the conditions, with

articles for latrines, can better be imagined than described. The steamer spent thirty-six hours on the journey and it was said that six pilgrims died during the voyage. The other Shereefian steamer, the "Rushdi," also brought 360 pilgrims from Yembo to Jeddah, and the conditions on that boat were equally bad. The pilgrims complained very bitterly, and I wrote to the Hashimite Government drawing their attention to the terrible conditions on these boats and asking what steps had been taken to deal with those responsible for such a state of affairs, and to prevent a repetition of these atrocities. The reply was entirely irrelevant, but at the same time word must have been received at Mecca that the pilgrims were writing reports, because the mutawwifin were ordered to pay back to the pilgrims the cost of the food and assurances were given that things would be looked into and put right. There was some talk of the pilgrims being sent to a town where there are few conveniences for pilgrims, petitioned King Hussein, who sent them on the Shereefian steamer, "Tawil." All those who could not pay were taken free of charge.

The last voyage of the "Tawil" for this season was when she embarked 188 Egyptian pilgrims at Suez. The quarantine authorities at Suez found the conditions on board very bad, and that the steamer was quite unsuited for the transport of pilgrims.

For the first time since the war three special steamers ran between Beirut and Jeddah for the transport of Syrian pilgrims. Owing to the difficulty of transit of foreign pilgrims through Egypt we can only hope that this plan will also be followed in the future in the case of North African, Palestinian and Turkish pilgrims.

Pilgrim Expenses

Inspector Hakim Said Hassan, M.B.E., Indian police officer, has worked out in rupees the minimum expenses incurred by a pilgrim during the Mecca and Medina pilgrimages after he reaches Jeddah harbour.

The same officer has also worked out the taxes from pilgrims which go to the Hashimite Government, and the results are shown in the following tables:—

I. Minimum expenses per pilgrim. -

	Rs.	a	p
1 Porterage of luggage from steamer to sambuk ..	1	8	0
2 Bakhshish to quarantine people (Jeddah Islands)	0	4	0
3 Bakhshish to boatman	0	8	0
4 Sambuk hire	2	0	0
5 Porterage of luggage from sambuk to house	1	0	0
6 House rent at Jeddah, one night	0	4	0
7 Wakil's fee at Jeddah	2	8	0
8 Camel hire to Mecca, half camel	7	0	0
9 Shughduf hire to Mecca or price of shibri	2	0	0
10 Municipal dues on shughduf at Jeddah	0	4	0
11 Stamps for passport at Jeddah	0	2	0
12 Wages of servant to Mecca	0	4	0
13 Bakhshish to servant	0	4	0
14 For halt at Bahra	0	4	0
15 Bakhshish to camelman to Mecca	0	8	0
16 Moallim's fee at Mecca	12	0	0
17 Zamzami's fee at Mecca	2	0	0
18 House rent at Mecca	10	0	0
19 Bakhshish to Haram people at Mecca ...	0	4	0
20 Camel hire to Arafat and back to Mecca, half camel	12	0	0
21 Shughduf hire to Arafat and back to Mecca, half camel	3	0	0
22 Tent hire for Arafat	2	0	0
23 House rent at Mona	1	0	0
24 Camel hire to Medina and back, half-camel	11	8	0
25 Shughduf hire to Medina and back, half-camel ...	6	0	0
26 Wages of servant to Medina	5	0	0
27 Charges for lighting on Medina way	5	0	0
28 Bakhshish to camelman, both ways	30	0	0
29 Bakhshish to camelman, both ways, guard duty	13	0	0
30 Moazzawir's fee at Medina	6	0	0
31 House rent at Medina	4	0	0
32 Koshan from Medina, half camel	2	8	0
33 Camel hire from Mecca to Jeddah	6	0	0
34 Shughduf hire to Jeddah	4	0	0
35 House rent at Jeddah, one night	0	4	0
36 Medical certificate at Jeddah	2	8	0
37 Porterage of luggage from house to sambuk	0	6	0
38 Sambuk hire to steamer	1	0	0
	261	0	0

II. Taxes paid to the Hashimite Government. -

	Rs.	a	p.
1 From sambuk hire (Nos. 4 and 38) 2½ per cent	2	8	0
2 From camel hire (No. 8) as Koshan	0	2	0
3 Municipal dues (No. 10) per shughduf	0	2	0
4 For stamps for passports (No. 11)	0	2	0
5 Moallim's fee (No. 16)	12	0	0
6 From camel hire (No. 20) as Koshan	2	8	0
7 From camel hire (No. 24)	14	0	0
8 Koshan per camel from Medina (No. 32)	2	8	0
9 Fee for medical certificate (No. 36)	2	8	0
	46	4	6

* Owing to the shortage of shughdufs the hire in the end had gone up to 10 rupees per pilgrim.

† The whole of the moallim's fee is taken by the Government, and the moallim thus uses other means to get enough out of the pilgrim to suffice him for the whole year.

Inspector Hassan works out the minimum expenses at approximately 260 rupees per pilgrim and this does not include food and water, nor does it include the cost of transport from and to India.

The amount which goes to the Government in taxes works out at 66 rs. 4 a. 6 p. per pilgrim, plus 2½ per cent. of the sambuk hire, and plus the quarantine and entrance tax, now 90 Turkish piastres, making a total of not less than 78 rupees per pilgrim, or approximately 5½ per pilgrim.

The quarantine dues for next season's pilgrimage have been raised by the Hedjaz quarantine authorities from 37½ Turkish piastres to 90 Turkish piastres. Of this sum 40 Turkish piastres is for quarantine dues, and the remaining 50 Turkish piastres for landing permit dues. These dues are charged at the fixed rate of 112 Turkish piastres to the gold pound sterling, and, as in previous years, is charged in the pilgrim's ticket and paid by the shipping agents in Jeddah.

There is no doubt the pilgrimage is becoming yearly more expensive, and compares very unfavourably with the pilgrimage expenses in the time of the Turks.

Indian Pilgrimage

This year we began the registration of Indian pilgrims. Four thousand, eight hundred and seventy seven Indian passports, containing the names of 8,583 Indian pilgrims were registered at the agency, and was a very useful record for future reference. Two hundred and sixty eight pilgrims deposited at the agency money totalling 544 and 84,917 rs. 15 a. The amounts were kept by Inspector Hakim Said Hassan. Depositors Nos. 32, 65, 127, 137, 157, 159 and 216 died, and the money was paid to the heirs of the depositors whom they had nominated at the time of making the deposit. Depositor No. 158 and his heir both died, so the money was sent to the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. Depositors No. 156 (120 rupees) and No. 252 (140 rupees) have not yet turned up to claim their money.

Pilgrims holding return tickets deposited 713 coupons at the agency for safe custody. They were given receipts on their passports. Seven hundred and eight coupons have been withdrawn, while five are still unclaimed.

As in past years the Bent ul Mal at Mecca and at Jeddah collected the effects of the deceased pilgrims. No passports were collected, no efforts were made to find out the full address of deceased pilgrims, the names were not taken down correctly, and, as in previous years, the work of these departments was entirely unsatisfactory.

This year the number of destitute Indian pilgrims was greater than in past years. The reason for this was threefold -

1. The majority of the pilgrims came on single tickets, and had not sufficient money to keep them in the Hedjaz or to purchase a ticket for the return journey.
2. Owing to the competition between the different shipping companies it was possible to obtain single tickets at a very low rate—35 rupees a head—and many pilgrims were tempted to make the journey without preparing for future needs.
3. It is now a well known fact among the pilgrims that they will be repatriated, and they take no precautions to save money for the return journey.

This year the destitute pilgrims were repatriated at the expense of the Central Hadj Committee of India. One thousand and fifty-four pilgrims were repatriated at the cost of 25,000 rupees. The amount originally voted by the Central Hadj Committee was 20,739 rs. 8 a. The amount found not to be sufficient, and they wired authority to spend an additional 7,500 rupees. The work of repatriation and of administering this fund was in the hands of a local committee of Indians, with His Majesty's agent and consul as president and the Indian vice-consul as secretary.

As we still had a certain amount of money in the old destitute fund (subscribed some years ago by local people) I tried this year the experiment of issuing money on loan. Receipts were taken and forwarded to the district authorities concerned. Also 162 repatriated pilgrims promised to repay the cost of the ticket to the Central Hadj Committee, and lists, with receipts, were sent to that committee for necessary action.

Conclusions.

The pilgrimage for 1922 was, so far as the pilgrimage to Mecca and Arafat was concerned, a success. The health of the pilgrims also was good, and the death rate low. The public security on the Medina road, however, shows no improvement, and the pilgrims are being more and more exploited as a source of revenue both by the Hashimite Government and by the people of the Hedjaz. The ordinary passenger service to Suez after the pilgrimage was completely disorganised as the Italian steamers refused to take passengers, and the Khedivial Mail Line, so as to avoid quarantine of their steamers, could only take a very small number. The large number of Indian destitute pilgrims, increased from 500 in 1921 to 1,054 in 1922, is a disgrace to our Indian administration, and has still further lessened the prestige of the Indian pilgrim in the eyes of the local inhabitants. The entrance of the Hashimite Government into the pilgrim shipping traffic was a tragedy, and so far as the coastal trade on the Arabian coast is concerned a difficult thing to remedy. The Egyptian pilgrimage was well organised, but the failure of the steamers to call at Tor on the southward journey was greatly to be deprecated.

With regard to the pilgrimage for 1923, it would appear useless to reiterate recommendations which so far, in regard to the Indian pilgrimage, have borne no results. Nevertheless, a scheme for the better control of Indian pilgrims will be submitted, in a separate despatch, by Mr Vice-Consul Grafley-Smith. I am more than ever convinced that the only way to deal with the question of destitute Indian pilgrims is to institute compulsory return tickets. The pilgrims knew about the repatriation fund when they left India, and quite early in the pilgrimage two destitute Indians came to the agency and demanded to be sent back at the cost of that fund. Inspector Hassan informs me that some Indian pilgrims have done two pilgrimages in the last four years, and have been repatriated on each occasion. The local committee found it extremely difficult to find out who were really destitute, but there is no doubt that the majority are destitute, because on arrival in Jeddah after the pilgrimage they camp in the streets and they have not the wherewithal to pay for a lodging.

The Indian Government have demanded the return to India of Inspector Hakim Said Hassan, M B E., and he will leave Jeddah by the first boat for Bombay. He will be a great loss to this agency, where, for more than five years, he has been invaluable and indefatigable in pilgrim work. His knowledge of the language, the country, and the people is a great asset, and if he is not replaced by a suitable man the work of the agency will suffer. The Dutch Government, who are in agreement with us in the direction of that pilgrim control which we consider essential, will undoubtedly suffer. I envy the Dutch in their control of the pilgrimage. They have more pilgrims than any other country. They have no destitutes. They have little or no trouble with shipping. The pilgrims are well disciplined and well behaved. The prestige of the Javanese pilgrims is higher than that of other foreign pilgrims.

not visit Jeddah while they were in the Near East. They could have interviewed the foreign representatives and the local authorities and conceived an idea of our difficulties with regard to quarantine before putting forward recommendations for the amending of the International Convention.

If the pilgrimage is clean I think the call at Kamaran for returning pilgrim is [b] [d] [e] [f] [g] [h] [i] [j] [k] [l] [m] [n] [o] [p] [q] [r] [s] [t] [u] [v] [w] [x] [y] [z] the south with less than 1 per cent sick pilgrims on board need not call at Kamaran on the northern journey.

I again submit that the quarantine measures imposed on ordinary passengers proceeding north after the pilgrimage are unjustified. Also, I must protest against the breaking of article 128 of the International Convention in that Egyptian pilgrims at Jeddah, instead of imposing twenty-four hours' quarantine at Jeddah, had ordered the boats back to 'Tor'. It was perhaps fortunate in this case, that the Hashimite Government did not recognise the International Convention. As I have previously stated, if the pilgrimage were infected, we would be only too ready to assist the International Quarantine Board and the Egyptian Government in their endeavors to prevent the infection reaching Egypt, but when the pilgrimage is clean I can see no necessity for these elaborate precautions. Our intelligence on the health of the pilgrimage is, I think, trustworthy. Dr Munir-ud-Din, the Indian vice-consul at Jeddah, informed me that on the 17th of October, 1918, when the Mahmal there was a doctor with the official Palestine pilgrimage and Dr Mohammed

Hassani, the Egyptian doctor in Mecca, keeps me informed of the health conditions and always reports if any diseases or these occur. In addition, Inspector Hassan and Ismail Effendi, our chief translator, were on the pilgrimage. In the afternoon of the 22nd, the King and I were allowed to talk to me on the terrace, where he was seated so I could hear him. He did not, however, telephoned to me from Mecca purely to report on the health conditions.

I expect that, with the aid of the new road, the pilgrim traffic the Akaba route will be more used than formerly for Syrian and Palestinian pilgrims. In the "Kibla," No. 648, of the 1st January, 1923, the Hashimite Government announced that the H. C. Government had agreed to the export of King Hussein, and that they had sent him to the H. C. Government in 1923. I am sure this is a foolish hope, but in this connection I must point out all will depend on the quarantine arrangements, that Musn is now administered by the Hashimite Government and not by Transjordan. We have no reason to hope that any quarantine station at Musn will be the property of the H. C. Government.

I think the Egyptian official who was in charge of the work should arrange for a station to take care of the pilgrims at the Holy Places. Also, I consider that, for the present, the Egyptian official in charge of the embarkation of the pilgrims should work at this agency under our supervision instead of independently. The officials who did this work in 1920 and 1921 were retired Egyptian army officers, and always worked in close co-operation with this agency. The official who did the work this year, and who had apparently no idea of administrative work, remained in the customs and did not even report at this agency until I sent for him. He also made a very bad impression on the local authorities as before his departure, he did not call on the Kaimakam to thank him for the office and other facilities which were placed at his disposal by the local authorities.

In a despatch written on the 24th October, the Governor of the Straits Settlements has drafted a scheme for the protection and control of the Malay pilgrims. With the recommendations contained therein, we are in complete accord, and so far as the Local Government is concerned, we have no objection to what proposes to be a great boon to the Malay pilgrims. Besides the scheme, the pilgrims of every year will be required to deposit their photographs and addresses at the Straits Settlements, within twenty-four hours after disembarkation, deposit of return tickets and a written agreement signed by each pilgrim.

I feel recommendations are very likely to be the scheme adopted by the Dutch in their supervision of the Javanese pilgrimage, and offers, in my opinion, the same prospect of success.

In conclusion, I beg to express our thanks to the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, Bombay who, through their local agent, Sheikh Suleiman Gabil, carried all the destitute Indian pilgrims at the low rate of 25 rupees per head

W E MARSHALL, R A M C.,

Agent and Consul

Jeddah, January 15 1923

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Muhammed Beg to Major Marshall

Jeddah, October 2, 1922

Sir,
I MOST respectfully beg to lay down the following facts to your benign notice,
~~I beg to state that the~~ ~~fact of the~~ ~~loss of~~ ~~the~~ ~~lives and~~
money of the Indian pilgrims in Arabia.

The caravan started on the 20th August, 1822, for Medina, and we were told by the merchants that 230 rupees per camel was the rate of fare (per camel) fixed by the Directors of Mecca, who had arranged with the British Consul, and that there was no danger on the way. Another sum equal to 30 rupees was to be paid for the shughdafa, muallim and zamzami charges. On this assurance that 230 rupees was the fare from Mecca to Medina and back to Jeddah we, or myself, took 125 rupees with me and 367 rupees was sent through the Delhi shop at Jeddah. On the way we had some provisions, such as bread &c. with plenty of ghee and had to pay them I repeat daily besides the tolls &c. &c. so that it was not long before we were not allowed as little rations as would take us to Rabak, whence we bought more.

We reached Asfan, when we heard that several foot passengers were looted and killed by the Hedouin. We stopped at this place for the whole day and the

night, in the latter part of which an Egyptian lady was attacked by the Bedouin, but on a hue and cry being raised, one of her relatives got a wound on his head, but there was no loss. The Bedouin were firing from the hills, and we could see them moving about.

We went on till we left Gadima on the 25th August, and were proceeding in our shughdufs when all at once the camel train stopped and a great noise in the front. We were all thunderstruck, as bullets were passing over our heads like showers of rain. One bullet came in my shughduf, but by a miracle, after tearing some clothes, remained stuck in the bag tied to the side of the shughduf. I produce it to show it to you. Our muallim cut off the train of his caravan and took a side of the Bedouin, as two women were shot and died the following night and were buried in Rabik the next day.

We left Rabik on the 28th at about 12 noon and were proceeding when there was trouble again and shots were fired from the surrounding hills, but we were passing hastily through danger. I cannot say whether there were deaths or not, as the train of camels was too long and I could not see what happened in the front or rear.

We reached Beir Hassan on the 30th and were detained for two days. We heard several shots during the night and the day following, and the result was that we had to pay 2 mejidis per camel.

On our way from Khulus to Bir Abbas on the 2nd September we were again surrounded by the Bedouin and shots were profoundly poured on us, but we did not stop and nothing can be said what loss of life occurred here again. At this place we were detained for six days and consumed our rations. We suffered a deal from suspense, heat, exposure, and at last were asked to pay a guinea each camel, but again it was found that the sum thus collected would not meet the demand of the Ahmadi tribe. The camel keepers had also gone to their homes, which were in the vicinity of this camp. The traders were also of the same tribe as that of the chief of the jammals (Solomon) and were to be given a chance to earn money and thus benefit themselves by our stay. People were in great distress and ran this way and that to get release. I went to see the chief jammal, but found him in the middle of a crowd of Hajis of all caste and country. He could not stand this, and got up and went away. The Hajis then held a meeting, and it was agreed that a further sum of 2 mejidis should be collected and given. Thus we had in all to pay the chief (Solomon) a total sum of 13,300 mejidis. The sum had to be sent to the Ahmadi tribe on a camel and we had to wait till next day the return of the carrier with permission of the Ahmadi tribe to let us proceed and the return of jammals from their homes. There were several deaths here as well.

We left this place on the 6th September but I am not sure of exact dates, as we had lost clue of dates and days, and after two hours of our departure from this camp we were again stopped by the Bedouin and shots were being fired on us, but we went on and to my belief nothing occurred. During the night which was dark, as we were going along cries of women were heard and one of the women passed us running and crying. She was made to get down, and the jammal took away the camel. No one could help her. Another woman of our caravan died, and a man complained that he had lost 100 rupees during the night journey.

We reached Medina on the 15th September, 1922, where after four days we were told that Shereef's orders were to send us to Yembo instead of Jeddah and that we should pay the jammals 2 mejidis for detention over three days, and we had to pay it along with the backshish to the jammals, who forced us to pay them.

I asked the muallim to take me to the kaimakam, and I went with him and four other men. The kaimakam, after hearing me, said that he had orders from Shereef to send us to Yembo, and he was not responsible for what fare we paid and what promises were given by the Shereef at Mecca; we should pay 2 mejidis to the jammals and leave Medina or we would be turned out by force.

We were ordered to leave Medina soon after Friday prayers, and brought out our belongings to where our shughdufs were standing, but we were again made to wait for two days as it was said that the Shereef had not paid some money as an allowance to a tribe and told the tribe to get from us. I cannot prove the veracity of this statement, but we had to wait there exposed to the sun and dew in an open place after leaving the houses we had hired in the town.

On our leaving Bir Derweish in the afternoon of the 18th September at about 10 o'clock in the night we were again attacked very severely by the Bedouins. Shots

were poured like showers of rain on us and the bullets passed our heads. It was a severe attack, but we hurried on. I saw a camel dropping and an Egyptian lady shot.

We arrived at Turrah on the 18th September, and the Egyptian woman was here. A local passenger who met us at day said that he was left behind and came at daybreak from where he had slept and saw a shughduf without riders and with beds and utensils lying about and a heap of mud, seemingly the grave of the occupants.

We arrived at Yembo in the morning of 23rd September 1922. Here I and several others had no money left, and we had been without rations and managed by begging. We hired a house where water was very dear, so sparingly, 2 ps. 8 as was the daily charge. When I and others went to buy tickets for the steamer we were not allowed by the menials. I went to the kaimakam, who looked down, and I told him that no one can go up without payment. He said that I was not allowed to go up by the gatekeepers. I was allowed to go up by the gatekeepers without paying, and the kaimakam was very angry. One of my friends who was there since two hours told me that one of the menials had taken a rupee with the promise of getting him the ticket, and which he had not complied. I went to the kaimakam, who at first waved me off but I persisted, he sent for the menial and got the rupee from him, not even reprimanding the man. Bribery was common and openly asked, and we had to pay in all 25 rupees, each man for one ticket, including quarantine charges, and bribery at each step.

On the 29th September, 1922 at about 2 P.M., we were ordered to bring our luggage to the sea side. In the afternoon we were in the sun till evening when we were carried out, and at night we were exposed to the cold. Next morning we had to take our luggage again to the sea side and hungry and thirsty we had to wait till the morning. The kaimakam would not let anyone go in until he paid 100 rupees. We were made to wait till the morning. At last, after paying different sums to the officials, we were made to take our seats in the boat and taken to the steamer. We were hoisted up by our arms and thrown by the boat to the steamer without being allowed to take a drop of water or food. No pen can describe the misery men and women suffered in this black hole. Men and women cried for water, and it was horribly hot, and both up and down floors were cram full, so that no one could move about, while sitting even was difficult. There was no accommodation for making water and we, and it was impossible to go up. Men were made to go to the captain, but he did not hear me. I crawled up and trampled several to go to the captain, but he did not hear me. The rule of a Mahomedan was to go to the captain, but he did not hear me. We came to Jeddah, where our luggage was thrown in boats which came on shore a dash, and then, having no luggage, we were left with no money for thirty hours, we had to face another difficulty of picking our luggage, as there was no light in the boat to enable us to find our things. God only can fathom the misery and trouble we went through in the night.

Now my request by taking all this trouble and taking your time, is to beg you, please, to ask the Arab Government—

1. Why fare from Mecca to Medina and back to Jeddah was taken from us when we were to come back through Yembo?
2. Why the Government took the monopoly of sending its own small steamers for 2,000 (or near) men to be taken by the steamer when it had accommodation for 400 or 500?
3. Why no consideration was given to the comforts of men, but they were packed like sheep and fowls? It is quite evident that the Government had its own profit in view by not sending one of the company's steamers which were standing at Jeddah.
4. Why an assurance was given us that our journey and our lives will be safe on the way, and why no arrangements were made against these tribes?

I am, &c

MOHAMMAD BEG

Resident of Lahore.

MOHD. BEG

No 18.

[WITH THREE MAPS.]

Paris, March 14, 1923.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
ERIC PHELPS

Enclosure 3 in No. 18

Signal 15, situé dans la vallée du Ouadi Bediyeh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 6, situé au confluent du Ouadi Bediseh avec l'Ouadi Khelal, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 17, situé sur le piton ouest du Djebel Haramun, la frontière suit ensuite une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 18, situé sur le piton est du Djebel Haramun, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 19, situé sur une colline, à 2.100 mètres au sud-est du village d'Yarus, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 20, situé sur un éperon, à 2 kilomètres à l'est du village d'Yarus, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 21, situé sur le sommet du Djebel-el-Asy, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 22, situé sur la berge d'un ouadi à 600 mètres au nord de Kh. Auda et à environ 1 kilom. au sud de Birket, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 23, situé sur le sommet du Djebel-el-Ghabieh et à 600 mètres au sud de Deir-el-Ghabieh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 24, situé sur l'éperon à l'est du Djebel-el-Ghabieh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 25, situé dans la vallée, au bord est d'un thalweg, à 600 mètres au nord-ouest du village d'El-Mulkyeh, puis elle suit le cours du thalweg, en direction sensiblement nord jusqu'au

Signal 26, situé à l'intersection de la piste de Kades à Moia, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 27, situé à 700 mètres ouest-nord-ouest du village de Kades et à proximité de l'arbre de Kh-el-Mensfir, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 28, situé au croisement de la piste de Kades à Moia avec l'Ouadi Atabah, puis elle suit le thalweg du Ouadi Atabah jusqu'au

Signal 29, situé au confluent du Ouadi Atabah avec le Khallet Ghuzaleh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 30, situé sur la crête à l'est du Merj Tufeh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 31, situé sur un petit éperon à 800 mètres à l'est du village le plus oriental de Moia, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 32, situé à 300 mètres au nord-ouest de Kh-el-Menarah et au croisement des pistes de Moia à Hunin et de Kh-el-Menarah à El Hols, puis elle suit la ligne de crête en direction sensiblement nord-nord-ouest jusqu'au

Signal 33, qui est le point de triangulation ancienne dénommé Sheikh Abbad, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 34, situé dans la vallée de Hunin et à 1 kilom. au nord-nord-ouest du village de Hunin, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 35, situé sur la ligne de partage des eaux entre le Liban et la Syrie, à 300 mètres au nord du village de Hunin; puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 36, situé sur la ligne de partage des eaux entre le Liban et la Syrie, à 300 mètres au nord du village de Hunin; puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 37, situé au col d'Odeissa, à 300 mètres à l'est des dernières maisons du village et au sud de la piste d'Odeissa à Metallah, puis la frontière suit la piste partant de Metallah vers le sud-est à la croisée des pistes qui vont vers Jdeida de Merj Ayoun vers El Kham et vers El Kala, ensuite elle passe à l'est du village de Metallah, puis elle suit la piste de Metallah à Banias, en direction générale nord-sud, jusqu'au

Signal 38, situé sur la colline à 900 mètres au nord-nord-est du village d'Abil. Du signal 38 à Tell-el-Kady, qui reste en territoire palestinien, la frontière est constituée par une parallèle, à 100 mètres au sud de la piste de Metallah à Banias passant par l'ancien pont romain sur la rivière Hasbani. A partir de Tell-el-Kady la frontière suit la piste de Metallah à Banias jusqu'au

Signal 39, situé au sud de la piste et à sa jonction avec un canal d'irrigation, à 1.000 mètres à l'ouest du village de Banias. Toute la piste entre le col d'Odeissa et Banias reste en entier sur le territoire syrien.

Signal 40, situé au sud et à proximité de Tell Alla; puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 41, situé sur la berge gauche du Nahr Banias et à environ 900 mètres au

sud-ouest de Banias, puis elle suit le sommet de la berge gauche du Nahr Banias jusqu'au

Signal 42, situé à 700 mètres au nord-nord-est de Tell Azizat, sur la piste longeant la berge gauche du Nahr Banias, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 43, situé au sommet du Tell Azizat, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 44, situé à l'intersection de la piste de Mudahhal à Banias avec le thalweg du Ouadi El Zahir à Serd Huda-bin-Yakub.

A partir de ce point, par lequel passe la courbe de niveau 180 qui doit rester en place pour permettre la construction d'un pont, la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au signal en signal, avec signaux érigés savoir

Signal 45, situé à 1.400 mètres à l'est de Tell-el-Sakhui, sur la ligne de crête au nord du thalweg du Ouadi El Zahir.

Signal 46, situé immédiatement à l'ouest de la maison isolée dite El Bergiat.

Signal 47, situé au changement de pente à 1.800 mètres à l'est d'Ain Sheikh Mahmud et au nord du thalweg Ouadi Hamarula.

Signal 48, situé à l'arbre dit Kherbet Dheintain.

Signal 49, situé immédiatement à l'ouest du moulin de Seida.

Signal 50, situé à 600 mètres à l'est de l'arbre qui est à l'embouchure du Ouadi Fajir.

Signal 51, situé immédiatement à l'ouest du moulin d'Yalunna.

Signal 52, situé immédiatement à l'ouest de la maison située elle-même à 1.200 mètres au sud de Benat Yakub.

Signal 53, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest du poste de gendarmerie syrienne de Benat Yakub.

Signal 54, situé à 350 mètres à l'est du moulin en ruines qui se trouve à 900 mètres au sud du pont de Benat Yakub.

Signal 55, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest du lieu dit El Min.

Signal 56, situé à l'est et au-dessus de la chute du Ouadi Sheikh.

Signal 57, situé à 400 mètres au nord-est du lieu dit El Rafit.

Signal 58, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest du lieu dit El Rafit.

Signal 59, situé à 2.300 mètres au sud du lieu dit El Rafit et à environ 400 mètres à l'est du Jourdain, sur un petit sommet.

Signal 60, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest de Kalnat-el-Knasab. Après le signal 60, la frontière passe parallèlement et à 50 mètres à l'est du bras oriental du Jourdain jusqu'à l'embouchure, dans le lac de Tibériade, du bras est du Jourdain. De ce point aux sources thermales de Moesfer, la frontière suit, sur la terre une ligne parallèle et à 10 mètres de la rive du lac de Tibériade suivant les fluctuations résultant de l'exhaussement des eaux, par suite de l'établissement d'un barrage sur le Jourdain au sud du lac de Tibériade.

Signal 61, situé aux sources de Moesfer, à partir de ce signal, la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 62, situé à 1.200 mètres à l'est du signal 61, sur un éperon, puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 63, situé au sommet du Djebel Kurei Jerada, au sud-ouest de Bir Shekum, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 64, situé à l'est des ruines sur le sommet du piton de Kalat-el-Husu, à l'ouest de Fik, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 65, situé au sommet du Tell el-Kady, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 66, situé à 200 mètres au-dessus et à l'ouest de la source d'Ain Rajel, à l'ouest du village de Kefr-Harbi; ensuite la frontière suit une ligne déterminée par les escarpements blancs sur les pentes occidentales du plateau de Djoulun jusqu'au

Signal 67, situé à 250 mètres au sud-est d'Ain Shereira, puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 68, situé à 730 mètres au sud-ouest d'Ain Shereira, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 69, situé immédiatement à l'est de Kh. Tawafik, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 70, situé dans un col à 500 mètres au nord-nord-ouest du kilomètre 91,760 de la voie ferrée Deraa-Haifa, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 71, situé à 50 mètres au nord du kilomètre 91,750 de la voie ferrée, puis la frontière suit une ligne parallèle à 50 mètres au nord de la voie ferrée jusqu'à la piste de Semak à El Hammé. Elle suit cette piste jusqu'au point où la piste traverse les escarpements à 100 mètres au nord-ouest de la station d'El Hammé, elle suit alors le

superieur des escarpements au nord de la voie ferrée, jusqu'au pont situé à 500 mètres à l'est de la station d'El Hammé.

Le Gouvernement de Palestine ou les personnes autorisées par ce Gouvernement auront le droit de bâtir une digue destinée à élever le niveau des eaux sur les lacs Houlé et Tibériade au-dessus de leur niveau normal, à condition de payer une juste indemnité aux propriétaires et aux occupants des terrains qui seront ainsi inondés.

Toutes contestations survenant entre ledit Gouvernement ou les personnes par lui autorisées, d'une part, et les propriétaires ou occupants du terrain, d'autre part, seront définitivement réglées par une commission composée de quatre membres, chacune des Puissances mandataires désignant deux des membres de cette commission.

Tous droits acquis à l'usage des eaux du Jourdain par les habitants de la Syrie seront intégralement maintenus.

Il est entendu que le report de la frontière de Syrie vers le nord, entre Semakh et El Hammé, laisse à la Syrie le chemin de fer jusqu'à Semakh où la gare sera utilisée en commun par les deux pays, dans les conditions qui pourront être déterminées par la commission prévue à l'article 5 de la convention du 23 décembre.

Le Gouvernement de Syrie aura le droit de construire un nouvel appontement à Semakh sur le lac de Tibériade ou d'avoir l'usage commun de l'appontement existant dans les conditions qui pourront être déterminées par la commission susvisée.

L'extraterritorialité de ladite section du chemin de fer (jusqu'à la gare de Semakh exclusivement) qui, par suite de la rectification de frontière, se trouve en Palestine et les droits du Gouvernement syrien ou de ses agents techniques au plein et libre accès pour toutes les questions de chemin de fer, y compris la police de cette section, sont reconnus.

Les personnes ou les marchandises passant du débarcadère ou des débarcadères futurs sur le lac de Tibériade, et allant à la gare de Semakh ou inversement, ne seront pas, au point de vue des règlements douaniers ou autres, réputées personnes ou marchandises entrant en Palestine, pour la seule raison qu'elles doivent traverser le territoire de Palestine, et le droit du Gouvernement syrien et de ses agents d'intervenir à ces débarcadères est reconnu.

Les habitants de Syrie et du Liban auront les mêmes droits de pêche et de navigation que les habitants de la Palestine sur les lacs de Houlé et de Tibériade et dans le Jourdain, entre ledits lacs, mais la responsabilité de la police des lacs incombera au Gouvernement de Palestine.

Il est entendu que le rapport ci-dessus, résultat final des travaux de la commission, ne concerne que la frontière entre la Méditerranée et El Hammé, et que le Gouvernement britannique aura la possibilité de poser la question d'une rectification de frontière entre Ramma et Metallah, sous les conditions qui pourront être convenues entre les deux Puissances mandataires, en vue de faire de la route nord qui unit les deux villages la frontière définitive.

Il est entendu que la frontière, telle qu'elle a été déterminée sur le terrain par la commission, est indiquée en rouge sur les cartes jointes revêtues de la signature des membres de la commission.

Fait à Beyrouth, le 3 février 1922.

Pour le Gouvernement français
Le Lieutenant-Colonel,
N. PAULET

Enclosure 3 in No. 18

Note from Embassy (Paris)

THE members of the Boundary Commission designated, in accordance with the terms of article 2 of the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, for the purpose of fixing the line of the Syro-Palestinian frontier, between the sea and El Hammé, concluded their labours and drew up a final report at Beyrouth on the 3rd February, 1922. Three maps, on a scale of 1:50,000, on which the line proposed by the Commission has been traced, are annexed to this report.

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, in addressing to his Excellency the President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of the report and of the maps annexed thereto, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Newcombe, the British delegate, whose agents equally, binds the State under the terms of the Convention, to inform him that His Britannic Majesty's Government agree to ratify the proposals of the commission, and consider the present note as being equivalent to ratification.

The necessary instructions will be sent to His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, in order that the present agreement may take effect from the 10th March next.

A copy of the report of the commission, dated the 3rd February, 1922, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Newcombe, together with a copy of the present exchange of notes, will be communicated by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the League of Nations.

Paris, March 7, 1923.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

The Final Report on the Demarcation of the Frontier between the Great Lebanon and Syria on the one Side, and Palestine on the other Side, from the Mediterranean Sea to El Hammé (in the Lower Valley of the Yarmuk) in Pursuance of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of Paris of December 23, 1920.

In accordance with article 2 of the said convention, that the boundary between the Mediterranean and El Hammé shall be as follows:

The frontier leaves the Mediterranean Sea at the point called Ras-el-Nakurah, and follows the crest of the spur to cairn 1, situated 50 metres north of the Palestinian police post of Ras-el-Nakurah.

Thence the frontier follows the same crest to cairn 2 at Kurbet Danian.

Thence it follows the same crest to cairn 3, which is an old point of triangulation 400 metres south west of Labana village.

Thence it follows the same crest to cairn 4, 1 kilom. east-south-east of the village of Labana.

Thence, running southwards, it follows the thalweg of an unnamed wadi to its confluence with the Wadi Kutayeh; runs up the thalweg of Wadi Kutayeh east-north-east for 2 kilom.; thence runs up the thalweg of a small tributary on the left of the Wadi Kutayeh, coming from the east up to cairn 5, which is situated at the south-east corner of the cultivated lands of this wadi. Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 6, situated on the crest between the Wadi Kutayeh and El Dalem. From cairn 6 it follows a straight line of 700 metres in a south-south-east direction to cairn 7, which is situated at the confluence of Wadi Dalem with a small thalweg running from the north; it continues up the Wadi Dalem 1,300 metres in an east-north-east direction to cairn 8, situated on the road from Alma-el-Shaub to Yurdeth, and 2,500 metres east of the village of Alma-el-Shaub.

Thence it follows the road passing a few metres to the north of Yurdeth, and thence a few metres to the south of Birket el-Risha to cairn 9, situated 700 metres south east of Kurbet Balat at the junction of the road from Ramma to Terbikha with the road from Ramma to Alma-el-Shaub.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 10, situated at 600 metres south-south-east of cairn 9, thence along the crest between Wadi Terbikha to the south and the basin of Ramma to the north to cairn 11, situated 1 kilom. south-east of the village of Ramma.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 12, situated on the peak 700 metres west of the village of Aita-el-Shaub.

Thence it follows the crest in a generally southern direction to cairn 13 on Tel Ramma.

Thence running in a straight line to the confluence of Wadi-el-Waul with an unnamed wadi 300 metres to the north-east of Tel Abu Baboun, it follows this unnamed wadi which passes east of Manaurah and west of Samukleh as far as cairn 14, situated at 600 metres west of Ain Katamun.

Thence it runs in a straight line in an easterly direction to cairn 15, situated in the valley of Wadi Bediyeh.

Thence it runs in a straight line to cairn 16, situated at the confluence of Wadi Bediyeh with Wadi Khelal.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 17, situated on the west peak of Jebel Haran.

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Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 18, situated on the east peak of Jebel Haranun.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 19, situated on a hill 2,100 metres south-east of the village of Yaron.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 20, situated on a spur 2 kilom. east of the village of Yaron.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 21, situated on the top of Jebel el-Asy.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 22, situated on the bank of a wadi 600 metres to the north of Khirbet Auba and about 1 kilom. to the south of the Birket.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 23, situated on the top of Jebel Ghahieh and at 600 metres to the south of Deir-el-Ghahieh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 24, situated on the spur east of Jebel Ghahieh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 25, situated in the valley on the east bank of the wadi north-west of the village of El Malkiyeh.

Thence it follows the thalweg in a generally northern direction to cairn 26, situated where the thalweg is cut by the path from Kades to Atherun.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 27, situated 700 metres west-north-west of the village of Kades, near the large tree of Khirbet Kenatir.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 28, situated at the crossing of the path from Kades to Mea with the Wadi Atabeh.

Thence it follows the thalweg of Wadi Atabeh to cairn 29, situated at the confluence of Wadi Atabeh with the Khallat Ghuzeloh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 30, situated on the crest east of Merj Tuleh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 31, situated on a small spur 800 metres to the east of the eastern village of Mea.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 32, situated at 300 metres to the north-west of Khirbet el-Menarah, at the junction of the path from Mea to Haranun and Khirbet el-Menarah to El Hala.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 33, situated on the crest in a generally northern direction to the old triangulation point called S. 1000.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 34, situated at 1 kilom. north-north-west of the village of Hunin.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 35, situated on the watershed between the Lotan and the Haleb and 1,300 metres north of Hunin village.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 36, situated on the summit of Jebel-el-Merni.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 37, situated on the col of Odeissa 900 metres to the east of the last houses of the village and south of the path Odeissa to Metallah.

Thence it follows the path from the col of Odeissa, and passing 1,400 metres to north-west and to north of Jebel Ariak, turns to the south-east at the junction of the paths leading to Jerada of Merj Ayoun, Kham and Kaleia; thence it passes over the ridge 300 metres north-east of the village of Metallah, then it follows the path from Metallah to Banias in a generally southern direction to cairn 38, situated on a hill 900 metres north-north-east of the village Abl.

Thence it follows a line parallel to and 100 metres to the south of the path from Metallah to Banias, passing by the old Roman bridge over the River Heshbani, as far as Tel el Kadi, which remains in Palestine.

Thence it follows the path from Metallah to Banias to cairn 39, situated to the south of the path and at its junction with an irrigation canal 1,000 metres west of the village of Banias. Thence it follows the path from Banias to the Syrian territory.

Thence it follows the irrigation canal to cairn 40, situated to the south of and near Tel Aun.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 41, situated on the left bank of Nahr Banias and about 900 metres to the south-west of Banias.

Thence it follows the top of the left bank of Nahr Banias to cairn 42, situated 700 metres to north-north-east of Tel-Aziziat on the path along the left bank of the Nahr Banias.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 43, situated on the top of Tel-Aziziat.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 44, situated at the junction of the path from Maddahad to Banias with the thalweg from Ain Fit to Seid Huda-bu-Yakub.

From this point where the contour 180 metres passes (this contour must remain entirely in Palestine to permit of the construction of a canal), the frontier follows a succession of straight lines from cairn to cairn with cairns erected as follows:—

Cairn 45, at 1,400 metres east of Tel el-Sakhni, on the crest to the north of the thalweg of Wadi el-Zatur.

Cairn 46, immediately west of the isolated house called El Bergiat.

Cairn 47, at the change of slope 1,800 metres east of Ain Sheikh Mahmud, and to the north of the thalweg of Wadi Haranun.

Cairn 48, at the tree called Khirbet Dh.

Cairn 49, immediately to the west of the mill Semia.

Cairn 50, 600 metres east of the tree which is close to the mouth of Wadi Fajr.

Cairn 51, immediately west of the mill Jal.

Cairn 52, immediately west of the house which stands 1,200 metres to the north of Benat Yakub.

Cairn 53, 20 metres to west of the Syrian gendarmerie post at Benat Yakub.

Cairn 54, 350 metres to the east of the ruined mill which is 900 metres to the south of Benat Yakub.

Cairn 55, 20 metres to west of the place called El Min.

Cairn 56, to the east of and above the falls of Wadi Soukh.

Cairn 57, 400 metres to the north-east of the place called El Raht.

Cairn 58, 20 metres to the west of the place called El Rafit.

Cairn 59, 2,300 metres south of the place called El Rafit, and about 400 metres to the east of the Jordan on a small peak.

Cairn 60, at 20 metres to west of Kalaat-el-Qasbi.

After cairn 60 the frontier follows a line parallel to and 50 metres east of the eastern branch of the Jordan to the mouth of that branch in Lake Tiberias. From the mouth of the Jordan to the sulphur springs at Messier, where is placed cairn 61, the frontier follows a line on the shore parallel to and at 10 metres from the edge of Lake Tiberias, following any alteration of level consequent on the raising of its waters owing to the construction of a dam on the Jordan south of Lake Tiberias.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 62, situated 1,200 metres to the east of cairn 61 on a spur.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 63, situated on the top of Jebel Kurin Jerada to the south-west of Bir Shakum.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 64, situated to the east of the ruins on the top of the peak Kalaat-el-Husu to the west of Fik.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 65, situated on the top of Tel Khallis.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 66, situated at 200 metres below and west of the spring of Ain Rajil to the west of the village of Keft Haril.

Thence the frontier follows a line marked by the white cliffs on the western slopes of the plateau of the Jaulan to cairn 67 situated at 250 metres to the south-east of Ain Sherara.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 68, situated at 750 metres to the south-west of Ain Sherara.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 69, situated immediately to the east of Khirbet Tawahk.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 70, situated on the col 500 metres to the north-north-west of kilometre 91750 on the Dama-Haifa Railway.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 71, situated 50 metres to the north of kilometre 91750 on the railway.

Thence the frontier follows a line 50 metres to the north of and parallel to the railway, as far as the path from Semakh to El Hammé. It follows this path up to the point where the path crosses the cliffs 100 metres north-west of the station of El Hammé. Thence it follows the upper edge of the cliffs north of the railway to the bridge which stands 500 metres to the east of El Hammé station.

The Government of Palestine or persons authorised by the said Government shall have the right to build a dam to raise the level of the waters of Lakes Huleh and Tiberias above their normal level, on condition that they pay fair compensation to the owners and occupiers of the lands which will thus be flooded.

MAJOR W. E. MARSHALL M.C., R.A.M.C., His Britannic Majesty's agent and consul, left for the United Kingdom on the 16th February. King Hussein sent the Amir Ali to Jeddah to take a farewell visit. A personal and friendly visit was officially explained as having been made in the service of specific Arab interests, and "Al Kibla" announced that His Highness travelled from Mecca in



SHEET 1.



MAP SHOWING BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIA AND PALESTINE

SHEET 11



MAP SHOWING BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIA AND PALESTINE.



Eastern (Syria) Mar 18 Sep 1

order to inspect the progress of the new Jeddah machine-shops and the new Jeddah dry-dock. Neither of these undertakings has yet advanced beyond the stage of selection of site.

The Emir Ali has now been detailed to accompany the ex-Sultan of Turkey who left Mecca for Ta'if on the 26th February, having found the climate of Mecca rival, the ex-Sultan has kept very much to his Hussein, but regularly attending, under escort. He there hears King Hussein's a new experience for the ex-Caliph.

King Hussein recently informed this agency in confidence, that the ex-Sultan King's amiable protests, his offer of accommodation at Ta'if and a promise that the arrival of the Sultanic family from Constantinople would be expedited. King Hussein seemed to be sceptical of the plea of ill-health and separation from his kin on which the ex-Sultan's departure was mooted, and he attributed to his distinguished guest other vague and less innocent motives. Local opinion firmly holds that His Majesty's and that the reported abolition of Sultan Abdul Mejid's temporal authority is a British rumour only. All seem agreed that King Hussein intends somehow to wrest from Sultan Mohammed Wahid ud Din the title of Caliph.

King Hussein's own propaganda, at present, is limited to a reiterated comparison of the Caliphate in these latter evil days with that stern orthodoxy of early tradition by which his own acts and the Arab administration are alleged to be inspired. He appeals for a return from modern laxity and European influence to strict apostolic simplicity, and holds that the Commander of the Faithful should be distinguished not by a knack for painting or for poetry, but by strict observance of the dogma laid down by God and His prophet. It is left to his audience to divine where such a paragon is to be found.

His Majesty was making himself useful to his brother in the neighbourhood of Mosul. Later, on hearing from his representative at Lausanne that Ismet Pasha had, in conversation, emphasised Kemalist respect for the integrity of Arab territories, King Hussein wrote to Major Marshall, urging that the British should at once evacuate Mosul, to

News that the Nejd Pilgrimage would this year be unrestricted has been received with despair by the King who bitterly resents the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in the steady spread of Riyadh influence through the peninsula. He thinks that British policy should long since have checked the tide which has now engulfed Jauif, Ebha and Taraba and which laps the walls of Khaibar and Kufuda, upsetting all balance of power in Arabia.

He states that he has good reason to believe that Ibn Saud is about to make an attack on Transjordan. He has also sent me a telegram from the Emir of the Juhaina reporting the defeat of a raiding-party of seven "standards" of Wahhabis, at a distance of six hours from El 'Ula. This raiding-party, which is said to have previously put to sleep Ibrahim ibn Rajab, was repulsed with machine guns. One of the "standards" belonged to Farhan-al Aida another to Awajl. It is unsafe to remind King Hussein that desert raids are likely to outlive any political settlement in Arabia, and idle to represent that Ibn Saud cannot easily control events on the fringes of his vast dominions. His Majesty sees only the swell and spread of the Wahhabi tide and the erosion of his own territories.

if we say that this is British hostility. We do not say so. The beloved knows he is loved, so he begins

by recollections with Ibn Saud, and the other remains in occupation of

He expressed his regret that the British Government had not yet given him a British passport. He said that he had been refused a Hashemite Government passport. The matter had been discussed in the most representations, and at last, when in Jeddah in 1921, King Hussein had been told that if the man was given a certified copy of his pre-war passport, his right to travel on a British passport would be recognised. The man was complied with but the Indian is still debarred from leaving Jeddah.

Quarantine.

All the pilgrims who have as yet arrived—from the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore—have been sent to the quarantine islands for twenty four hours, although in many cases no single death or illness had occurred on the voyage. The Dutch consul has, I think wisely, refrained from re-echoing last year's protests, and I have followed his example of silence in the case of British Malayan pilgrims. Thabet Bey, the Director-General of Quarantine, is assured of King Hussein's sympathy and support in his anti-European attitude and he waxes fat and thrives on the question of quarantine. His words will induce the Hashimite Government not to put pilgrims into quarantine here, and the interpretation of some clauses of the International Convention by the International Quarantine Board in Alexandria has certainly encouraged the local authorities in their imposition of "local rules." Unless and until it be decided support protests, if disregarded, by some sort of action, I am convinced that it is better to leave Thabet Bey to his devices rather than to rumble with empty thunder, since this only stiffens the arrogance of opposition and leads, eventually, to the greater discomfort of the pilgrims.

I was interested to see in a Malay vernacular journal of reading for the masses, subsidised by the Dutch Colonial Government, that Kamaran Island is described as an overflow quarantine station from the Hedjaz Islands of Abu Saad.

Dr Granville, President of the International Quarantine Board, visited Jeddah from the 1st to the 4th February on the Egyptian Government steamer "Aida" for the purpose of conveying to King Hussein a warning of the penalties in store for the steamship "Tuwil" and the steamship "Rushdi" if these Hashimite Government vessels again carried pilgrims in excess of the numbers permitted by convention. The King delegated Thabet Bey to represent him in these conversations.

Advantage was taken of Dr Granville's presence to discuss certain difficulties which arose last season, and various shipping agents were invited with the Dutch, French and Italian consuls to meet him.

In the course of discussion Dr Granville explained the omission of Egyptian pilgrim ships to call at Tor (on the southward journey), on the ground that Tor quarantine station was not at the time ready to receive these pilgrims. He explained the return of the Italian steamship "Maseuna" from Suez to Tor (on the northward journey), on the ground that the quarantine station at Moses' Wells (Suez) was not at the time in repair. He agreed that ships carrying not more than one 3rd class passenger (100 tons) could call at Moses' Wells. This leaves the Maseuna free to proceed direct to Suez while pilgrim passengers by Khedivial Mail Line must pass their quarantine period at Tor and thence proceed to Suez by ferry steamer. In case of plague, &c., being reported at Suez, the Maseuna would be required to Tor.

Dr Granville stated that he saw no objection to non-Egyptian pilgrims in transit for the Mediterranean or Palestine being allowed to land in Egypt on their way home, provided they can prove that their passage, or railway fare, to their ultimate destination has been paid, e.g., by a system of through booking from Jeddah. The hardship is, that having transited Egypt on their way to Jeddah, these pilgrims may be refused permission to return by the same route. Dr Granville stated that it had never been the intention to apply strictly the prohibition on the landing or transshipment of non-Egyptian pilgrims. But so long as the risk exists, the shipping companies will refuse them passages, if only in order to be on the safe side.

Non-pilgrims from the Hedjaz, if they could satisfy the quarantine authorities (e.g. by certificate from this agency given with the visa) that they were not pilgrims, would be exempted from quarantine at Tor or Suez. The observation was made that it was illogical to discriminate between pilgrims and the non-pilgrims who had shared with them rooms in Jeddah and the promiscuity of deck-passage on board ship. Dr Granville admitted this, but stated that, so long as the pilgrimage was clean, it did not much matter what happened to non-pilgrims. The Egyptian Public Health authorities should not stop pilgrims, after a clean pilgrimage, from being quarantined at Tor.

Dr Granville admitted that cholera inoculation had had excellent results, but he opposed the insertion of an article in the convention making such inoculation compulsory, on sentimental grounds.

Dr Granville emphasised the fact that his personal inclinations and the decisions of his Board did not necessarily coincide.

The King conferred upon Dr Granville the second class of the Order of El Nahda.

Pilgrimage.

Tariffs of pilgrims' dues, identical with those published last year (see my report for 1921) are in force. The 22nd February 1922 has been declared a public holiday. As before, Javanese and Malay pilgrims pay more than Indians and others. These charges represent a hypothetical minimum, not fact.

Economic.

Financial transactions in the Hedjaz become daily more chaotic. Not only is the export of gold from the country prohibited, but gold sent from town to town is subject to a 10% tax. Money is scarce. Money is scarce. Money is scarce. Jeddah except by draft, for which they have to pay 3 or 4 Turkish piastres per £ premium. Where commodities like flour are in question, this extra charge cuts deep into the narrow margin of profit.

A Government order prohibits the import of "halalas" (Turkish piastres and fractions) under penalty of confiscation, and "mejdias" (Turkish dollars of 20 Turkish piastres) and fractions are liable to a 50 per cent import tax. All pilgrims from ex-Turkish territories are liable to a 10% tax on the rate of exchange of these coins. Their local rates to the pound sterling have been set swinging by the merchants' fear of the King's spies who are sent from Mecca to enforce the "official" rate to the £ (at which the Government sell their mejdis), by their fear of the Hashimite mint, and by their anxiety to sell to the Director-General of Customs, who recently bought a large consignment from Yembo at the rate of 10 mejdis to the £. Shopkeepers do not know where they are—still less where they will be two months hence.

The following amounts of gold coins for the periods ending on 31st December, 1921, and the 10th March, 1922, arrived on the 15th February 1922:—
Gold coins to replace the "halalas," which are not current outside the Hedjaz; possibly silver dollars and fractions to replace the "mejdias." It is not impossible that pilgrims and others arriving in the country will be compelled to exchange their Indian or Egyptian currency for the new Hashimite coinage, at an arbitrary rate with no option as to exchange. The King Hussein's intentions are known only to himself. He has a fair stock of confiscated "halalas," "mejdias," Maria Theresa dollars and Napoleon III 5-franc pieces on which to start minting operations.

It is worth noting that the King has asked that the pilgrims now received at his request, by which all dhows leaving the Soudan coast for Hedjaz ports are required to call first at Jeddah, there should be substituted a system of control permitting dhows to leave the Soudan coast for any Hedjaz port, on condition that they produce, on their return to the Soudan, a certificate of duly discharged cargo to be issued by the Hedjaz authorities at the ports for which they loaded. By this concession to King Hussein, it appears to be intended to give him power to ration the tribes round Rabegh and other northern ports. Whether he has provided for strict control of the tribes on the Medina road one grievance the less this year I cannot yet say. Local opinion, always disposed to accept the tortuous, sees in the measure an elaborate royal scheme for getting "halalas" into the country, while forbidding their importation, by giving facilities for their smuggling from the Soudan to Yembo. Certainly the request for this change in dhow control procedure, the arrival of the mint, and the removal of the long standing prohibition on the shipment of "halalas" from Yembo to Jeddah, all occurred within the space of seven days.

The octroi in Mecca is being very strictly applied. Bedouins require official permission to take any foodstuffs or cloth out of the town.

Medina.

I understand that there was a fight in Manakha, the market of Medina, on the 29th January last, between citizens and Masruh tribesmen, in which two men were killed and many wounded.

Three small "rukabs" (see my report for the period ending the 28th February 1922) arrived in Jeddah from Mecca during the month and proceeded along the

coast en route for Medina. Their normal road, through Ispahan, is impracticable owing to Bisha hostility.

An Arab who worked last year on the repair of the Hedjaz Railway at Buair, under His Highness the Emir Ali, informs me that all the repair work accomplished by the Emir Ali was destroyed by Wahhabi raiders within a week after His Highness's departure. All bridges between Buair and Medina have been washed away by floods.

King Hussein's alternative to the British and French Government's suggestions for railway administration is referred to in the attached notes on the press. On the 1st February, 150 and 200 troops and Bedouin left Jeddah on the steamship

for El Wejh en route for El 'Ula to repair the line. They took two months to get to El 'Ula. The repairs to the line are said to be completed above. Fifty of these irregulars are said to have deserted between Mecca and Jeddah. They were kept under police supervision while in Jeddah. Army salaries are many months in arrears.

General

The Indian police officer attached to this office for duties as pilgrimage officer, Khan Sahib Hakim Said Hasan, M.B.E., left for India on the 21st February, having been recalled to the Government of India. The equipment of the Indian Police in the Hedjaz is said to be in a state of disrepair.

Mr T. F. Critchley, Egyptian manager of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, spent a few days in Jeddah during the month. The Jeddah branch of this bank, to the title of which King Hussein strongly objects, has not been allowed to function since the revolt, and Mr Critchley may recommend to his principals that they should cease to keep a manager here doing nothing.

An American yacht, "Wisdom II" of Los Angeles, owned and sailed by a Mr. Salisbury and a party of journalists, cinematograph men, and a scratch Kanaka crew, called and stayed some time in Jeddah harbour on her way round the world. Cinematograph pictures were taken on land and from the air. These pictures, which were shown to the Arabs by interviewing all the Europeans in Jeddah, were made much of by the local authorities. "Al Kibla" refers to them as the "first American mission to the Hedjaz." Their version of life in Jeddah, as given to the American press, will be entertaining, if not veracious.

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 4th February and left on the 7th February.

Press Summary ("Al Kibla")

No. 656 January 25, 1923.

Decorations.—M. Krajewski, French consul general in Jeddah, his son, and officers of the French sloop "Algol" receive the Order of El Nahda.

Official Notice.—The Government notifies all travellers to the Hedjaz that any "metal money" they may bring of higher value than 10 Turkish piastres will be confiscated. Further, that Turkish mejidi dollars, or fractions thereof, above 5 dollars, are liable to 50 per cent. import duty, but these may be deposited with the Customs Administration and recovered without charge on the traveller's departure from the Hedjaz.

(By "metal money" nickel coin is meant, and by nickel coin, only Turkish nickel coins ("hal-las") are subject to confiscation. All other coins, Indian, Egyptian, and all other coins are liable to be confiscated, so the Government were therefore asked to define more precisely their intentions.)

The Caliphate.—Articles on the separation of the Sultanate from the Caliphate are reproduced from "Al Akhbar" of Cairo (No. 867 of the 28th December, 1922). "Al Kibla," in its issue of the 25th January, 1923, reproduces the same articles, and adds to-day with the Caliphate of early Moslem tradition, and says that none of the charges so often made against King Hussein by his enemies are a patch on the decision of the Angora Assembly.

No. 657. January 29, 1923.

The Curse of Husto.—Articles are reproduced from "Al Mokattam" (of the 10th January), from "Alif Ba," of Damascus (No. 714), and from "Al Ahram" (No. 13050), criticising the Kemalists' decision regarding the divorce of the temporal

and spiritual powers of the Caliphate. "Al Kibla" remarks on the growing note of criticism in these and similar articles, and regrets that the press in general should have been originally so hasty to applaud, and should now have to reconsider its first enthusiasms.

Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahid. It is been said that after the Ka'aba where he put up some years ago, he is now to put up a new Ka'aba in the vicinity. We congratulate him on a privilege enjoyed by none of his ancestors.

Sheikh Atwa-bin-Saleh-el Majali. Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahid, and Sheikh Ismail Kazzaz, Karaman, El 'Ula have been made welcome in Mecca. Also another batch of Turkish refugees from Constantinople via Suez.

(The Arab notables came to discuss Hedjaz railway business.)

No. 658. February 1, 1923.

Official Notice.—The Hedjaz Railway. Repairs will be undertaken at the expense of the Government. There will be a Board of Administration for all permanent and fundamental matters connected with the line, and a temporary board of repairs. General superintendence over all administrative matters is vested in King Hussein. The duties of residents in the Hedjaz are to be performed by persons of the country, is to sit at Medina, under the Sheikh-ul Haram, to administer the line. The Emir Abdullah is to be general director of repairs; El Sayed Mohamed Shukri, Karaman, is to be in charge of repairs and other works and the R. and B. of the Hedjaz of Anman is to be in charge of contracts, &c.

At Karaman it is stated that the first instalment of the Arab Government's contribution has been paid to the "Board of Administration."

"Leave the Imposters in their Deceit."—This, and an article on Syrian attachment to King Hussein, are pro-Arab, anti-Kemalist articles, vigorously applauded by "Al Kibla," copied from "Alif Ba."

Lausanne.—The Arab delegate's efforts, and his compliance with the instructions laid down for him, are said to have led to a good presentation of the Arab question to the conference.

No. 659. February 5, 1923.

Decorations.—Dr. Granville, president of the International Quarantine Board, Alexandria, receives the second class of the Order of El Nahda.

Sheikh Atwa-bin-Saleh-el Majali and two other notables of El Kerak are also decorated.

Official Notice.—Persons arriving in the Hedjaz from countries in which there is a risk of the spread of the plague, and whose passports are not endorsed by the Arab agent, will not be allowed to land.

Angora and the Caliphate.—Reproduction of an article contributed by "A real Arab" to "Alif Ba" of Damascus, of a tone hostile to Turkish ambitions and friendly to Arab orthodoxy and Arab national sentiment.

Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahid. Attended the Friday prayer with His Majesty King Hussein, strongly escorted by soldiers and police.

Return of the Turkish delegate. The Hedjaz delegate has asked permission to leave Lausanne.

Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahid. A district road, a path between the Makhbat road to Hassa and Abu Jafan has been swallowed up (in a landslide or earthquake).

No. 660. February 8, 1923.

Angora.—The newspaper "Yeni Gun" of Angora having declared that "Disaffection is rife in the Hedjaz, and the inhabitants are driven to extremes by the tyranny of the Government," "Al Kibla" reproduces, verbatim, a stormy debate in the Angora National Assembly, as reported in "Al Ahram." Cat-calls, mud-slinging and rowdy abuse: how can an Assembly so devoid of decency be considered the arbiters of Islam and the source of a thousand journalistic hopes?

Poetry.—A Bedouin Kazidah in honour of King Hussein.

"Political Hysteria."—(From "Al Siyaca" of Cairo.)

E. 754.

On the 28th July we telegraphed to Sir R. Graham saying that the Italians were alleged to be asking more from the French in regard to Syria in the way of assurances than we had given them in regard to Palestine. Sir R. Graham was instructed to urge the Italians to limit their demands to the assurances we had conceded in Palestine and to expedite an agreement with the French.

E 7458 contains the *procès verbal* of the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on the 24th July containing a declaration that the mandates for Syria and Palestine will come into force when France and Italy notify the President of the Council of the League of Nations that they have reached an agreement.

E. 755.

Sir R. Graham on 28th July 1922. The Italian Government had explained that the French intended to consider their assurances to the Italian Government about Syria as only applicable if similar assurances were given to Italy by His Majesty's Government about Irak. We telegraphed (No. 257) to our Ambassador in Paris instructing him to protest to the French regarding their attitude.

E. 7706.

On the 7th August we replied by telegram (No. 413) stating that the French held that the real attitude was between Syria and Irak and not between Syria and Palestine.

E. 8452.

On the 24th August he telegraphed (No. 436) that M. Poincaré was now satisfied. Lord Hardinge, in his despatch No. 1992 of the 27th August transmitted a note from M. Poincaré in which the latter claimed that His Majesty's Government must promise in precise terms not to accord to Italy in Irak a less favourable situation than that acquired by her in Syria through the Franco-Italian Agreement. It was subsequently explained that this note superseded Paris telegram No. 436 of the 24th August.

E. 12102.

The Colonial Office on the 4th November transmitted suggestions by Sir P. Cox as to the assurances which the Italians should be given in regard to Irak, and we sent to the Colonial Office a draft memorandum for concurrence, setting forth these assurances for submission to the Italian Ambassador.

E. 13122.

On the 14th December the above memorandum was transmitted privately to the Italian Ambassador.

E. 16111.

On the 14th February, 1923, we wrote to the Italian Ambassador enquiring whether the memorandum had proved acceptable to the Italian Government. At the same time a despatch was sent to Sir R. Graham instructing him to approach the Italian Government with a view to obtaining, at an early date, an expression of their views on this subject.

J MURRAY

Foreign Office, March 22, 1923

E 3500 531, 89}

No. 21.

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 5.)

No. 22

My Lord,

Aleppo, March 17, 1923

I HAVE the honour to report that Subhi Bey Berakat, President of the Syrian Federation, left to-day for Damascus with all the staff of the Federal Administration. The Aleppo members of the Federal Council are to follow in a fortnight's time.

M. de Caix, Acting High Commissioner, paid a short visit to Aleppo last week to inspect the work of the various Federal Commissions on the eve of their transfer to Damascus. He was apparently rather dissatisfied with the progress of the commission's labours.

The decision of the Federal Council to transfer the seat of the Federation permanently from Aleppo to Damascus has caused discontent here. Aleppo was reluctant to enter the Federation, and would have preferred to remain a separate administrative unit. It only entered the Federation as a result of French pressure and on the understanding that the Federation would sit alternatively at Aleppo and Damascus. The first session of the Federal Council was accordingly opened at Aleppo last December. The council, however, after dealing with its main business, *i.e.*, the federalisation of certain departments (War, Justice, etc.), presented a resolution to the effect that the Federation should sit permanently at Damascus. The representatives of Damascus and the Alawites voted together against those of Aleppo.

Aleppo feels that it has been tricked and that its interests are being sacrificed. It maintains that voluntarily it is not prepared to surrender its position since the latter has been shorn of the Jebel Druze, and that it will have to provide the greater part of the Federal budget. Aleppo is also dissatisfied with the fact that the seat of the Federation is now at Damascus, and that the Federal Council is likely to be dominated by the Damascus element. It is true that M. de Caix appears to have withstood attempts to secure undue assignments of Aleppo revenues to the Federal budget, but ultimately circumstances may lead to the French High Commissioner. Anyhow, between a Damascus with a completely centralised administration and Aleppo, which has been the chief victim of the partition of Turkey in Asia and the T. E. A. B. Agreement with Ankara, seems to be marked out for the rôle of the "chick" of the Syrian Federation.

While Aleppo is situated only a few miles from the Turkish frontier, in a region subject to frequent raids by bands, often acting under Turkish instigation, and to continual Turkish propaganda. Moreover, Aleppo's face is turned towards regions outside of Syria. Its economic life is bound up with its lost Anatolian and Mesopotamian markets, which it must not sink into insignificance. Damascus, both by its situation and its religious and historical prestige, is obviously the more appropriate capital of an Arabian Federation in Syria.

Unfortunately there is no such thing as a Syrian national unity. Aleppo has no sympathy with Damascus, and I presume that this indifference is reciprocated. The Alawites, who are a very powerful element in the Syrian population, look with disfavour on the idea of the Federal capital owing to French pressure. But they, too, would prefer a nominal independence to the subordination of the Federation under French pressure. If Damascus is to be the seat of the Federation, this attitude is no doubt inspired by the hope that Damascus is going to profit financially by the subordination of the other two States.

Moreover, the French authorities obviously must make an effort to unify Syria, and all that can be hoped for is that gradually bonds of interest will be forged between the three States and reconcile them to co-operation. The lack of cohesion among Arabs, in Syria or elsewhere, now or at any other time of their history, justifies some scepticism as to the possibility of a united Syria in the immediate future.

I have &c.

W A SMART

[E 3616, 406, 89]

No. 22.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 14, 1923

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 34, Confidential, of the 16th February concerning co-operation with the Syrian Federation, and more particularly to the last sentences of paragraph 1 and to paragraph 3.

I also took the matter up once more here verbally.

The result of my letter No. L.A.O. 16 to the Haut-Commissaire has been very gratifying.

On the evening of the 1st March Commandant Arleboise informed me that he had been invited to interview the Emir Abdallah at his camp at Hama on the 11th March, and that he would like me to go with them, if possible.

I attach great importance to this action, as Commandant Arleboise is the most noted man in Syria and Transjordan. His nomination for this voyage—he is head of the Political Section here—could only mean that the French were still somewhat suspicious, but had decided to give our offers a fair trial.

I accordingly arranged to make the journey to Hama with them, and we left on the 3rd March in a special carriage sent up from Amman by Mr. Philby. At Deraa we discussed details for a combined demonstration with the local French authorities.

On the 4th March Mr. Philby and Colonel Peake took us across from Amman to have lunch with Emir Abdallah at his camp at Shua. Mazhar Bey, the Prime Minister, was present.

* For text of treaty, see Enclosure I in No. 25

Acting Consul Graffey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (Received April 17.)

(No. 27. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, March 31, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period of the 1st to 31st March, 1923.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Darnassau.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY SMITH, *Vice-Consul*

Enclosure in No. 24.

Jeddah Report for the Period March 1 to March 31, 19

1948 2 10 1

III. period under review has been comparatively calm.

The ex-Sultan.

His return in Taif was cut short after less than a fortnight by his illness. His illness of life in Taif which in Meccan eyes fringes the delights of Paradise is a common one. He returned to Mecca in March to Mecca, and in the Hedjaz. He has been ordered to Malta, and his family may be transported from Constantinople to Hama, and that he may be sent 2,000l from his own funds. In this message he makes no reference to his own intentions, but he declares that his health does not allow him to remain for long in the Hedjaz. In a message to his daughters, of slightly later date, he describes his health as perfect and makes no comment on their statement that the family's transport (to the Hedjaz) has been arranged. He views with apprehension a Ramadan spent in the heat of the Holy City. Haifa appears to be his destination of predilection, though Cyprus and Switzerland are rumoured as alternatives. It is of course impossible to raise with him the question of his departure until he refers more definitely to it himself. His farewells to the Hedjaz, which will in any case be unpopular with King Hussein, will be doubly resented if the new residence selected lies in a non-Muslim country.

Turkish Refugees

[illegible]

Pilgrimage

The first pilgrim caravan of the season, consisting of 3,500 camels, left Mecca for Medina on the 22nd March. They took the Sulvaun road to Rabegh, but their movements thence will depend upon the Ahanda tribesmen, who are reported to be in revolt against the central authority in Mecca on account of the cessation of their tribute. If their attitude is uncompromisingly hostile, the caravan will have to take the Bir Rudhwan-Bir Mashi route.

The camel hire charged in this caravan is 95 Turkish Mıyidi dollars for the return journey. This was collected from the pilgrims at the rate of seven dollars to the gold pound, £13½ sterling gold and a few piastres. Of this the Government retains £6½ for a camel, leaving the camel-men but small remuneration for the expenses of their journey with the caravan, usually the least of the pilgrims.

Medina.

I learn that prices in Medina have risen by about 60 per cent. as a result of the tribesmen's prevention of transport from Yembo. No mails have reached Medina from Yembo (i.e., from Jeddah) for seven or eight weeks.

few expect to see him return to Mecca. As a result of this, all invitations to walk into the trap, but King Hussein is said to have summoned him to advise the ex-Sultan about the journey to Medina which His Majesty was alleged to have in mind. Should Sharif Sa'ud make the journey from Mecca to Medina in 4 or 5 days His murder would remove from the Hedjaz stage a most picturesque character.

Star Trade

Individuals locally known to be slave-traders have been returning during the last months in twos and threes to Aden, en route for Abyssinia. Nothing is gained by refusing them a passport-endorsement; nor would it be possible to persuade the Haahumite Government to take action against them, even if evidence more precise than general knowledge could be obtained. Their names, ages and arrival in Aden are, however, regularly signalled to the Political Resident, Aden, for such black-list

Early in the month, the sheikh of the auctioneers boasted to a trustworthy informant that King Hussein had been pleased to grant him the right to charge a special extra brokerage of 10% on each slave sold in Jeddah. I have heard of no new arrivals during the period under review.

General

"Colonel" Chirokof, with a Russian mechanic and an Arab pupil, flew the Armstrong machine from Jeddah to Ta'if on the 23rd March. I know that he has every desire to resist orders for bombing expeditions towards Kheikh and Taraba, but it is difficult to see what non-aggressive object is served by the presence of the Armstrong in Ta'if.

Jordan carpenters have been told from King Hussein's court that they will be allowed to hire out "shukdufs" (camel-litters) and that they may refuse to repair shukdufs which they do not control. This promise, which will mean higher prices for camel hire, does not, however, take effect until after the current season.

Members of the police force whose contracts expired from one to five years ago are not to be paid from 1912 to 1914. As a result, many a poor devil has been led by the promise of long arrears of somebody else's back-pay to engage in the force and so to send a previous victim on his way rejoicing.

Press.

A summary of Nos. 666 to 673 of "Al Killa" is annexed. The new style of "El-Husseini" and "El-A'zun" in references to the King is perhaps worth noting.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

"What are they asking for?": report of Lord St. Clement's question in the House of Lords, pressing for publication and fulfilment of His Majesty's Government's pledge to the Arabs. "Al Kibla" thinks the Arab case is in good hands.

Pilgrim Caravana.—A second caravan of Gulf pilgrims for Medina will leave very shortly.

Shipping Intelligence to March 28, 1923.

[illegible]

No. 25

Arabic text as the result of the scrutiny, it will be telegraphed to you to communicate direct to Dr. Nain.

4. Dr. Naji intends to use his best endeavours to persuade King Hussein to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which will automatically make the Hejaz a member of the League of Nations.

5. You will of course keep me informed by telegram as far as possible of King Hussein's reception of the treaty.

Dr. Naji raised the question of King Hussein being invited to visit Great Britain if he accepted the treaty. In spite of the failure of this inducement during the negotiations in 1921, he believes that it may materially help on this occasion. I am considering the advisability of such an invitation and the conditions upon which it should be extended, and Dr. Naji was informed before his departure that I would telegraph my decision to you for communication to him.

[illegible]

8. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo and Constantinople.

1st to, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure 1 to No. 25

English Text of the Anglo-Hashimite Treaty, initialled by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by Dr. Najm-el-Asid, April 16, 1923.

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

[illegible]

Have determined to conclude a treaty of peace; peace and have united and appointed as their plenipotentiaries -

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; The Right Honourable Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and

His Hashimite Majesty King Hussein, Leader of the Arab Revolt, Founder of the Arab Hashimite State and its King, Warden of the Inviolable Precinct of the Sanctuary of God, and of the City of His Ancestor, Lord of the Divine Messengers: Dr. El Beyyid Naji-el-Azmi,

* Not \$0.00M., as previously printed.

18. 19. 20.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1923.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11 of to-day's date, I transmit to you the following copy of the draft treaty of peace between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein, as drafted by me and Dr. Na'aj, Assistant Secretary for Mecca, on the 17th April taking with him the initialled texts. He hopes to be able to obtain King Hussein's authority to return to London for the formal signature of the treaty at an early date. Dr. Na'aj is confident that if King Hussein authorises him to sign the treaty, he will ratify the treaty as signed.

2. The text of the treaty differs, as you will see, in some respects from that signed by the [redacted] Laurence-Abdullah treaty of 1924. As regards the content of the treaty, however, it is almost entirely identical with the unratified Laurence-Abdullah treaty) and also as regards Articles 3, 4 and 5, which provide for the question of the disputed land frontiers of the Hedjaz. The bulk of the articles, however, are identical with those of the latter treaty.

3. As it has been essential, owing to King Hussein's ignorance of English and his general attitude, to omit the clause usually inserted in such treaties, wherein the English is declared to be the authoritative text, it has been necessary to exchange notes with Dr. Naji, copies of which are enclosed, strictly defining the Arab translation of an important passage in article 2 of the treaty. It was also agreed that the Arabic text should be initialed subject to final scrutiny by an impartial English expert in Arabic, and copies of a note addressed to Dr. Naji in this sense and of his acknowledgment are transmitted herewith. If this expert advises an amended version of the

Which, after being communicated to each other by their respective plenipotentiaries, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty King Hussein, their heirs and successors. Each of the high contracting parties agrees and promises to use all the means which his laws provide to prevent his territory being used as a base for activities directed against the present or future interests of the other.

ARTICLE 2.

His Britannic Majesty hereby undertakes to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in Iraq and Trans-Jordan and in the Arab States of the Arabian Peninsula (exclusive of Aden). As regards Palestine, His Britannic Majesty has already undertaken that nothing will be done in that country which may prejudice the civil and political rights of the Arabs. In all of these territories expressing a desire to enter into an association for customs or other purposes with a view to eventual confederation, His Britannic Majesty will, if requested to do so by the parties concerned, readily use his good offices to further their desire.

His Hashimite Majesty hereby recognises the special position of His Britannic Majesty in Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Palestine, and undertakes that in such matters as may require the influence of His Hashimite Majesty concerning these countries, he will do his best to co-operate with His Britannic Majesty in the fulfilment of his obligations.

ARTICLE 3.

His Hashimite Majesty undertakes to maintain the friendly relations which existed between himself and the ruler of Asir and between himself and the ruler of Nejd before the Arab revolt, to observe the pacts formerly existing between himself and those two rulers, provided that there is nothing in those pacts which is contrary to the spirit of the treaties existing between His Britannic Majesty and those rulers, and to do all in his power to forbid in his own territories and in all parts over which he has authority anything harmful to the material or moral interests of those States or their rulers.

ARTICLE 4.

His Hashimite Majesty undertakes to use his best endeavours to settle by friendly negotiation any disputes relating to the frontiers between his territories and those over which the two rulers referred to in article 3 have authority.

His Britannic Majesty, for his part, undertakes that he will use his good offices when it is desired in promoting and assisting the settlement of any such dispute, more especially in any case where a change has taken place since the date of the Arab revolt.

ARTICLE 5.

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to restrain by all peaceful and practical means in his power any aggression upon the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, within such frontiers as may ultimately be determined under article 4 of this treaty or otherwise, by neighbouring States which are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 6.

Each high contracting party agrees and promises to receive and recognise the agent of the other. His Hashimite Majesty may appoint an agent to reside in London. His Britannic Majesty may appoint an agent to reside at Jeddah or other seaport town of His Hashimite Majesty. Out of respect for the special character of Mecca and Medina, His Britannic Majesty will not appoint an agent there.

His Hashimite Majesty shall be entitled, if he so desires, to appoint consular agents in England and India, and His Britannic Majesty shall be entitled to appoint a consular agent at Jeddah and such additional seaports of His Hashimite Majesty as His Britannic Majesty may from time to time deem expedient.

These agents and consular agents shall respectively enjoy the usual diplomatic and consular privileges.

ARTICLE 7.

His Hashimite Majesty hereby recognises the provisional quarantine arrangements set up by His Britannic Majesty in Kamaran to fulfil the medical provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912, or of any other sanitary convention which is binding upon his Britannic Majesty.

On his part, His Britannic Majesty agrees to recognise such complementary measures as, in conformity with the medical provisions of the said convention or conventions, are to be taken at Jeddah and other ports of the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, in accordance with regulations to be published by His Hashimite Majesty.

ARTICLE 8.

Subject to the provisions of article 10, His Britannic Majesty undertakes not to interfere in any way with the measures adopted by His Hashimite Majesty within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty for the care and comfort of pilgrims.

On his part, His Hashimite Majesty undertakes to assist any efforts made by His Britannic Majesty, to contribute towards the welfare, health and food supply of pilgrims in the Hedjaz, as His Hashimite Majesty is doing in the case of Am Zobeida.

ARTICLE 9.

The high contracting parties agree to fix a definite sum per pilgrim by way of dues for sanitary services respectively performed by them. These dues shall cover the cost of the total sanitary services up to the time of the landing of the pilgrims, and shall be included in the price of the tickets issued by the various shipping companies.

His Hashimite Majesty shall retain dues charged for measures at his ports, and His Britannic Majesty shall similarly retain dues charged for measures at Kamaran.

ARTICLE 10.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to recognise the Hashimite status of all subjects of His Hashimite Majesty who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty, or within British-protected territory or territory under a British mandate, provided such Hashimite subjects are possessed of papers issued by His Hashimite Majesty showing the Hashimite status of the bearer.

On his part, His Hashimite Majesty agrees to recognise the British status of all British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may be at any time within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, provided such British subjects or British-protected persons are registered at a British consulate in the Hashimite territories. Further, in order to obviate complications, such persons must have in their own possession documentary proof of their nationality, as is laid down in the case of Hashimite subjects above.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply to British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who are habitually resident in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 11.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that the property of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may die in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, shall be handed over to the British representative in the said territories, or to such authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British representative in the said territories will see that any dues or taxes which are payable on such property under Hashimite laws are duly paid.

ARTICLE 12.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that in all cases which arise in Hashimite territories and in which a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty is plaintiff or defendant, a British consular representative shall attend the

Hashimite courts during the hearing of the case, and where the British agent wishes to make diplomatic representations on grounds of equity to His Hashimite Majesty, the British agent shall be permitted to do so, but the case shall proceed except after permission of His Hashimite Majesty.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 13.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that he will cause to be delivered over to the British consular authority British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who have been arrested by the Hashimite authorities, if the British consular authority gives security for their appearance when required by the Hashimite authorities.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 14.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that cases between British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty in which the interests of Hashimite subjects are not involved shall be tried by the British consular authority.

It is understood, however, that it should be tried by the Hashimite court, as provided in article 12, nor in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 15.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to surrender within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty persons who are not British subjects, but who are enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, in virtue of the Capitulations between Great Britain and Turkey.

ARTICLE 16.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees to notify the British agent in all cases where he requires the deportation from the territories of His Hashimite Majesty of a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, and the British agent shall be responsible for the deportation of the person indicated within a reasonable time.

ARTICLE 17.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to permit the British agent to register at Jeddah any British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who is in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, and to permit the British agent to register at Jeddah any British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who is in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, and to permit the British agent to register at Jeddah any British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who is in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty.

It is understood, however, that it should be tried by the Hashimite court, as provided in article 12, nor in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 18.

Each of the high contracting parties hereby declares that he will not, during the continuance of this treaty, enter into any treaty, agreement or understanding with a third party, directed against the interests of the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE 19.

No clause contained in this treaty shall override any obligations which may have been incurred, or may in the future be incurred, by either of the high contracting parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under any convention which may be adopted by the League of Nations and entered into by either of the two parties.

ARTICLE 20.

The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible. It shall come into force immediately upon ratification, and shall be binding during seven years from the date of its coming into force. In case neither of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years of his intention to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of a further term of seven years, after which either of the high contracting parties shall have given such notice.

The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. One copy of each text will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of His Hashimite Majesty, and one copy of each text in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done in duplicate at London, the _____, of the Mahommedan era, corresponding to the _____, 1923.

Enclosure 3 in No. 25.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Dr. Naji-el-Assil.

Foreign Office, April 16, 1923.

Sir, IN transmitting to you herewith the English and Arabic texts of the treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty,* initialled by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I am directed by the Secretary of State to inform you that, in order to meet your desire to return at once to Mecca to submit the result of the negotiations to His Majesty King Hussein, he has initialled the Arabic text on the understanding that it shall be subject to a final scrutiny by an impartial English expert in Arabic. Should this expert advise the Secretary of State that in any important respect the English text has not been sufficiently closely translated, an amended version will be submitted for your consideration by telegraph through the acting British agent at Jeddah.

I am, &c.
W. TYRRELL.

Enclosure 3 in No.

Dr. Naji-el-Assil to Foreign Office.

Hyde Park Hotel, London, April 16, 1923.

Sir, I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 16th April regarding a final scrutiny of the Arabic text of the treaty between His Hashimite Majesty and His Britannic Majesty, the contents of which I have carefully noted.

I am, &c.
NAJI-EL-ASSIL.

* See Enclosure 1.

[E 4025 4025/91]

No. 26.

Memorandum on the Arab Bureau, its Purposes and Services.

THE Arab Bureau was an outcome of the critical situation which arose for Great Britain when, by the entry of Turkey into the war, it became possible for Germany, by means of Turkey, to threaten the vital British line of communication which passes through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

The danger was much greater and much more insidious than ever became generally known in England. It was not confined to the certainty of having to meet military operations directed against the Canal and Egypt. There was the further and less known danger that the Germans and Turks went far—of establishing German submarine bases and wireless stations in the Red Sea. It was also known that the Germans attached enormous importance to the possibilities opened for them against Great Britain by the German alliance with Turkey and the influence upon Islam which they hoped the Turkish Caliph could exert.

In combating these strategical and Islamic influences exerted by the German-Turkish alliance, Great Britain sought to secure the Islamic and the military assistance of the Sherif of Mecca and the Arabs of the eastern coast line of the Red Sea. Great Britain succeeded in obtaining the assistance of the Sherif and the Arabs as allies—assistance loyally rendered to the end, and far more decisive in character than is recognised except by a few with inner knowledge. The delicate and peculiar needs attending the execution of British policy towards the Arabs during this period led to the formation of the Arab Bureau.

German-Turkish efforts directed against the British line of communication through the Canal failed, so also did German-Turkish efforts to secure even the partial support of Islam outside of Turkey. To the British Arabian policy of the period is due much of the success of the British line of communication. In fact, the monetary cost of the bureau from first to last is an absurdly disproportionate sum compared with the outlay which would have been incurred by Great Britain had the Arabs thrown in their lot with the Turks.

The brief history of the bureau and its purposes is as follows:

During 1915 and at the beginning of 1916 British policy in Arabia was directed by His Majesty's Government through the Foreign Office rather than through the India Office; and the High Commissioner in Egypt was the local authority under the Foreign Office. These military commanders, namely, the General Officer Commanding in Egypt, Mesopotamia and Aden, were involved, as well as the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies and Egyptian waters and the Governor-General of the Sudan.

And as many authorities, all directly interested in events in Arabia, it became necessary to have a central organisation for the exchange of information and advice. This policy was at first provided by the Cairo Intelligence Office, directed by Lieutenant Colonel Clayton, who was the channel of communication between the High Commissioner and both the Sirdar and the General Officer Commanding, Egypt.

But, as His Majesty's Government sought to strengthen this system of co-ordination by the establishment of the Arab Bureau. The original constitution of the bureau was decided on the 17th January, 1916, by order of the Prime Minister. The Foreign Office, War Office and India Office were represented at this conference.

The first function of the bureau was decided to be the harmonising of British political policy in the Near East and to keep the Foreign Office, the Committee of Imperial Defence, War Office, the Admiralty and the Government of India simultaneously informed of the general tendency of German-Turkish policy.

The second function was to co-ordinate British policy in the East and to keep the Entente among non-Indian Moslems without clashing with the susceptibilities of Indian Moslems and the Entente Powers.

The bureau was formally constituted as a Foreign Office institution on the 17th February, 1916, and was closed towards the end of 1920.

It was staffed by men with special knowledge of the Near East. Amongst those who served on it, with Brigadier-General Clayton as director, were Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Clayton, Major K. Cornwallis and others well known for their Arabian and Eastern qualifications.

Subsequently a branch of the bureau was established at Jerusalem, and another branch, under the India Office, at Bagdad.

It should be mentioned that one of the lesser activities of the Arab Bureau was the issue, weekly or bi-monthly, of a remarkable intelligence journal, the "Arab Bulletin." This journal was sent to all British officers and officials to whom the journal was circulated were forbidden to allow anyone but themselves to see their copy. Nor might the journal be quoted from, even in secret communications.

Such, in brief, were the nature and duties of the bureau. For the purposes it was intended to serve, for the duties it carried out, the name by which the organisation was known was—perhaps intentionally—inadequate and misleading. The bureau, in fact, was a very real and very effective instrument of British policy in the Arab countries; it gathered, collated and sent out political and military intelligence of the greatest moment, and members of its staff were from time to time sent on missions to Arab rulers and conducted negotiations.

W. J. CHILDS.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1923.

[E 4032 4032 89]

No. 27

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received April 21.)

[By Bag.]

No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 20, 1923.

APPOINTMENT of General Weygand to succeed General Gouraud in Syria is greeted with satisfaction, although some regret is expressed that so eminent a soldier is leaving the West. There is a tendency to attribute the appointment to a fear of the influence of the Syrian Government on the operations of Turkish troops in that quarter, and there is a general idea that his appointment is due to nervousness as to Turkish designs and to uncertain state of affairs in the Near East generally.

[E 4330 46/91]

No. 28

Acting Consul Graffey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received April 30.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 10, 1923.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 165 of the 29th December last, covering copies of correspondence regarding the proposed treaty between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that when Major Marshall, before leaving the Hedjaz, addressed to King Hussein a statement of the amendments which His Majesty's Government desire to see introduced into the version of this treaty which has been signed by King Hussein and presented to your Lordship by Dr. Najj-el-Azail, this communication provoked correspondence from King Hussein of a tone so embittered and so hostile to those of the proposed alterations which concern the Sultan of Nejd and the special position of His Britannic Majesty in Palestine and in Mesopotamia, that I have thought it expedient to refrain from attempting to continue negotiations, a favourable issue to which appears to be, in present circumstances, impossible of attainment.

I gather that Dr. Najj-el-Azail is inclined to take some credit to himself for the treaty which he considers himself to have negotiated in Mecca, but I do not doubt that King Hussein's signature to a treaty differing from that signed at Amman in respect of those material particulars which render the document communicated by Dr. Najj-el-Azail objectionable to His Majesty's Government could, without difficulty,

[10594]

F 2

have been obtained at any stage of the 1921-1922 negotiations. It is because the efforts then directed towards securing King Hussein's ratifications of the Amman Treaty failed to gain acceptance for the articles relative to the Sultan of Nejd and to the position of the mandatory in Mesopotamia and Palestine, that they were, if only temporarily, abandoned. Any expectation that King Hussein would prove amenable, when confronted with a revival of the old objections in the form of amendments to a version expressly devised to exclude them, must, by neglecting to allow for the spirit of intransigence which has not ceased to inform His Majesty's attitude towards these questions, fail of realisation.

I am not aware what importance His Majesty's Government attach to the conclusion of a treaty with King Hussein. It is, perhaps, doubtful whether a black-and-white definition of mutual obligations may not lead to check rather than to foster that impulse towards friendship with Great Britain which now comes at times with the vague yet real strength of a tradition to inspire the Sherreef's relations with His Majesty's Government. The loose bond of "mutual confidence" to which King Hussein so often in his letters refers, however lightly it weighs upon him, may link him more closely to us than a treaty which, by defining his obligations, restricts them and which, since King Hussein is a signatory, has hardly the value of the paper on which it is written. For King Hussein is indifferent to European opinion; to Moslem opinion he is abnormally sensitive. Were he to find, after signing away his boasted freedom from European attachments, that he could enlist the sympathies of any large section of Moslem opinion by floating a treaty with His Majesty's Government, I believe that no thought of the loss or gain of a monthly subsidy of 5,000L. would have power to deter him. Such a sum, which offends King Hussein by not exceeding many fold that paid to Ibn Saud, is but a fraction of the monthly receipts of Jeddah customs and is quite inadequate as an instrument of restraint.

If, however, the conclusion of a treaty with King Hussein is considered urgently necessary for the maintenance of friendly relations between the various Arab leaders and for ensuring that the signature of a treaty of peace with Turkey shall not find His Majesty's Government unprovided with treaty-authority to intervene on behalf of British subjects in Jeddah, though not elsewhere in the Hedjaz, I venture to submit that the document communicated by Dr. Najj-el-Asul represents the limit of what experience suggests King Hussein as being likely to sign. On the subject of the deletion of the word "Egypt" in article 4 and the prevalence of the English text in case of doubt, King Hussein has not expressed himself; these are, however, matters as to which no serious difficulty need eventually be anticipated.

Of the other amendments to his version, the proposed omission in article 2 of the phrase "and in particular by the suspension of all manner of subsidies" and the proposed omission from article 3 of the phrase: "as they existed under the suzerainty of Turkey" have not, I believe, been discussed with the King. The phrase "as they existed" occurred in the document signed by Emir Abdullah and Colonel Lawrence at Amman, and it is not easy to explain to King Hussein why it should now be omitted, when copied from that document into his own version. The latter phrase may be intentionally insidious, but is it impossible as a basis for arbitration? In view of Ibn Saud's contention that there existed in Turkish times no frontier between the Hedjaz, Nejd and Asir other than the shifting tide line of individual authority, it might be presumed that the Sultan of Nejd has little to fear from a reference to Ottoman frontiers. King Hussein, however, has always been at odds with Ibn Saud, and it is not necessarily as they were in the times of their respective grandfathers, not necessarily as they were on the date of the outbreak of the war.

As regards the recognition by King Hussein of the special position of the mandatory in Palestine and in Mesopotamia, while I am convinced that no consideration will avail to induce His Majesty to admit such recognition in so many words in a public document, it is not impossible that he considers himself already to have made this concession in article 17 of his draft treaty.

I am not aware what, if any, progress has been made in negotiations with Dr. Najj-el-Asul, whose potentially large financial interests in the Hedjaz make him an unusually eloquent advocate, and with whose proximate return to this country local rumour is now busy. I doubt, however, whether his most persuasive arguments will avail to win from King Hussein assent to points on which the King's sons and others have hitherto found steady opposition.

It is only on the assumption that His Majesty's Government consider the conclusion of a treaty with King Hussein as a matter of expediency, and not as a result of the strong belief that some of the proposed amendments have no chance of acceptance

by King Hussein, that I have ventured to suggest their reconsideration. If, however, it is not a matter of expediency, but a matter of principle, then the present unsatisfactory relations between the King and His Majesty's Government will not necessarily be improved by the signature of a treaty, and that 60,000L. per annum is, in the circumstances, a heavy price to pay for the signature of King Hussein.

I have, &c.
L. B. GRAFFTEY SMITH

No. 29

Acting Consul, Jeddah, to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 1, 1923.

Dr. NAJJ EL-ASUL has received my telegram of the 28th April and has made an excellent reception. King's alterations in my immediately following telegram have been accepted. Dr. Najj-el-Asul considers alterations harmless.

He has also accepted the suggestion of the 28th April that he should send a counter-argument to that of the 28th April.

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No. 30.

Acting Consul, Jeddah, to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, May 1, 1923.

FOLLOWING are alterations in text referred to in Jeddah telegram No. 23.

1. Article 2: After "territories" insert "Palestine included."
2. Article 3: Substitute Al Idriai and Ibn Saud for titular reference, "Ruler of Asir" before war Turkish mutasarrif.
3. Article 4: After "change" insert "of frontiers and authority."

No. 31.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 1, 1923.

MY telegram No. 11 of 19th April: Hedjaz Treaty.

You should inform Dr. Najj-el-Asul on arrival that, after final scrutiny, only substantial change in the Arabic text desired by His Majesty's Government is the substitution of the words "in the event of any or all . . . eventual confederation" in article 2. An amended Arabic version of this phrase was sent to you by bag No. 15 despatch No. 50A of 19th April.

There are a few slight corrections in grammar and spelling of Arabic text, which are explained in a further despatch, now on its way to you. These corrections do not affect the meaning of text, though they should be embodied in it before final signature by King Hussein.

You are therefore advised to inform His Majesty's Government that Dr. Naji will doubtless wish to stay at Jeddah until it reaches you.

[E 4412 408 88]

No. 32

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 2.)

N. 7
My Lord

Damascus, April 16, 1923.

I refer to my despatch No. 55 of the 14th March, I now have the honour to report that Sultan Attrash made his submission to the French on the 5th April.

2. When returning from Bagdad I met, at Palmyra, Commandant Arnaud, the French representative at Deraa, with whom Commandant Arlebosso and I had discussed the preliminaries as to the combined action of Colonel Peake's forces and the French troops. Commandant Arnaud was extremely gratified at the result; he considered this submission could only have the most beneficial results for general tranquillity, added that it was an immediate result of the recent entente, and that he had now ventured to take a few days' "local leave" to visit Palmyra.

3. He pointed out, however, that the French had expected another meeting with Colonel Peake's forces on the 10th April, but that the latter had not appeared.

I promised to refer to this in my next despatch, but pointed out that there must have been some misunderstanding, as Colonel Peake was enthusiastic for such combined "sweeps" at regular intervals.

I suggested that Commandant Arnaud should always keep in direct touch with Colonel Peake by means of the Deraa-Ammann railway telephone.

4. Under the above circumstances, I need scarcely add that my reception by the French camel corps at Palmyra was of the most genuinely cordial type.

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4516 987 65]

No. 33

Note referring to the Draft Memorandum containing Definite Assurances in connection with the British Vantage for Irak communicated by Sir Eyre Crowe in his Letter of the 14th December last.—(Communicated by Italian Ambassador, Rome, 1 May 4.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Government have closely examined this draft and have made the following observations and emendations with regard thereto:—

Article 2 of the British draft, which relates to the possibility of concessions of public works to Italian enterprises and to the promise of a special agreement to regulate and protect any Italian work in Irak, is satisfactory and in conformity with article 2 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement respecting Palestine.

The article relating to the judicial protection of Italians in Irak differs from the analogous article 3 for Palestine, inasmuch as the latter lays down that there shall always be a majority of British judges on the tribunals which are called upon to try an Italian subject, whereas the article proposed for Irak confines itself, when the judicial bench is composed of more than one judge, to the stipulation that the single president must be British. With regard to this point, the Italian Government must insist on obtaining a provision analogous to that contained in the agreement for Palestine, the more so in the event of Italy's being called upon to introduce a similar provision in the agreement which is to be negotiated in respect of Syria. It is trusted, therefore, that the British Government will agree to the proposed modification, so as to provide that Italian subjects in Irak shall always be tried by tribunals composed of a majority of British judges as has already been fixed in regard to Palestine.

Article 4 reproduces in entirety articles 4 and 5 of the Palestine Agreement. It is to be noted that the agreement for Irak nothing is mentioned in respect of the reciprocity of economic treatment contained in article 6 of the agreement for Palestine, but that may be explained by the fact that this article refers only to maritime transport, and accordingly cannot be applied to Irak.

Article 5, respecting the exemption from customs duties for Italian religious institutions in Irak, lacks precision, whereas the corresponding article 7 of the agreement for Palestine is very clear. This article, indeed, plainly grants customs exemptions to the aforesaid institutions, whilst the draft for Irak confines itself merely to placing on a parity, as regards privileges, Italian and foreign institutions of a similar character existing in Irak.

In this case also it is hoped that the British Government will comply with the desire of the Italian Government to obtain privileges in Irak similar to those agreed to as regards Palestine.

Italian Embassy, London, May 2, 1923.

[E 4518 1165 65]

No. 34

The Duke of Devonshire to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 4.)*

(No. 142 Confidential)

(Telegraphic.)

Downing Street, May 2, 1923

YOUR telegram No. 129 of 14th April; Sultan Attrash

Please convey to His Highness the Emir Abdullah expression of satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at successful issue of trans-Jordan Syria co-operation which they regard as happy augury for the future. You are authorised to communicate the substance of this message to the Emir Abdullah and to the Sultan Attrash by the best means of making it public.

"Subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, the Britannic Majesty's Government will recognise the existence of an independent State of Trans-Jordan, the boundaries of which will be determined by the Council of the League of Nations, and will be subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations."

No. 35

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Graffley-Smith (Jeddah).

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 3, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 23 and 24 of 1st May: Anglo-Hashimite Treaty.

King Hussein's amendments to articles 3 and 4 are accepted.

As regards article 2, His Majesty's Government see no grounds for singling out one of the several territories referred to in first sentence of the article for special mention in third sentence, as the meaning of the article is already clear.

If the King is obdurate, however, there is no objection to the adoption for third sentence of article 2 of wording given in my immediately following telegram, though it would be preferable not to have to do so.

The foregoing should be communicated to Naji.

Regarding proposal of King to send a representative to Jerusalem, Sir H. Samuel has been asked for his views, which have not yet been received. You should therefore await a further telegram from me on the subject.

* Also to Bagdad (No. 316).

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 5, 1923

FOLLOWING is wording referred to in third paragraph of my telegram No. 15 of 8th May: Anglo-Hashemite Treaty:—

"In the event of the Government of any or all of the above territories, namely, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and the Arab States of the Arabian peninsula, 'expressing a desire,' &c.

[N 4385 312.97]

No. 37

Memorandum by Sir P. Lorraine.—(Received May 15)

(Secret.)

I HAVE read with great interest the memorandum of the 26th January, 1923, on the co-operation of Moslem countries and Russia

This paper refers to two projects, viz:—

The formation of a Confederation of Moslem States—

(a) On the initiative and under the ægis of Russia

(b) On the initiative of the Angora Government, under the ægis of the Ottoman Caliph, and to the exclusion of Russia

I do not think there is any prospect in present circumstances of Persia joining

As regards (a), few things would be more repugnant to the ruling and intelligent classes in Persia than a political association with Communist Russia, or indeed, with any other Russia that the Persians can visualise. They would regard such an association as a prelude to political absorption, a prospect which terrifies them from any quarter whatsoever, and most especially from Russia. Turkish disinclination to enter the combination would even remove Persian fears of the consequences of a blank refusal.

Combination (b) might appeal to the Persians on paper, and would be consonant with the constant pratings about the need for Islamic unity to resist the "colonising" policy of the Western Powers, and of Great Britain in particular. It would not, however, suit Persian policy or ideas for two reasons:—

1 The Shia sect has never recognised the Ottoman Caliphate, and never can recognise it, because it strikes at the very foundation of the Shia faith. This fact would render the proposed confederation, if made, practically inoperative in action so far as concerns Persia

2 Persia is scarcely less afraid of Turkey than of Russia. There is a considerable population of Turkish origin and Turkish speech in Persia, especially in the north-western provinces. Persians are all aware that Turkey has designs on these areas, that she only awaits a favourable opportunity to declare them a *Turchia irredenta*, that Turkish pan-Islamism is a mere cloak for pan-Turanism, and that to join a confederation in which Turkey was the preponderant partner would weaken her hold over the Turkish-speaking provinces, and might even lead to their loss. Russia no doubt realises this also: if, for example, Persian Azerbaijan were absorbed by Turkey, the whole position of Russia in the Caucasus, which for her is the key to the Middle East, would be turned. If, therefore, Russia is unable to dominate and control the confederation movement, she will if only for this reason, oppose its development to the utmost of her power

It is possible that Persia, with her irresolute and vacillating policy, may flirt with the idea of a Turco-Perso-Afghan Confederation, even that she may profess academic sympathy with the idea; but I think she is unlikely to enter into one. Should she do so under the threat of an anti-Persian Turco-Afghan combination, her position would in some ways resemble that of Italy in the Triple Alliance before

1914, and perhaps with not dissimilar results. She is much more likely to do her best to keep out of it

The reappearance, with Muhieddin Pasha, of Turkish diplomacy on the Tehran stage may have one of two results:—

1. A Bolsheviki-Kemalist anti-British combination.
2. Turkish and Russian policies to diverge and set each other off: this would be to the advantage of Great Britain

The latter is the least improbable: by careful handling it might even be facilitated.

PERCY LORRAINE.

Tehran, April 6, 1923

[E 4940, 1165/65]

No. 38.

Sir H. Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, Received at Foreign Office, May 15.)

(1)

(No. 159)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, May 12, 1923

ON 9th and 10th May Chief Secretary saw Emir Abdullah.

Conditions on which grant-in-aid depends were agreed to by Abdullah, and he will give them to chief British representative in writing. He agrees further that reserve force should be increased to 1,200 or 1,300. Economies will be effected in Transjordan budget by disbandment of gendarmerie and reduction of police. Transjordan defence forces will thus be entirely under Peake. Transjordan budget, which has been submitted, will be examined here.

Abdullah was much pleased with contents of your telegram No. 142 of 2nd May, which were communicated to him. He expresses his sincere gratitude to His Majesty's Government. Local press are to be given announcement this afternoon. Chief Secretary is reporting by next mail.

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, May 13, 1923

CONDITIONS on which grant-in-aid depends have been signed by Transjordan Government and handed to chief British representative.

This is in continuation of my telegram No. 159.

[E 5175 653 91]

No. 39.

Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22)

No. 39)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 30, 1923

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st–30th April, 1923

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aleppo, Saida and Damascus

I have, &c

L. B. GRAFFTEY SMITH

Enclosure in No. 31

Jeddah Report, April 1–30 1923

(Secret.)

KING HUSSEIN, accompanied by Sheikh Foad-al-Khatib, arrived in Jeddah on the 18th April with the ex-Sultan and suite.

The Sultan's decision to send his aide-de-camp to explore the residential quarter of Hama clashed with His Majesty's Government's expressed regret that adequate arrangements could not be made for His Majesty's residence in Palestine.

and their suggestion that he might well consider the possibilities of Switzerland as a place of abode. On receipt of this message, the Sultan declared to King Hussein his intention of leaving Mecca at once for Jeddah, and of proceeding (he did not specify whither) by the first available boat, after consultation with this agency. King Hussein made some demur; but a flood of press propaganda which has reached the Sultan, attributing to King Hussein designs on the latter's title of Caliph, makes it as difficult for the King to press his guest to stay as it would be indelicate to insist on his departure. A party of 12 men started to jolt over some 50 miles of desert in a shared barouche. They rested for less than three hours on the way and arrived on the following morning more or less broken. King Hussein received visitors that same evening, the Sultan remained invisible until the afternoon of the 19th, when I called upon him at his request.

He began by complaining that his health left much to be desired, a statement which his frail appearance indeed confirmed, without need of the assurance of his physician, Reshad Pasha, that His Majesty had lost over 30 lb. in weight since arriving in the Hedjaz. The frustration of his hopes of residence in Haifa had much distressed him. His wish was to elect a residence in some British protected Moslem country, the proximity of Cyprus to the Cilician coast. It was perhaps not understood, and he wished strongly to emphasise, that he asked for no free accommodation or maintenance. Much to my embarrassment, he quoted Mr. Jack Jones on the subject of "15s a week unemployment dole for the ex Sultan and 1s a week for each wife", he seemed to consider this as a pronouncement by His Majesty's Government. He intended to live at his own charge. It was essential that he should leave the Hedjaz, his health demanded it. It was, moreover, essential that he and his "family" should be reunited. Switzerland, as a non Moslem country, was an unsuitable residence for himself and his "family", it was, incidentally, too expensive for his convenience. It it were really of no avail again to request permission to proceed to Haifa, he desired me to ascertain whether any objection existed to his settling in Cyprus. I gathered from his suite later that a refusal in respect of Cyprus would probably send the ex Sultan to Switzerland for at least a few months' visit without his family.

I ventured to assure His Majesty that the difficulty in the way of his residence in Haifa was much less one of any material expense of hospitality than of the very real possibility of the British Government, responsible for the maintenance of public security, the possibility of the authorities in Cyprus feeling unable to accept this responsibility was moot.

At the moment of writing, no reply has been received from His Majesty's Government on the subject, and the ex Sultan's future movements, which have inspired the wildest local rumours, remain nebulous. He did not attend Friday prayers on the 27th April.

King Hussein, in conversation with me, made no effort to disguise his contempt for the boredom of Taif, the climate of which is as pleasant as any he will find elsewhere, until the pilgrimage, and to defer his departure from the Hedjaz until after he had been able to show himself in Mecca to tens of thousands of the faithful whom he claims still to command.

I have seen what I believe to be the only copy in Jeddah of a document printed in Mecca, in Arabic and Turkish, which purports to be Sultan Mohammed Wahid-ud-Din's first manifesto since leaving Constantinople. This document is variously reported to have been compiled by the ex-Sultan and disapproved by King Hussein, or by the ex-Sultan and approved by King Hussein, or by the ex-Sultan and presented to the ex-Sultan for his signature, which he refused to give. Whatever its origin and authorship (and I cannot conceive the Meccan printers printing anything without King Hussein's approval), the manifesto was, almost immediately after publication, withdrawn from general circulation. It is in the nature of an *apologia* for the Sultan's policy from the date of his accession. It attacks the Kemalists, reiterates the Sultan's refusal to recognise their right to tinker with the Caliphate and ends with effusive gratitude to King Hussein and prayers for the Arab cause, hardly in place in such a manifesto.

King Hussein himself has been in very gracious mood since his arrival in

Jeddah, the source of this rare benevolence being his expectation of a miracle at the hand of Dr. Najj-el-Assil who arrived in Jeddah on the 30th April. With no knowledge of the trend of recent negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Dr. Najj-el-Assil, this agency can do nothing either to endorse or to discourage King Hussein's semi-certitude that the day of his deliverance from Moslem reproach is at hand. Briefly, His Majesty believes that he is to be recognised forthwith as the head of a State comprising Palestine, Transjordan, Irak and the Hedjaz, and he counts on the attraction which this nucleus of Arab unity must, with discreet British assistance, exercise to ensure the speedy formation of the United States of Arabia, within which each ruler is to keep his present territories and titles and to send a representative to the seat of Central Government (not necessarily Mecca) to represent local interests in the common Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. King Hussein would appear to reserve for himself only the "papal States" of Mecca and Medina and to propose to Ibn Saud an even larger subsidy than that ruler at present receives. After a year of such suzerainty, an Arab Caliphate would, it is thought, be irresistible. That achieved, the King's entourage ask no more from him than that he should intone the "Nunc dimittis."

King Hussein has not himself confided to me his hopes, but I understand from Sheikh Fuad-al-Khatib that the King firmly believes Dr. Najj-el-Assil to have laid the foundations for this edifice of Hashimite glorification. It will be a bad day for the little Bagdadi concessionaire if he cannot show to the King some very definite accomplishment to justify his cabled assurances of all that His Majesty's Government are prepared to concede to secure a strong anti-Turkish bloc; and a bad day for us, as well.

King Hussein has informed Sheikh-al Khatib that he may possibly visit his son Abdullah in Transjordan after the pilgrimage. The Egyptian press foresees a subsequent meeting between King Hussein and Ibn Saud at Jauif, with a view to an entente.

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The will to an understanding with Riyadh has not yet been allowed practical manifestation. Hashimite troops occupied Elha in mid April at the instance of the British.

441

Besides strictly limiting the quantity of all commodities which Bedouin are permitted to purchase in Mecca without special permission from himself, the King has now set octroi-guards at the entrance to the Mu'abba and Sheikh Mahmud al-Hadrami, quarters of the King's household, to prevent any further sale of bag of foodstuffs is allowed into these quarters without Royal licence. These measures, which are intended to bring his less amenable subjects to heel and to enhance King Hussein's influence among the tribes, have caused curses and discontent among Arabs and to shape the King's policy. The King's policy of Royal monopolies, Royal manipulation of exchanges and the system of Royal licences for petty purchases have brought merchants to the edge of despair.

It is estimated that over 600 "Hedjazi" Arabs (Mecca-Taif and district) were conscribed in Mecca during the early days of the month. The sheikh of these Arabs in Jeddah was instructed on the 2nd April to prepare a list of those resident in the town.

The bazaar between Safa and Merwa has been roofed in, much to the comfort of pilgrims whom religion obliges to run seven times between these hills. Arab soldiers and police were employed on this work. It is said that their long arrears of pay have been retained as a donation towards the cost of this municipal improvement.

Medina.

A section (the pilgrims of three mutawwifin only) of the first pilgrim caravan arrived in Medina from Mecca on the 24th April. The caravan took the Darb al-Hijab route, which is the most direct route from Mecca to Medina. The caravan was composed of 1000 pilgrims, including 100 women and 100 children. They were accompanied by 100 camels and 100 mules. They suffered no loss of life by attack on the road. This is the first caravan of the season.

For the first time in the history of the city, the Meccan townfolk and Bedouin appear to reign both in and around the town. The Mecca "Rakab" was held up, despite the protection of a "Khawi," and the Bedouin, who in many cases occupy the forts built by the Turkish Government for road protection, were able to capture the Meccan caravan. Ahmed bin Mansour, the acting Governor, able sufficiently to compose the feud between Medina townfolk and Bedouin, arising out of a quarrel and bloodshed in the town in the early days of Rajab and resulting in the closing of the city gates for many days on end, to enable the populace to attend the Rajabieh ceremonies of Svedua Hamza. Blood money was paid to the tribesmen for their wounded and a six months' "am" (or respite from blood vengeance) granted by them for their killed, at the expiration of this period they reserve the right to kill four inhabitants of Medina. Ladies of the family of Omar Kurdi, Kazi of Mecca, travelling to Rubagh, only escaped kidnapping by the fortunate intervention of two influential sheikhs of their aggressors' tribe. The Indians above referred to were set upon and robbed of goods to the value of 1200 at Bur Irwa, the last stage before Medina. Complaints to Ahmed bin Mansour failed to recover for them even the stolen head-gear and garments in which their robbers swaggered through the Medina bazaars. The Governor admitted, indeed, to one Indian complainant that a stolen head-dress belonged to the Indian and not to the Arab wearer, but he pleaded that the latter had no hand to deal with this anarchy.

For seven months, it is said, no caravan from the east has reached Medina. Postal and other communications with Yambo are chaotic, and Bedouin raid and loot the "uyun" or gardens 5 miles from the city wall. The eulogy of Hashimite public security arrangements in and around Medina, which appears in No. 676 of "Al Kibla," and the Government's official notice of the reign of peace throughout its dominions, will carry conviction to those only of "Al Kibla's" readers who have not yet realized that this journal is inspired by the same unprejudiced spirit of impartiality when discussing the affairs of the House of Hashim as is such a periodical as "Bubbles" when dealing with the interests of the House of Pears.

Mr. Peter Graham, a British subject and manager for Palestine and Arabia of the Singer Manufacturing Company, New York, has been in Jeddah for the last two months vainly endeavouring to wrest, if not justice, at least a decision from the local courts in claims against native agents. I am addressing a separate despatch on the subject of his experiences, which are illuminating, to the Department of Overseas Trade.

One of his claims is against his Jeddah agent, an Egyptian subject, who has in the past enjoyed, *quid* Egyptian, the good offices of this agency as against Hashimite methods of justice. It is anomalous that in present circumstances an Egyptian is not liable to the jurisdiction of this consular court, and in order to prosecute him it is to Hashimite methods of justice that Mr. Graham has had to appeal.

King Hussein is still, and not unreasonably, resentful of the Egyptian Government's refusal to accept in Egypt the destitute Turkish refugees sent from Egypt to the Hedjaz during January and February last. For those who have elected to stay in the Hedjaz he is making some provision. The others, some thirty, whose passages to Suez he is prepared to pay, are in process of starving while their right to return whence they came is debated at a telegraphic cost sufficient to pay the onward passages of many from Egypt to their desired destinations. Four who are in Jeddah

lie sick of fever on the bare floor of an unfurnished room. When Dr. Munir ud din last visited them they had neither bread nor water. Local charity dare not give where King Hussein withholds. It is strange to recall that the odyssey of these unfortunates began with their Anglophile sentiments, but not strange that these sentiments should vary with the adequacy of their reward.

M Chirokof has flown the Armstrong safely back from Taif. While in Taif he made many flights for the edification of the Bedouin; he flew also over Kleikh and Taraba, but did not attempt bombing. He reports that the Emir Ali wants to purchase a Handley-Page machine with Rolls-Royce engines, but that there is constant propaganda by Constantin Yanni and Rushdi Bey in favour of Italian machines. It seems a pity, since aeroplanes will probably be imported into the Hedjaz Air Service from the Anglo-Government Air Corps, which has gone to a British firm.

A man of this name who is, I believe, wanted for hotel bills in Cairo, arrived on the steamship "Mansourah" on the 6th April. He informed the King that he was a member of the "Royal Family of Morocco," and that he had suffered much at French hands and needed money. The King gave him 700l., and discovered, shortly after the man's departure, that he had been swindled. Stories of French wickedness are a sure way to the King's heart and purse.

The terms on which the Khedivial Mail Company should carry Hashimite mails have recently been under consideration. At present the company perform this service in exchange for free telegraphic facilities between their agencies in the Hedjaz. The company have asked, in addition, for exemption from all Hedjaz telegraph charges in respect of messages between the Alexandria-Suez and Hedjaz agencies. As it did not seem right to suggest that the Hashimite Government should exempt the company from Suakin-Jeddah cable charges, the Hashimite Government's right to dispose of which is still disputable, I felt compelled to refuse to forward these proposals to Mecca, and the company have been asked to suggest other terms.

No success has attended our efforts to induce the Government to recognise its obligation to pay a 40 per cent. general average contribution in respect of a shipment of £E 500 specie by the Khedivial Mail Steamship "Borulus." The Government's communications on the subject have been characterised by complete absence of dignity.

The welcome decision of the international Quarantine Board at Alexandria to refuse to detain a ship for a southward bound journey is a very welcome protection for King Hussein as to its implication that detention on the island of Abu Saad becomes, as it indeed is, quite unnecessary. The King now has full right to apply such local measures as he thinks fit. It is regrettable that his invitation to Jeddah telegraphed to the commission appointed by the League of Nations to examine the quarantine of Arabia has not been well received by such a visit. For any revision of the 1912 Convention, based not on personal inspection at Jeddah, but on material supplied by the president of the Quarantine Board at Alexandria he has no response.

In default of very clear proof that King Hussein and his Government are indeed internationally bound to act in accordance with the procedure followed by quarantine authorities elsewhere, I would recommend that the detention of Egyptian pilgrims for twenty-four hours at Abu Sa'ad should not be a prelude to a riot from which no good to the pilgrims can possibly result. Experience, not mere cowardice, suggests that it is foolish to begin a riotous argument unless the right cause is certain to prevail.

Mention should have been made above of the arrival on the 28th April, by Italian steamer from Suez, of Sheikh Abdul Kader Muzaffer, the Syrian extremist. It is to be regretted that he should have been permitted to leave Palestine for the

Hedjaz at this particular moment. From him, as from the Lotfallah crowd and from Sheikh Abdul Malik, Arab agent in Cairo, tooth-and-nail opposition to any scheme Dr. Naji may have brought must, I fear, be anticipated. Sheikh Abdul Kader's arrival was timed to precede Dr. Naji's by a few days, it remains to be seen whether

Arabic Press

A summary of Nos. 674 to 682 of "Al Kibla" is annexed

L. B. GRAFFTEY SMITH

PRESS SUMMARY

("Al Kibla.")

No. 674 of March 29

Decorations. Sheikh [unclear] and [unclear] (his private secretary) have been given the second-class of the Egyptian Order of the Nile, the Grand Kadi has received the same Order with brilliancy.

Official notice. The Government announces to all intending visitors the reign of complete public security and order within the Hedjaz. The country flings its doors wide for the reception of Moslems of every race and devotes every endeavour to the service of the pilgrims.

Anniversary of the Arab revolt. Festivities, speeches and appropriate verse. [unclear] of these tribes under the Emir Sherif Maala, to kiss the Hashimite Threshold after fighting and beating back a party of Wahhabi raiders. The two captured Wahhabi [unclear] the Emir's possession up to eleven.

Medina caravans. A pilgrim caravan of 500 camels left for Medina to day. [unclear] refugees on charge, providing for those who wish to stay in Mecca (39) accommodation, food and service and paying the passages of those who wish to leave for various destinations (29). This is the true humanity of Moslem to Moslem brother.

No. 675 of April 2

France and the Kemalists. An article from "Al Siyasa" of Cairo (No. 108) reproducing the pessimistic views of a writer in the "Debuta" as to the weakness of French policy towards the Kemalists before and during the Lausanne Conference.

Ali Riza Rikabi. Has accused the Emir Abdulilla of lavish expenditures, which is absurd, because the Emir has been living under canvas in the ice and snow at Amman since arriving there. As for other charges made by Rikabi, he would not be the son of his father if he neglected to make them.

Land split in Nejd. Further details.

No. 676 of April 5

Glad tidings for our brethren the pilgrims. Five columns of admiration of the perfection of public security obtaining between Yambo, Medina, Rabegh, Jeddah and Mecca, contributed by an anonymous Egyptian. From internal evidence the writer would appear to be both blind and deaf.

No. 677 of April 9

Quarantine. Official communiqué.

The Hashimite Government has observed that great publicity is being given in the press to the employment of Tor as a quarantine station instead of the Island of Abu Saad. How can this be reconciled with the provisions of article 124 of "their

The Tor proposal is alleged to be based on desire for pilgrims' comfort, the Hashimite Government yields to none in devotion to this blessed object: witness the 1000 packages lying in Jeddah customs waiting to be claimed by pilgrims. But how reconcile a desire for pilgrims' comfort with Article 125 of the convention, which ordains that if, on inspection at Jeddah, cases of suspects are found, the vessel must be sent back for detention at Tor? This is definitely to the discomfort of pilgrims,

especially just before the day of Arafat, when time is everything. It looks as if Tor in the north was to be a copy of Kamaran in the south.

Remember how the Egyptian pilgrims complained of their detention at Tor on the return from last year's Haj. This proposal is a clear infringement of the sovereign rights of the Hashimite Government. But if the International Board of Health sends its inspectors to visit our islands and to make recommendations, we will carry these out gladly and readily provided their intention is not to encroach upon our rights.

Criticism levelled against the Government quarantine dues we ignore as unworthy of our attention. But what about the 300 Egyptian pilgrims whom the Hashimite Government transported gratis last year to Suez from Yambo, where they had been left like so much rubbish simply because they had chosen to visit the Prophet's tomb at Medina.

The International Board of Health choose to overlook the fact that pilgrims are sent here packed in boats like sacks of beans.

Arab unity. Press comments from Egypt and Syria on recent debates in Parliament regarding the evacuation of Irak and on the general question of pan-Arabism and an Arab federation. The great benefit that would result from friendly co-operation between the Idrisi and the Imam, and between King Hussein and Ibn Saud (whose intention to foregather at Jauif during King Hussein's rumoured visit to Amman is mooted) finds universal encouragement and recognition.

A note. [unclear] between King Hussein and one of his representatives in one of the capitals of Europe —

[unclear] "The British Government do not deny their promises, but state that they are still striving to make them effective, and that they are ready to recognise the [unclear] of the Arabs."

From Mecca. Present my heartfelt, unselfish thanks to the British Government for this confirmation of their recognition of Arab unity by Arab effort. Inform them that in accordance with their original communication to me in the name of the Arabs, I made the known communication to the Arabs, and the requirements of these fundamental principles constrain me to issue an official notification guaranteeing that I and Great Britain have been true to our promises, with especial view to declaring to them my own fidelity to my promises. I invite them to a conference of delegates of Irak, Palestine and of all other sections of the peninsula whose co-operation in the war was real to explore the bases of this unity and to select their centre and branches to their own satisfaction and choice."

Deaths. [unclear] of the Royal family of Morocco. (Recognised after his departure to have been an imposter.)

Abdullah Effendi Deri Zadeh, ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey.

Sheikh Mirza Wasef Pasha—on Hedjaz Railway business from Transjordan.

Obituary. Sheikh Mohammed Mahmud al-Mujaddidi, a leading domiciled Indian, formerly of Medina.

No. 678 of April 12

Decorations. Order of Al Istiklal for M. Nikolai Nadiouf, the Russian aviator, and his first successful Arab pupil, Abdul Salam Sirhan.

Official notice. In view of the approach of Ramadan and the continuance of high prices, Government stores will reopen for the sale of rice, flour, sugar, &c., at Government prices.

Arab airmen. Letter from Ruslidy Rev. Commandant of Jeddah, announcing the successful flight of Lieut. Abdul Salam after only ninety-two lessons, and [unclear] King Hussein with [unclear] of news of further successes next week.

(The next week's efforts were successful in reducing an aeroplane to smithereens.)

Quarantine. An open letter. After laying down the principle that no decision of any Quarantine Board can be allowed to affect the rights of the Hashimite Government to do what they like with their own property, the (barely) anonymous writer proceeds to make a number of violent and lying charges against the Administration responsible for the Egyptian pilgrimage and for the quarantine arrangements at Kamaran and Tor. Allegations of the failure of the Egyptian Government to provide accommodation, water, &c., for its pilgrims as required by [unclear] well from a [unclear] other charges [unclear] [unclear]

No 679 of April 18

The Chester Concession. Details of its provisions.

The ex-Sultan. Will shortly proceed to Jeddah for reasons of health.

Medina caravan: We learn that the caravan, having accomplished its blessed purpose, is returning from Medina.

Arrivals Sheikh Abdurrahman-ez-Zayani of Babrein.

Quarantine: Distressing experience of a member of "Al Kibla" staff quarantined last year at Moses' Wells (Suez). Comparative excellence of Abu Saad arrangements

No. 680 of April 10.

The ex-Sultan His arrival with King Hussein at Jeddah

Occupation of Ebha. The Hashimite troops in Asir have occupied Ebha, in response to the appeal by Hassan-bin-Aidh and other leaders for the righting of their wrongs and for the termination of an evil situation.

This, says 'Al Kibla,' is clear proof that King Hussein has no ambitions of supremacy, for his troops could have taken Ehha easily at any time. In doing so now they are inspired by Arab readiness to succour a friend in need.

Nos 681 and 682

Nothing of importance, the most influential contributor being away from Mecca.

[illegible]

HMS "Cornflower" arrived on the 30th April

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received June 11.)

(No 42)

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 30, 1923

1 HAVE the honour to report that the new French High Commissioner, General Weygand, paid his first visit to Aleppo on the 17th instant. He arrived by road from Alexandretta, and was welcomed ceremoniously at a garden just outside the town, whence he rode into the city and reviewed the troops.

In the morning of the 18th May the general held an official reception, in the course of which he requested the members of the Consular Corps to be his interpreters, towards their respective Governments, of the spirit of concord in which he was assuming his duties.

In the afternoon the general went to the Serai, where the Governor-General, Mustafa Barmada, read an address of welcome, in the course of which he expressed the confidence of his fellow citizens in France and the new High Commissioner on whose assistance they counted for the administrative and economic welfare of the State.

In the evening the Governor-General and the municipality gave a banquet in honour of the Foreign Consuls and the Consular Corps. The Governor-General read a very colourless speech of welcome, without any reference to the rôle of France and the High Commissioner in Syria or the attitude of the people towards the mandatory Power. It might have been a complimentarily speech worthy of an official reception. The French were naturally vexed at this non-committal attitude of the Governor-General they had appointed.

General Weygand made a sensible and sober reply. He said that France, in sending him to Syria, had not changed her intentions towards the country. She was determined to execute the mandate with which she had been charged by the League of Nations. According to the latest news from Lausanne, it seemed likely that Syria's external security would shortly be guaranteed. But, not seeking to avoid the burdens of the mandate, he had caused troops to be lined up along the whole frontier. As regards internal security, essential to the economic development of the country, the French would do their duty energetically. Most of the difficulties ahead were general and common to the whole world. They could not be removed by a single person or a single country. But the French were prepared to do their best to help in the solution of certain local problems, such as the reduction of railway rates, the bringing of water to the town, the installation of electricity and tramways. A general plan must be traced for gradual execution in the course of several years. France, he concluded, is decided to execute its mandate completely and in a more and more liberal manner.

On the 19th May the High Commissioner gave a luncheon to which were again invited the local notables and the Consular Corps. After the luncheon Mgr. Raphael, the Greek Orthodox Archbishop, made a very inappropriate speech in Arabic. He said that he had eschewed public speaking for three years because he thought that truth had been buried in Syria. The people had to complain of French officials, who had behaved as though they were in Morocco or Algeria, and had not respected the nation's sentiments of independence. But this did not mean that the people did not love France, whom they distinguished from her officials. Syrians knew that they could not govern themselves at present, and welcomed the assistance of France.

While the speech and its expurgated French translation were in progress, a hurried consultation took place between General Weygand, General Billotte and M. Reclus, the *délégué* adjoint. Finally, they decided to disregard the prelate's inopportune remarks, and after a further address of welcome from the doyen of the French colony, General Weygand made a colourless speech of thanks. He left the table immediately afterwards, as he had to reach Alexandretta the same evening to go on board the "Lorraine," which was to convey him back to Beirut.

The French were much irritated by the speech of Mgr. Raphael, who was already in their land some years ago, and who is now the first bishop of the new Ethe-Sherceen regime. M. Reclus, who has done most of his service in Tunis, apparently

To the onlooker, one of the most striking features of the various ceremonies was the prominence of the Christian clerical elements and the effacement of the Arab.

I have, &c
W. A. SMART.

I am, &c
H. YOUNG.

[10594]

of the Anglo-Arab Treaty, the second article of which was summarised for their benefit (see press supplement). This proclamation, which was Dr. Naji's idea, was, at the same time, cabled to Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine and Egypt, with the idea, presumably, of silencing ill-informed criticism in those countries. The King's approval of the treaty terms having been thus broadcast over the Arab world, it was something of a shock to this agency, which had naturally taken no part in Dr. Naji's negotiations with his royal master, to find, when Dr. Naji returned on the 18th May to Jeddah, that King Hussein had inserted in the Arabic text, signed by him, various highly controversial expressions. As Arab, and not British, delegate, Dr. Naji was never in a position to oppose very vigorously King Hussein's efforts to edit the Arabic text. He has tact and a certain Levantine suppleness, but he cannot afford to appear to maintain always the British, never the Arab, cause. I discussed with him certain obvious objections to King Hussein's interpolations, and he used my expression of opinion as a final argument to induce the King to withdraw them. His Majesty has not done so, but he has given Dr. Naji a letter disclaiming for his proposals the more sinister of the developments which they appear to me inevitably to imply.

Dr. Naji left for Suez and London on the 24th May.

Sheikh Abdul Kadir Muzaffer left Jeddah with the King for Mecca on the 5th May, but, having been caught speechifying in fervent eulogy of Mustafa Kemal, he was allowed to hear the jingle of dungeon keys, and he left in considerable disgrace on the 12th May for Palestine. It is certain that he came here not only to find out what exactly Dr. Naji had in his pocket, but also to make definite proposals to King Hussein on behalf of Ankara. King Hussein resented both his unannounced arrival and his barely veiled effort of supervision.

Pilgrimage.

The main body of the first Medina caravan returned to Mecca early in the month after great hardships. I have not been able yet to obtain definite details, but I hope soon to do so. Pilgrims appear to have been robbed, kidnapped and murdered. Government declarations of public security appear in every number of "Al Kibla."

One hundred and twenty-six Egyptian pilgrims left Suez for Yambo on the steamship "Borulo" on the 21st May, but they were forbidden to land at Yambo, whence they wished to proceed to Medina, and they had to be brought by the company to Jeddah. No pilgrim is allowed to proceed to Medina except from Mecca; the Government accept no responsibility for public security on routes other than those prescribed by themselves for each caravan. The King does not wish to lose his "koshan" of 6½l. gold per camel-litter to Medina.

This Royal share in the profits of pilgrimage has been, by discreet blackmail, extended. The King announced to mutawwifin that the second and subsequent caravans to Medina would go by sea to Yambo. This arrangement, which can hardly have been seriously intended, provoked a loud outcry among those whose interests would suffer from a discontinuance of the land caravan service, and, in return for his concession in withdrawing his proposal, His Majesty declared that to every four camels an extra baggage-camel must be reckoned. The Royal "koshan" on this fictional beast of burden, spread over four real camels, costs each of the "shukdufs" something just under 2½l. extra charge. Such threats and such fictions are the delight and the favourite source of the private revenue of the King. He is continually threatening mutawwifin with a revival of the "tagrir" system, by which certain mutawwifin are given the monopoly—against heavy payments to the King—of touting for pilgrims from particular regions of the globe. Last year he laid it down that only those mutawwifin might leave the Hedjaz for Java and Malaya who promised to pay to himself a special tax of 2½l. per head per pilgrim. None left. This year he declared that, as some mutawwifin have relatives who act as their agents in Java and Malaya, they may practically be considered to have visited these places in person and therefore to have become liable for the 2½l. contribution. Since, however, he cannot establish who has and who has not agents in the Far East, he consented to levy a slight extra charge on all pilgrims from those parts without discrimination: 1½l. instead of 2½l. This is, in fact, the first sum which the mutawwifin of Javanese and Malay pilgrims hasten to extort from their victims on landing, and their desperation when confronted with penniless stowaways is ludicrous. The mutawwifin milk the unfortunate pilgrims, but King Hussein skims the cream. The proceeds of "koshan," &c., go, of course, to the King's money bags, not to the Hashimite Treasury. By popular estimate, his private board is now enormous. Half the sum which he pockets from the Medina caravans, if judiciously expended among the tribes, would ensure safe roads everywhere. But King Hussein is

too near of kin to the camel-men, senzemis, and others who prey upon "the guests of God." It is doubtful, indeed, whether anyone of Sherrefian stock has it in him to order the pilgrimage as it should be ordered; despite King Hussein's protestations, it is with him instinctive to see the pilgrims through Arab rather than through Moslem eyes.

One innovation, by whatever motives prompted, is likely, while giving offence to individuals, to reduce the totality of "incidents" on the Medina road. It has been ordained that none may make the pilgrimage to Medina on foot. Guards have been posted at various points between Mecca and Rabegh to turn foot-pilgrims back to Mecca, and I learn that a second attempt means prison. Large numbers of the very poor, Somalis, Nigerians, &c., have in past years trokked on foot with or behind the regular caravans to Medina, and their destitute and helpless state has exposed them more than any other pilgrims to kidnapping and enslavement by the Bedouin. I had to invoke the help of the local authorities during March to recover a young woman and a boy, both of Sokoto, who had been carried off from their little party a few days' march from Rabegh. The presence of crowds of starving beggars accompanying the caravans is, no doubt, something of a nuisance to other pilgrims, but it remains to be seen whether public opinion will endorse this latest measure of restriction in the "Bilad-ul-Muslimin." Foot-pilgrims, by not hiring camels, avoid making any contribution to the King's privy purse.

The second Medina caravan (the first to include Indian pilgrims) left Mecca on the 28th May. It is said that they are to travel by the Sultania road.

Medina.

The Yambo-Medina road has been closed to mercantile and other traffic during the greater part of the month by the hostile attitude of the tribes. Goods shipped to Yambo by steamer and passengers (other than pilgrims) for Medina have had to go to Rabegh by dhow. I hear that the appeal of the Beni Salim camel-men to their Ahanda fellows has, however, at last been successful, and that a merchant-caravan of 3,000 camels has been permitted by the Bedouin, who draw a share of the camel-hire, to leave Yambo for Medina.

Jamil Pasha has been appointed commandant of Medina. He left Taif for Medina with Sherref Shahat and the mounted troops of Emir Ali's forces, who have been detailed to patrol the Hedjaz railway line above Medina. A body of infantry, sent by sea from Jeddah to Yambo, has been ordered to proceed through Jubela country to Et Ula to protect the operations of railway repairs. A certain Sheikh Zahid, preacher in the mosque at Medina, having delivered a speech in Bombay against King Hussein, the King has for the last few months refused permission to any inhabitant of Medina to leave the Hedjaz. Moreover, residents of Medina returning from India, Java, &c., were for a long period forbidden to penetrate further than Jeddah, and they had to find surety that they would not leave Jeddah for Mecca or Medina. One victim of this measure was Mohammed Arusi, an Arab of Medina in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad, whom his Highness had selected to lead the Hyderabad Government caravan. This man was so terrified of reprisals from Mecca if he should appear to have complained through British channels that he refused to invoke the aid of this agency and dissuaded the Indian pilgrims in his charge, who were much inconvenienced by the delay, from visiting me. Finally, the veto was removed, and all except four of the Medina people were permitted to proceed to their homes. These four, after a painful interview with King Hussein, were given their liberty on the intervention of Emir Ali.

Turkish Refugees.

All Turkish refugees, who declared themselves unwilling to wait in Mecca until after the pilgrimage, were sent down from Mecca on the 10th May for me to dispose of. King Hussein cut off all supplies and withdrew his offer of free passages to Suez. They were fed from charitable funds supplied by this agency until arrangements could be made to despatch them to Cyprus. There remain about seventy in Mecca whose disposal will be a problem after the pilgrimage.

General.

A Jeddah merchant named Mohammed Hamed has been fined 200l. for posting a telegram to Port Sudan for despatch from there.

King Hussein has asked all consulates to arrange that no foreign ships should use wireless while in Jeddah harbour, "in accordance with international usage." He has, of course, adhered to no convention, postal or radio-telegraphic.

I note with regret that Egyptian pilgrims are not to be quarantined at Tor on the southward journey, as the Quarantine Board are unwilling to employ Tor unless the Hashimite Government cease to employ Abu Saad. The position being apparently that the Quarantine Board are bound by International Convention and that the Hashimite Government are not, it is not clear how the action of the latter can release the former from compliance with article 128 of the Convention. King Hussein's insistence on his right to use Abu Saad is admittedly foolish, but, as the measures of quarantine there applied are completely ineffective, it is hoped that consideration for the comfort of Egyptian pilgrims will not be allowed to outweigh the fact that they constitute, unless the strictest measures are applied before they reach Jeddah, a real danger to the health of the pilgrimage as a whole.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Press Supplement ("Al Kibla").

No. 683 of April 30.

The Hedjaz Railway: Repairs have now nearly reached Medain Saleh. The Government are sending troops, mounted and foot, from Taif to patrol the railway line near El Ula. Sherif Shahat is in command.

Quarantine: The Quarantine Board of Egypt have decided to send pilgrims straight from Suez to Abu Saad Island, without a visit to Tor. This is the result of the Arab Government's protests against the former decision to employ Tor. We owe the Quarantine Board thanks for eschewing evil and following righteousness.

No. 684 of May 3.

The ex-Sultan: His departure for Switzerland, whence he intends soon to return to a Moslem country.

Arab Independence: Arrival of Dr. Naji-el-Assil, who is understood to have established Arab independence and union. Welcome!

Promotion: Thabet Bey, Director-General of Quarantine, becomes Thabet Pasha.

No. 685 of May 7.

Démenti: Dr. Naji-el-Assil stigmatises as lying and false "Al Ahram's" version of his declarations in Cairo.

Obituary: Abdullah Effendi Deri Zadeh, Sheikh-ul-Islam.

No. 686 of May 10.

Ebha: To avoid multiplying the causes of disturbance in present circumstances, the Hashimite forces which recently occupied Ebha have retired to their former positions.

Medina folk are double-faced. We hear with distress of speeches made against the Hashimite Government by Medina residents in Bombay.

No. 687 of May 14.

Regrets: We are by now accustomed to photographs of the wife of Mustafa Kemal, "whom they call the leader of Islam," taking part in public life. Now we see photographs of Mme. Zaghul, with a crowd of Egyptian and other men. "Are ye for part of the Book believers, and for part infidels?"

No. 688 of May 21.

Decorations: Two columns full.

The Id-ul-Fitr: Celebrations in Mecca.

Declaration of Arab independence and unity: Speech by King Hussein, in which he declares the day to be doubly a holiday "for it happens that the competent authorities have accepted all Arab demands." His Majesty ordered the following declaration to be read:—

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

"On the occasion of this blessed festival, we announce the purport of the Arab-British Treaty, based upon what we fundamentally established, by which His Majesty the British King recognises in our favour the independence of the Arabs in their peninsula and in their other lands, and promises us practical assistance in the establishment of a confederation embracing all these countries, including Iraq and Palestine and Transjordan, and other Arab countries in the Arabian peninsula (excluding Aden), and we ordain that this blessed day shall be regarded as the

festival of the recognition of the independence of the Arab nation; and God is the Lord of help."

Speech by Dr. Naji-el-Assil in compliment to King Hussein.

Distinguished arrival: Ramadan-al-Shilash (*vide* Damascus reports *passim*). He has been promoted to the rank of Iwa, and decorated with the Second Class of the Nabda.

Departures: Dr. Naji-el-Assil has left Mecca to conclude discussions in London about certain articles of the treaty.

Mustafa Sabry Effendi, ex Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey, is leaving for a change of climate.

No. 689 of May 24.

Nothing of interest.

APPENDIX.

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
						Packages.	
Prometheus	British	Batavia	Port Said	May 1	May 1	302	..
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 1	" 2	499	810
Zayasi	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 2	" 3	1,042	2
Akbar	British	Suez	Aden	" 3	" 4
Kench	British	Suez	Aden	" 6	" 7	19	959
Pao	British	Singapore	Port Soudan	" 6	" 7	786	100 tons timber
Homayun	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 8	" 10	941	5,436
Sarvisan	British	Batavia	Bombay	" 8	" 9	1,012	..
Borak	British	Aden	Suez	" 9	" 10	206	2835
Palamed	Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 10	" 11	54	..
Assara	Italian	Suez	Masara	" 12	" 12	..	547
Koweit	British	Bombay	Suez	" 13	" 14	839	3,072
Amson	Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 14	" 14	55	..
Boonskerk	Dutch	Zanzibar	Port Said	" 14	" 14	20	..
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	29	555
Sahana	British	Basra	Bombay	" 21	" 23	785	45,385
Agapenor	British	Singapore	Port Said	" 21	" 21	407	50 tons timber
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 21	" 22	113	178
Bejar	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 22	" 23	874	2,831
Assara	Italian	Masara	Suez	" 24	" 24	..	1,166
Borak	British	Suez	Aden	" 25	" 26	126	5,827
Masara	Italian	Suez	Masara	" 26	" 26	..	976

(H.M.S. "Cornflower" left on May 1, 1926.

[E 6332/867/89]

No. 43.

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 31, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that, from conversations I have had with French officers, it would appear that the French are now becoming more alarmed by the Pan-Arabian than the Turkish menace.

There have been recently various signs of recrudescence of Moslem reaction and fanaticism. An anti-alcoholic league, under the cover of a propaganda based nominally on grounds of religion, morality and physical well-being, has, it is said, been subterraneously working against the French. There has been a movement against the wearing of European clothes and in favour of native products. This

movement began to take the aggressive form of throwing of ink and sulphuric acid at persons, mainly women, wearing obviously luxurious European clothes. These demonstrations have, for the moment at any rate, been suppressed by the police. This recrudescence of reaction and fanaticism is attributed by my French acquaintances to Arabian rather than Turkish influences.

The continual reports in the press regarding negotiations between Great Britain and King Hussein and other Arab rulers with a view to the formation of an Arab federation under British auspices has excited natural anxiety among the French and premature hopes among the Arabs of Aleppo. Arabs have frequently asked me whether Syria was to be included in the forthcoming Arab federation.

At the same time, the reports appearing in the press of an Anglo-Turkish rapprochement have led pro-Turkish elements and Arab nationalists to imagine that the French might be turned out of Syria by the Turks acting with British support. These Arab nationalists doubtless think that the essential thing is to get rid of the French somehow or other, and that the Turks can be squared once their assistance has resulted in the liberation of Syria from the French mandate. The Oriental is guided by sentiment more than reason, and the Arab, in his desire to get rid of the French, is too irrational to anticipate clearly the obvious results of Turkish interference here.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a letter addressed to me by a body calling itself the National Revolutionary party. The Arabic of the text is poor and would seem to betray Turkish drafting. The proclamation enclosed in this letter was posted up in various places in the Arab quarters of the town just before General Weygand's arrival at Aleppo and at once torn down by the police. Needless to say, I have taken no notice of this irresponsible communication.

In the Alexandretta and Antioch regions there is undoubtedly a large Turkish minority whose racial sentiments naturally impel them to desire the reabsorption of those parts into the Turkish Empire. But at Aleppo the Turkish element is negligible, and there are not very many Arabs who have any sentimental yearning for reabsorption into Turkey. Pro-Turkish feeling here is either the reflex of anti-French feeling or it is due to economic uneasiness. Aleppo realises that it is doomed to decline if it is to be permanently separated from its Anatolian and Mesopotamian markets. The reconstitution of the old Turkey in Asia, or at least the re-inclusion in Turkey of Syria and Mesopotamia, would restore to Aleppo its old commercial pre-eminence. A comparison between the economic stagnation of to-day and the prosperity prevailing under the Ottoman régime naturally inclines many Moslems and Christians, without any pro-Turkish sentimentality, to toy agreeably with the idea of a refound economic unity under the Turkish ægis.

All this confused ferment is not serious as long as the Anglo-French *Entente* subsists and the Allied occupation of Constantinople and the Straits acts as a restraining influence on Turkey. The fighting value of the Arab is inconsiderable, and he would only rise against the French if he saw that there was little need of heroic sacrifice. Once, however, peace has been signed and Constantinople and the Dardanelles evacuated, an effective restraint on Turkey will have been removed. Unless the French can use the Greeks as a scarecrow to keep the Turks in order it is difficult to believe that the latter will respect their treaty obligations and refrain from creating difficulties for the French in Northern Syria. Moreover, if we were to evacuate Mesopotamia, France here would remain isolated and surrounded by hostile Turkish and Arabian conglomerations. It is not to be wondered that many Frenchmen contemplate the future with misgiving.

In the interest of, at any rate, local Anglo-French negotiations, it would seem desirable to reassure the French that our Arabian policies are not directed against their position in Syria.

I have &c.
W. A. SMART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

"National Revolutionary Party" to Consul Smart.

(Translation.)

WE have the honour to inform you that, according to a letter which we received from Aintab, an agreement has been arrived at between your Government and our Turkish Government, in consequence our Aleppo Nationalist party, which depends directly from the Grand Assembly of Angora, begs to present its respects and thanks

for this friendly union. History will revive the former alliance and mutual insurance of both Governments.

We have to bring to your consideration that our Revolutionary National party has been ordered to explain to the people of Aleppo the mission of General Weygand. We have, then, published incentive proclamations in accordance with the orders received by us from the Turkish Defence party, and we presume that you have heard of these proclamations.

But, to let you have an exact idea of the real situation, we beg to enclose herewith a copy of a proclamation, that you may know that the mission of Great Britain and that of the Turks are the same in presence of the Moslem world which looks with a discerning eye on us.

Our Revolutionary party begs from your Excellency the moral protection of certain persons. If you agree, it will be possible for you to understand our conditions from the delegate whom we will present to you. You will do better to summon him officially so as to avoid suspicion falling on him.

Our party begs to ask your Excellency's support as well as a moral and material help in the event of your Government's consent.

As our object is to remove the French and to start a revolution, we beg to tell you that all the Aleppo inhabitants have united round our party, and our internal movements are based on those of the Turkish army and the Defence party.

Under these circumstances we may communicate with you a second time with a view to discussions, and we will send you the delegate with a special signal of introduction, or we will send you his name and family's name so that you may summon him.

All our party presents its respects to you.

The Head of the National Revolutionary Party in Aleppo. Section 2.
(Four Initials.)

May 27, 1923.

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

Proclamation.

IN THE NAME OF GOD WHO ENJOINS THE PROTECTION OF THE FATHERLAND,
JUSTICE AND INDEPENDENCE!

ARISE FROM YOUR SLEEP, O NOBLE ARAB!

(Translation.)

HOW long this calm when the time for action has arrived? Here is this dog of a Frenchman (Weygand), who arrives with his armies and munitions to represent the second scene of the comedy begun by his colleague (Gouraud). He is determined to oppress you by killing your freedom, your independence and your economic life, and the first thing which he has done is to proclaim martial law, according to their own newspapers.

The Kemalist army, which has undertaken to expel the foreigners from these countries and to deliver them to their own inhabitants that they may enjoy their independence as they like, is now on the point of marching on this country, and we have had correspondence with its leaders who only ask from us the support of an internal revolution, so that the treacherous enemy should remain between two fires: the fire of the "Mojahidin" and that of the national revolution.

To work, O generous of soul! Do not lose this precious occasion accorded by Heaven. Undoubtedly God is with us. Many of the retired officers of the Turkish army have joined the Kemalist army since the beginning of this week, and they have sworn not to re-enter Aleppo but with the holy flag hoisted over their heads. Go to meet them with your goods. Life is cheap in comparison with honour. . . . Enough humiliation, each of you knows that the colonisers have humiliated us and have made us foreigners in our own country. You do not ignore their "tergiversations." Yesterday, they were helping the Turks, but, seeing that the American (Chester) has made agreement with the Turks for the restoration of their country, they (the French) have changed and become hostile to them (the Turks), while the British Government, who was the enemy of the Turks and the friend of the Greeks yesterday, seeing the demands of former were justified, have come to reason, throwing aside every selfish interest, promising not to touch their noble principles and their independence. And Great Britain will accord complete independence to both Irak and Palestine if we will

expel the French, who claim to be protectors of the Moslems as their newspapers pretend.

Consequently, let us rise up as one man to expel the superfluous colonisator.

God has said: "If you help God, God will help you." Get to work and do not lose this very precious occasion. This movement will be general in all Syria. Salam!

The Revolutionary National Party. Section 2.
(No Signature.)

[E 6457/987/65]

No. 44.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquis della Torretta.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, June 28, 1923.

CAREFUL consideration has been given to your memorandum of the 2nd May, in which your Excellency communicated the observations of your Government on the draft memorandum containing certain assurances which His Majesty's Government are prepared to give to the Italian Government in connection with the British mandate for Iraq.

Although the reasons which have led the Italian Government to suggest certain modifications in the terms of article 2 of the draft assurances are fully appreciated, His Majesty's Government feel that no close analogy can be drawn between Iraq on the one hand and Palestine and Syria on the other. Apart from those of the mandatory Power, the interests and nationals of other European Powers in Iraq are relatively few, and if His Majesty's Government, who are chiefly concerned, regard the judicial system established under the mandate as adequate to protect British subjects from injustice, the Italian Government should have no ground for apprehension.

So far as is known, there are no Italian institutions which would benefit from the suggested modification in article 5 of the draft assurances, and His Majesty's Government would find it impossible to justify to the Iraq Government a request for the grant in favour of Italy of a customs exemption which could not be withheld from other Powers.

In the light of these arguments, I feel certain that your Excellency will have little difficulty in convincing the Italian Government that they need have no hesitation in accepting the assurances in the form originally proposed by His Majesty's Government. I must, however, avail myself of this opportunity of expressing to your Excellency the surprise occasioned to His Majesty's Government by the apparent desire of the Italian Government to make the satisfactory settlement of this question a condition precedent to the opening of negotiations with the French Government in regard to the mandate for Syria. Unlike the draft mandate for Iraq, the mandate for Syria, together with that for Palestine, has been considered and approved in principle by the Council of the League of Nations. The council agreed to deal with these two mandates together, and to postpone the question of the mandate for Iraq for later consideration. The draft mandate for Palestine was approved without qualification, but, as it was considered desirable that it should be brought into force simultaneously with the mandate for Syria, it was decided that it should not actually become operative until certain differences between France and Italy relative to the mandate for Syria had been resolved by further discussion between the two Governments concerned. The decision of the Council of the League to the above effect was recorded as long ago as the 24th July, 1922. No suggestion was made at the time that the Italian Government would require to be satisfied in regard to their position in Iraq before proceeding to discuss with the French Government the points still outstanding in respect of the mandate for Syria, and, in the view of His Majesty's Government, it is not reasonable that a condition of this kind should now be introduced, ten months later, without any adequate cause.

I trust that your Excellency will be so good as to bring the above considerations to the notice of your Government, in the hope that an early solution of the various points under discussion may be reached.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.